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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis looks at the causes behind Fiji’s 5 December 2006 coup. It takes a 
twofold approach, first looking at the background causes which illustrate that Fiji 
was vulnerable to a further coup after the 2000 coup. The study then moves on to 
an analysis of the triggering causes. This analyses both the motive; consisting of 
threats to the military’s interests and failures of the government, and the 
opportunity, consisting of a deflation in the government’s legitimacy and military 
cohesion. To test these factors a cross-time comparison of the five instances of 
high tension between the Fijian military and Government is presented in an effort 
to identify how the coup differed from those disputes that preceded it. These 
periods of tension are: the 2004 reappointment of Bainimarama; the Unity Bill 
dispute; the January 2006 coup threat; the 2006 election; and the December 2006 
Coup. From this analysis it was found that threats to the military’s interests were 
key in generating the motive for intervention, but that governmental failures were 
not a significant factor; while they motivated the military to be a vocal actor, they 
did not garner the motive for intervention. The opportunity was only found to occur 
when there was both a deflation in the Government’s legitimacy and strong military 
cohesion. For Fiji’s 2006 coup the motivating factors were the threats to the 
military’s interests, from the scheduled Supreme Court ruling on the role of the 
military, the rivalry with the fully-armed Tactical Response Unit of the Police, and 
crucially the pending criminal charges against Bainimarama. This coincided with 
the opportunity for intervention from a drop in the Government’s legitimacy as a 
result of a crisis in the multi-party Cabinet and the Government’s growing ethnic 
bias, along with strong cohesion in the military. 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ANC - All Nationals Congress Party (1992-1995) 
CAMV - Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua (political party, dominated  
by supporters of 2000 coup, was in coalition with SDL from 
2001 – 2006) 
CRW  - Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit (of the RFMF) 
DPP - Department of Public Prosecutions 
EPG -  Eminent Persons Group (of the Pacific Islands Forum) 
EU - European Union 
FDF - Fiji Defence Force (military during WWI) 
FLP  -  Fiji Labour Party 
FMF - Fiji Military Forces (WWII – Independence 1970) (& 1987 – 
1990) 
GCC - Great Council of Chiefs 
GDP - Gross Domestic Profit 
NFP  -  National Federation Party  
PAC - Public Accounts Committee 
PANU - Party of National Unity (1998 – present) 
RFMF  - Royal Fiji Military Forces (Independence 1970 – 1987 
Coup) / Republic of Fiji Military Forces (1990 – Current) 
SDL  -  Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (political party headed 
by Qarase, in power from 2001 election up till 2006 coup) 
SVT - Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (political party, also 
known as the Fiji Political Party (FPP) in English) 
TRU  -  Tactical Response Unit (of the police) 
VAT - Value Added Tax 
UN - United Nations 
WTO - World Trade Organisation  
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C h a p t e r  O n e  
INTRODUCTION 
 
On 5 December 2006 Fiji faced its fourth coup. In many ways this was an 
unusual coup: by nature coups are generally conceived in secret and surprise the 
unsuspecting Government and its citizens. This coup, however, was well 
forewarned, even if many observers did not believe the threats of the Republic of 
Fiji Military Forces (RFMF). The coup was also unusual for Fiji as it was, for the 
first time, committed against an Indigenous Fijian-dominated Government, which 
the powerful chiefly hierarchy and nationalist elements strongly supported. In fact, 
ethnicity, previously the focus of almost all Fijian political crises, played only a 
background role in this coup. The RFMF, led by Commodore Vorque 
Bainimarama, overthrew the Government for the alleged purpose of ‘cleaning up’ 
the racist policies and corrupt nature of Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase and his 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party. While this appears to be an 
altruistic motive, historically most coups have been justified in a similar way, 
whereas upon closer examination other causes are revealed as more relevant. 
Thus, the central question of this thesis is: what were the causes of Fiji’s 2006 
coup? 
The 2006 coup had its roots in the coup of May 2000. Commodore 
Bainimarama, the Commander of the RFMF, was heavily involved in resolving the 
2000 coup; in particular, he removed the President Ratu Mara Kamisese and 
assumed this role under the Doctrine of Necessity. After several months of 
negotiations, he was then able to bring an end to the crisis through an agreement 
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that gave many concessions to the coup perpetrators and set up Qarase as the 
new interim Prime Minister. Soon after, the agreement broke down and 
Bainimarama had many of those who were involved arrested, often in a brutal 
manner. This resulted in a mutiny by those within the RFMF with connections to 
the coup perpetrators, during which Bainimarama’s life was directly threatened. A 
general election was called in 2001, which was won by Qarase’s new SDL Party, 
largely consisting of the interim regime in coalition with the Conservative Alliance 
Matanitu Vanua (CAMV) Party, which was composed of nationalist supporters of 
the 2000 coup. From this time on, Bainimarama took a very central role in the 
political process in Fiji. Of particular concern to him was the proper prosecution of 
the perpetrators of the 2000 coup. The SDL/CAMV Government often did not 
follow through on this and at times ensured the early release of the most high 
profile convicts.  
These tensions were played out on several occasions in the years between 
the coups. Of particular note are four instances of high tension between the 
Government and the military: Bainimarama’s reappointment in 2004, the Unity Bill 
dispute in 2005, the January 2006 coup threat, and the 2006 election. On each of 
these occasions, the possibility of a coup arose, but nothing eventuated. It 
appeared some sort of balance had been reached where the military would 
publically criticise the Government but not go as far as to intervene. As noted by 
the ex Vice President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi: 
After the 2001 elections to the eve of the coup, the military played a generally useful if 
somewhat vocal part in general debate on issues of national interest and concern. 
There is little doubt this helped to moderate the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua 
(SDL) Government’s inclination to pander to the nationalist and more extremist 
elements in its midst. (Madraiwiwi, 2007). 
However, this situation changed dramatically on 5 December when, after 
weeks of threats, Commodore Bainimarama announced that the military had taken 
control of the country. The conflict started in early October, when the RFMF issued 
a three-week ultimatum to the Government to dispose of the Promotion of 
Reconciliation Tolerance and Unity Bill, the Qoliqoli Bill, and the Indigenous Claims 
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Tribunal Bill, or to resign. The military, and much of the public, viewed these Bills 
as ethnically biased, and felt they would take the Government’s nationalistic stance 
to a new and unacceptable level. Tensions soared in late October, when the police 
held seven tonnes of ammunition at Suva Wharf, afraid that it would be used to 
overthrow the Government. The RFMF then took this ammunition by force. At the 
same time the Government tried unsuccessfully to supplant Bainimarama as the 
Commander of the RFMF. While the military called for the removal of the 
Government over these actions, at this stage they did not intervene, and it 
appeared that the conflict would simply die away in a similar manner to those that 
had preceded it.  
However, two weeks later a second ultimatum was issued, this time with nine 
demands to be met within two weeks or for the Government to resign. The 
demands included the removal of the three Bills but also that Andrew Hughes be 
removed from the post of Police Commissioner, and for the Police to drop the 
investigations that they were conducting into Bainimarama’s comments and 
actions against the Government. Then, in a final attempt at mediation, Qarase and 
Bainimarama met in New Zealand with New Zealand’s Foreign Affairs Minister 
Winston Peters. In this meeting all nine of Bainimarama’s demands were 
discussed, and, as far as was politically possible under the circumstances, Qarase 
conceded to them. By this stage, however, it appears that the coup was inevitable, 
and upon his return to Fiji Bainimarama announced that the Government had until 
noon on Friday, the following day, to meet his demands in full or be removed. The 
next day nothing happened, but after the weekend the military made its move, first 
seizing the Police Tactical Response Unit’s (TRU) headquarters and removing all 
of their munitions. They then cordoned off all Government buildings and 
surrounded prominent ministers’ houses, effectively putting them under house 
arrest. Then, at 6pm on 5 December 2006 Bainimarama announced on national 
television that the military had taken control of the country, and that he had 
assumed the position of President under the Doctrine of Necessity. 
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Literature on the Coup: Existing Explanations 
As of writing, there has been only a small amount of analysis done on the 
causes of the 2006 coup. Furthermore, much of what has been done are editorials 
and opinion papers, and thus there is a scant amount of academic research. From 
the research that has emerged there is little that has looked at the problem with 
any analytical depth, and even less that has couched the issue within the immense 
literature on civil-military relations. It is one of the purposes of this thesis to help to 
fill this gap. 
Among the limited literature on the 2006 Fiji coup, certain patterns have 
emerged in explaining the civil-military problems in the lead-up to the coup, and for 
the coup itself. Most of these prevailing explanations were captured by the Pacific 
Islands Forum Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) Report (2007) on the Coup. They 
found that the underlying causes were: SDL attempts to pardon coup perpetrators 
of 2000; attempts to discipline or remove Commander Bainimarama and review 
the RFMF; introduction of alleged racially divisive legislation; and lastly, issues 
relating to the conduct of the 2006 election and alleged widespread corruption. 
These factors are discussed below. However, the last two factors will be 
considered together as they present a very similar point: that the military overthrew 
the Government because of its malpractices. Also, this list misses the crucial 
aspect of the disagreement over the proper role of the military which has featured 
prominently in some of the best research to date, and thus is included in the 
discussion below.  
SDL attempts to Pardon Coup Perpetrators 
Many commentators (Dakuvula, 2004; Davis, 2006; Durutalo, 2006; Michael 
Field, 2006b; Ramesh, 2006) have expressed the view that the cause of the civil-
military tensions and ultimately the coup was the SDL/CAMV Government’s often 
successful attempts to pardon perpetrators of the 2000 coup. The basic argument 
is that the military believed its role was to uphold the rule of law, and took 
particular interest in the proper prosecution of the 2000 coup perpetrators. This put 
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the military in opposition to the SDL/CAMV Government, which included many 
politicians and officials suspected of involvement in the 2000 coup. The 
Government, therefore, often gave overseas postings to the suspects to avoid 
prosecution. Furthermore, for those who were prosecuted the Government often 
granted compulsory supervision orders, which released them from jail often after 
only a few weeks or months, to serve their sentences extramurally. This often 
caused disagreement between the military and the Government, and it is the 
argument of these authors that such confrontations were the root of all the civil-
military problems. 
Within this literature there are two opinions on the motivation for the military’s 
stance on the proper investigation and prosecution of the 2000 coup perpetrators. 
One perspective is that the military, and specifically Commodore Bainimarama, 
was motivated by the 2 November 2000 Mutiny at Queen Elizabeth Barracks, 
which was backed by many involved in the coup and involved an attempt on the 
Commander’s life. It is then argued that Bainimarama was motivated by revenge, 
to see those who conspired to kill him put behind bars (Michael Field, 2006b). The 
other perspective is that the military was motivated by the need/desire to uphold 
the rule of law. This emerged after the court ruling in 2001 on the 2000 coup, 
which said that the coup was illegal and that the amnesty offered to the 
perpetrators in the agreement that ended the hostage crisis was invalid because of 
their non-compliance with other stipulations. Thus, it is argued that the military was 
simply trying to keep to this ruling and ensure the proper course of justice 
(Ramesh, 2006). However, other commentators take the more reasonable and/or 
realistic stance that it was probably a combination of both factors (Dakuvula, 
2004). 
This explanation is somewhat problematic, as the Government’s attempts to 
avoid prosecution and pardon coup perpetrators had been a consistent theme 
since the 2001 election, and if anything became less of a problem in the lead-up to 
the coup. It is thus difficult to justify the overthrow of the Government by these 
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actions. Surely, this motivated the military to be the vocal actor that it was in the 
inter-coup period, but it does not help explain why it went the extra step to 
overthrow the Government.  
Attempts to Remove or Discipline Bainimarama and review of the RFMF 
It is argued by some (Dakuvula, 2004; Michael Field, 2006a; The Review, 
1/1/2005; Yabaki, 2007) that the civil-military problems and the coup were 
essentially a result of the Government attempting to remove or discipline 
Commodore Bainimarama, and review the RFMF. Over the years since the 2000 
coup there were several attempts by the SDL Government to try to remove 
Bainimarama, particularly in early 2004 when the Government threatened to not 
renew his contract as Commander, and in late 2006 when the Government 
unsuccessfully attempted to replace him with a more placid leader. There were 
also numerous attempts to discipline or charge the Commander with misconduct. 
During the 2005 Unity Bill dispute the Minister of Home Affairs Josefa Vosanibola 
unsuccessfully attempted to discipline the Commander, which further fuelled an 
already tense situation. In late 2005 Bainimarama was personally surcharged for 
overspending the RFMF budget, which was later found by the Appeal Court to be 
uncalled for. Then in late 2006 the police began to investigate Bainimarama’s 
actions, and just before the coup it appeared that charges were imminent. 
Furthermore, a Defence White Paper written in 2004 called for the RFMF to be 
dramatically downsized, cutting its numbers and budget in half. While this never 
really got close to implementation, it was periodically brought up by the 
Government as an option, particularly just after the 2006 election. The military 
would always react angrily against the suggestion, and then the Government 
would not follow it through any further. However, it is presumable that the military 
thought it was part of the long-term plan to cut the size of the RFMF.   
Essentially, these authors argue that the coup occurred because these 
attacks on the military forced it, out of pride or survival, to overthrow the 
Government. In many respects this thesis agrees with this basic argument; 
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however, in this simplistic form this perspective fails to really give any direct 
causation. As briefly shown above the attempts to remove and discipline 
Bainimarama, and the suggestion to cut the size of the military, were not exclusive 
to the immediate build up to the coup. They had been happening sporadically 
since early 2004, and therefore, by themselves, are not adequate indicators as to 
the occurrence of the coup. 
Introduction of Alleged Racially Divisive Legislation, and Government Corruption 
Another common explanation for the coup is that the military was acting in the 
interests of Fiji, to stop the Government from introducing legislation that the military 
argued was racially divisive, and also to put a stop to Government corruption 
(Chandrasekharan, 2006; Morris & Magick, 2007; Shah, 2006; Singh, 2007). The 
racially divisive legislation argument refers to three Bills: the Promotion of 
Tolerance Reconciliation and Unity Bill, the Qoliqoli bill, and the Indigenous Claims 
Tribunal Bill.1 All three of these Bills, it is argued, were biased towards Indigenous 
Fijian interests, neglecting the Indian community, and sometimes even threatening 
the economic growth of Fiji. These authors argue that these Bills were a 
continuation and escalation of the ethnically-based policies that were common in 
Fiji, a trend that they saw as holding Fiji back from growing as one nation. This is 
because politics in Fiji is often divided along Indigenous Fijian and Indian Fijian 
ethnic lines, such that the major political parties support is based upon one ethnic 
group. Therefore, when in power they implement policies and legislation to 
appease their ethnically based constituency, often to the detriment of the other 
major ethnic group.  
Furthermore, there were suspicions of widespread Government corruption, 
and there was even some suggestion that they manipulated the 2006 election. It is 
argued that the military saw this as a negative pattern that needed to be broken for 
 
1 For a more in-depth explanation and discussion of these Bills see chapter 5 for the Unity Bill, and 
Chapter 8 for the Qoliqoli and Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill.  
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the good of the nation. Thus, the military had to intervene to stop this pattern and 
put Fiji in a situation more conducive towards development.  
This argument essentially agrees with the justification given by the military, 
and implies that the RFMF took control for completely altruistic reasons, so as to 
put Fiji on a more stable path. However, conversely, it is also possible that the 
military simply appealed to the common mistrust of political trends and used this 
as a justification for the takeover, when other motivations were more important. It 
is extremely difficult to know accurately which of these two arguments is more 
valid; it is one of the goals of this thesis to try to test to see if this justification holds 
up under in-depth scrutiny. 
RFMF’s Role 
The last theme that has emerged in this early stage of the literature is on the 
proper role of the RFMF. It is argued (Michael Field, 2006; Kabutaulaka, 2006; 
Ratuva, 2006b) that one of the key reasons for the coup was that the role of the 
military was not properly described, and was interpreted differently by both sides. 
The military believed that it had a large mandate that included the protection of the 
well-being of the general populace, whereas the Government believed that the 
military should ascribe to the principle of separation from politics. Thus, when the 
military spoke out against the Government on issues of corruption, the early 
release of prisoners, or racially divisive legislation, these writers argue that the 
military did so because they believed that it was its role. The Government on the 
other hand, who saw the military’s role limited to military affairs, reacted angrily to 
these comments, which is where many of the conflicts were born. This general 
premise does hold some value, and it shall be discussed in greater depth in 
‘Chapter Three: Fiji’s Coup Risk’. However, it is only a background cause; it can 
help explain why there were such poor civil-military relations, but it gives no real 
indication as to why and when the coup occurred.  
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This analytical literature has only just begun, and few have approached it from 
a rigorous political science standpoint. Thus, there has been to date no convincing 
or direct causation given for the coup. Obviously, this is a complex situation and no 
singular answer will suffice, but even when all of these explanations are taken 
together there are still substantial holes in the understanding of why this coup 
occurred. It is the purpose of this thesis to try and fill this gap and provide a 
rigorous understanding of the factors at play and the specific causes of the coup.  
Methodology 
The basic methodology of this research is that of a case study, which as 
noted by Yin should be the method of choice when “a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is 
being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has 
little or no control” (2003: 9). The situation under examination here, Fiji’s 2006 
coup, certainly falls into this category. The central goal, as noted above, is to find 
the causes of the coup, which in effect is the same as asking why and how it 
occurred. Furthermore, Yin goes on to say that a researcher will use a case study 
when it is desirable to cover contextual conditions when they are highly pertinent to 
the study. This research takes this perspective, as the complexities of the 
contextual situation in Fiji were very important to determining the reasons that this 
coup occurred.  
Analysis  
To understand why this coup occurred, the analysis must be broken into two 
parts. First, the background causes will be examined, which will show why Fiji was 
particularly prone to intervention in the period between the 2000 and 2006 coups. 
Second, the triggering causes need to be examined, to gain a more accurate 
picture of the specific causes that set the coup in motion. 
The background causes are analysed using the framework developed by 
Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002), which examines: historical legacies, the 
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political economic and social context, the international context, institutional factors 
and military culture and professionalism. This has been chosen because it covers 
all the major propositions in the literature on civilian control, and thus gives a good 
indication of the background forces at play. From examining these factors, it has 
been determined that Fiji had a particularly high coup risk in the period since the 
2000 coup. This was primarily because of the country’s history of coups, its social 
divisions, the institutional difficulties of civilian control in Fiji, and the 
professionalism and culture of the RFMF, which was inherently political. This 
shows why a coup was always likely in Fiji although it does not show the specific 
causes that set the coup in motion.  
The triggering causes are much more difficult to determine, and identifying 
these is thus the greatest contribution that this thesis has to offer. The reason that 
this is so difficult is that it is almost impossible to determine which events were 
crucially important and which had no impact. To assist in this endeavour, this 
research shall use a cross-time comparison of the four instances of high tension 
between the military and the Government preceding the coup. These will be 
compared to the coup itself, to determine where the former conflicts differed from 
the decisive events surrounding the coup. To do this, a slightly modified version of 
Nordlinger’s (1977) theory on the causes of coups shall be used. This theory 
considers the coup from the perspective of the military and asks two basic 
questions: is the military appropriately motivated to intervene, and is there the 
sufficient opportunity for intervention? For this research, the motive will be 
considered to consist of threats to the military’s interests, and Government failures, 
while the opportunity will consist of a deflation in the Government’s legitimacy, and 
military cohesion. These factors have been chosen because they are common in 
the literature on civil-military relations, particularly when considering triggering 
causes. Table 1 below illustrates the outcome of this analysis.  
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Table 1: Triggering Causes and Outcomes for each of the Five Disputes 
Dispute Re-appointment Unity Bill January 2006 2006 Election 
December 
2006 Coup 
Motive      
Military Interests Yes No Yes No Yes 
Government Failures No Yes No Yes Yes 
Opportunity      
Legitimacy Deflation Yes Yes No No Yes 
Military Cohesion No Yes No No Yes 
Outcome 
Vocal 
opposition, and 
accused of 
planning a coup  
Vocal 
opposition, and 
indirect coup 
threat 
Vocal 
opposition, 
threat of 
intervention, 
and attempted 
mutiny 
Vocal 
opposition of 
the 
Government 
Coup 
This study shows that the military attained the motive for intervention only 
when the military’s interests were threatened. These threats, in the case of the 
coup, came from the pending Police charges against Bainimarama, the Police 
TRU, which increasingly resembled a palace guard, and the impending Supreme 
Court Ruling on the role of the RFMF. While the failures of Government were the 
purported reason given by the military for the intervention, when a comparative 
analysis is done with the other instances this appears to have minimal significance. 
This is because it appears to have little impact upon the military’s motive to 
intervene. The military did not have the motive to intervene in all of the disputes 
that included government failures, while the motive was present in all the disputes 
that involved the military’s interests. Furthermore, the dispute that resulted in the 
coup was driven by the threats to the military’s interests, and each time one came 
up there was a clear escalation in the conflict. 
The opportunity for intervention appears to have only been generated when 
there was both a deflation in the Government’s legitimacy, and strong military 
cohesion. For the coup, the deflation in the Government’s legitimacy was a result 
of the three controversial pieces of legislation that indicated an increase in the 
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Government’s ethnic bias, and the difficulties in governing as a result of a crisis in 
the multi-party Cabinet, which alienated much of the population, and brought their 
ability to govern effectively into question. The cohesion of the military was also 
strong, because of Bainimarama’s continued efforts to remove disloyal officers and 
replace them with those willing to pledge an oath of loyalty to him.  
 Thus, the motive was generated through threats to the military’s interests, and 
the opportunity was a combination of a deflation in legitimacy, and strong cohesion 
in the military forces. When simplified like this, as in Table 2 (below), then the 
picture of why the RFMF overthrew the Government in December 2006, and not in 
any of the other disputes, becomes clear, as the coup was the only time that both 
the motive and the opportunity came together.  
 
Table 2: Motive and Opportunity for Each of the Five Disputes 
Dispute Re- appointment Unity Bill 
January 
2006 
2006 
Election 
December 
2006 Coup 
Motive Yes No Yes No Yes 
Opportunity No Yes No No Yes 
 
Sources 
The information for this research has come from various sources. For the 
background causes, most of the information is simply secondary resources, as this 
section is largely a discussion of pre-established trends. However, for the 
triggering causes the analysis focuses on current events that have not yet been 
studied in any depth by other researchers, and as such it has been necessary to 
rely on primary resources. Thus, the majority of information has come from 
newspaper articles, with further reinforcement and clarity added through interviews 
gained in a research trip to Fiji in late November 2006.  
While newspaper articles are often an inaccurate source of information, they 
were the only available source so soon after the coup. Every attempt has been 
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made to make sure that the information contained is as accurate as possible, by 
using several different sources, primarily Fiji Live, Fiji Times, Fiji Sun and Radio 
New Zealand International. If information between these sources conflicted with 
one another the information has either not been used, or further research was 
done to find the most probable reality. Yet, because of the lack of concrete 
sources and thus the heavy reliance upon newspaper articles, there is a chance 
that some of the information is not entirely accurate. While every attempt was 
made to make sure that this did not occur, the possibility of inaccuracy still exists, 
and later work may show where the sources of information have been misleading. 
Throughout this research, there are detailed references so as any questionable 
information can be easily traced to the original source and from there any required 
amendments may be made.  
As a further source of information, the author took a research trip to Fiji in late 
November 2006. At this stage, the research question focused on the difficulties of 
civil-military relations in Fiji, and not on the causes of the coup as this had not yet 
occurred. Interviews were conducted with a number of key figures Jioji Kotobalavu, 
the CEO of the Prime Minister’s Office when Qarase was in power, was able to 
inform the author of the Government’s position to the military, particularly in the 
dispute leading up to the coup. Asaeli Lave, the chief of staff for the Fiji Times, 
helped clarify some of the inconsistencies in the newspaper articles used for this 
research and gave a good account of the feelings of the general populace about 
the conflict. Michael Green, New Zealand’s High Commissioner to Fiji, gave a 
picture of the official standpoint of one of Fiji’s closest and most important allies 
and trading partners. Dr Steven Ratuva, from the University of the South Pacific, 
who specialises in Fijian civil-military relations, helped to advance knowledge of 
the inerrancies of the situation, particularly the institutional problems. Lastly, 
Professor Ron Duncan, also of the University of South Pacific who specialises in 
the political economy of Fiji, was able to clarify the intensity of the economic 
problems that the country faced, and the potential outcome of the Qoliqoli Bill. In 
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addition, a concerted effort was made during the trip to talk to as many ordinary 
Fijians, both Indigenous and Indian, about the dispute, to gain a greater 
understanding of the perspective of the general populace.  
Definitions  
Before beginning on the rest of this study, it is first necessary to clarify some 
commonly used definitions.  
Coup d’etat 
Usually simplified down to ‘coup’. In the general sense, this refers to the 
sudden overthrow of a government, usually by a small group of people, who 
replace the top power figures. This definition suits the 2000 coup well, but it is not 
sufficient for the 2006 coup. Therefore, for the majority of this research the 
narrower term ‘military coup’ is implied in the word ‘coup’, and thus refers to the 
illegal or forceful removal of government by the military.   
Military intervention 
This term is used interchangeably with coup. It is used so as to give a better 
sense that it is a military action and that they are intervening into the political 
realm.  
Military 
When this research refers to the military it is usually concerned with the 
RFMF. While the military can often be defined in a larger sense to also include the 
police, for this research ‘the military’ will only cover the Fijian Army and Fijian Navy 
that together make up the RFMF. Also, in certain circumstances ‘the military’ will 
refer to the officer corps of the RFMF; these instances should be clear from the 
context. This includes the Commander of the RFMF, Commodore Bainimarama, 
but also specifically the titles of the Deputy Commander, the Chief of Staff, the 
Land Force Commander and the Strategic Commander, all of which were held by 
various persons during the conflict. 
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Civil 
‘Civil’, as in civil institutions, civilian control and civil-military relations in this 
research refers to the official parts of a state that are non-military. This includes the 
government, the judiciary, the police and the civil service. Often in this conflict the 
RFMF opposed the Fijian Government, the civil service, and near the end also the 
police; however, the judiciary was largely free from their attention. Thus the term 
‘civil’ is used sparingly, as it encompasses too many of the civilian institutions, 
some of which were never involved in the conflict, or only at various times.  
Government  
Instead of the term ‘civil’, often the term ‘Government’ will be used. This 
obviously focuses attention onto the particular Government in power, specifically 
the politicians in the ruling party or parties. 
Civil-Military 
‘Civil-military’ refers to the interaction between the civilian institutions and the 
military.  
Legitimacy Deflation 
‘Legitimacy’ refers to the right of the government to govern. This is conferred 
on the Government by the general populace, and in this research legitimacy is said 
to have been gained when the Government adheres to the normative and 
performance goals of the country. Often the term ‘legitimacy deflation’ will be used 
to indicate that there is not necessarily a full loss of legitimacy, but rather a 
deflation, or dip in the legitimacy of the government.2 
 
2 For further discussion on legitimacy see Chapter Two > Triggering Causes > Opportunity.  
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Government Failures 
The word ‘failure’, used in the context of ‘government failures’, refers to the 
breakdown of proper governance through corruption, mismanagement, 
malpractice, or failure to obtain the goals of modernisation.3 
Limitations 
In general this thesis shall limit itself to the period from the 2000 coup to the 
2006 coup. As such, the events occurring since the coup shall only be given 
minimal attention. Specifically, attention shall be placed upon the four instances of 
high tension and the coup itself, and therefore some of the irrelevant events in-
between have not been examined.  
As with any socio-political research methodology, the methodology used for 
this thesis contains some inherent flaws. First, it is possible that there are other 
causes for the coup that the author has overlooked, and these may be later be 
shown to be significant. The literature on civil-military relations is extensive, and it 
is beyond the scope of this research to give a complete review of all the causes 
presented. Thus, for the sake of practicality, focus has been put upon those factors 
which re-occur among the literature, or which appear to have a particular 
importance in the case of Fiji. Other research may find other causes to be of 
greater significance; however, since the coup is very recent, it is difficult at this 
stage to assess the outcome. If the argument of this research is incorrect, and the 
military did intervene to stop the racist practices and corruption of the Government, 
then this will start to become more obvious over time as they attempt to correct 
these wrongs. At this stage, however, it appears that the majority of the pre-coup 
talk about “cleaning up Government” has not been followed though as professed. 
Only time will reveal the true extent of this motivation.  
The factor of government failures has been found to be insignificant, as it 
neither peaks in the lead-up to the 2006 coup, nor is it the only time that 
 
3 For further discussion on Government Failure see Chapter Two > Triggering Causes > Motive 
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government failure and the appropriate opportunity were present. However, it is 
realised that this factor may have an accumulative effect, and that there may be a 
‘critical mass’ of government failure that needs to be reached before the military 
will intervene. If this is the case then this factor may have a much larger 
significance than this thesis argues; however this does not diminish the central 
argument that military interests were of crucial importance to the 2006 intervention. 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into four parts. The first part, Introduction, consists of this 
chapter and Chapter Two: The Causes of Coups Methodology and Literature, 
where the methodology of this research shall be further discussed, and then the 
two theories used will be expanded upon and their place in the literature explained.  
The second part, Background Causes, includes only Chapter Three: Fiji’s 
Coup Risk. This will look at the background causes of the coup, using Cottey, 
Edmund and Forster’s framework, where each of the factors: historical legacies; 
political, economic and social context; international context; institutional factors; 
and military culture and professionalism will be looked at in reference to Fiji. This 
will pay particular focus to the period between 2000 and 2006.  
The third part, Triggering Causes, contains Chapters Four through Eight: 
2004 Reappointment of Bainimarama; The “Promotion of Reconciliation Tolerance 
and Unity Bill 2005” Dispute; January 2006 Coup Threat; 2006 Election; and 
December 2006 Coup. For each of these chapters the theory as modified from 
Nordlinger (1977) is applied, to examine whether there was the appropriate motive 
for intervention, generated from threats to the military’s interests and government 
failures, and if there was the adequate opportunity, acquired from a deflation in the 
Government’s legitimacy and military cohesion. The preferable method of 
achieving this would be to study each situation by only looking at the motive and 
opportunity present, filling this out with any descriptive content necessary for 
understanding, and then concluding on why the outcome occurred. However, after 
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several attempts it was found that this was impossible, as it made an 
understanding of the situation difficult, as these indicators did not occur in a 
chronological sequence. Furthermore, one of the key requirements of a case study 
is to keep context with the analysis, which would not have been possible if the 
more narrow method of only discussing the specific indicators was used. 
Therefore, instead the structure used is to first give a description of the events for 
the incident, and then to discuss what this means, by looking at each of the 
indicators and determining if the events described showed whether  they were 
fulfilled or not. 
The fourth and final part, conclusion, consists solely of Chapter Nine: 
Conclusion. This brings the analysis back together and shows why the coup 
occurred. It goes on to indicate some of the implications of the findings, and 
suggests some further research.  
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C h a p t e r  T w o  
THE CAUSES OF COUPS: METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE  
 
This chapter is dedicated to explaining in detail the methodology used in this 
research, with reference to the literature on civil-military relations. The basic 
methodology of this research is that of a case study, which focuses on the ‘how 
and why’ behind Fiji’s 2006 coup. However, the design departs somewhat from 
that commonly used in case studies where the event in question is described and 
analytical comments on the specific occurrences are given. Rather, a twofold 
approach is used. First, the background forces which made Fiji a particularly coup-
prone state since the 2000 coup will be studied. Second, the triggering causes 
which specifically set the coup in motion are revealed.  
The first component looks at the civil-military problems in Fiji from a somewhat 
abstract point of view, in an effort to determine some of the background forces that 
have made Fiji a particularly coup prone state. In particular, the research will look 
at the specific conditions of the relationship between the Government and the 
military in Fiji to show why a coup was always a possibility after the 2000 coup. To 
achieve this, the theoretical framework developed by Cottey, Edmunds and Forster 
(2002) from their study into civilian control in Eastern Europe will be used. This 
looks at five categories that cover the major recurrent themes in civilian control 
research: historical legacies; the political, economic and social context; 
international context; institutional factors and; military culture and professionalism. 
The particular situation in Fiji will be studied in reference to each of these 
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categories, from which it will be determined that Fiji faced a high coup risk in the 
period studied.  
However, simply determining that Fiji faced a high risk of a coup is not 
adequate in determining how and why the coup occurred. Thus, the second 
component of this research looks at the coup itself, in an effort to determine the 
most pertinent triggering causes, and to give a good understanding and 
description of how the coup occurred. To achieve this, the cross-time comparison 
method will be used. This method closely resembles a comparative case study, 
but instead of focusing on different countries, it examines the same country in 
different time periods (B. G. Peters, 1998: 23). For this research, the instances 
studied will be: the 2004 reappointment of Bainimarama, the Unity Bill dispute, the 
early 2006 dispute, the 2006 election and the December 2006 Coup. Inherently, 
this method most closely resembles the most similar system method, where 
almost all the crucial components are the same, but the outcome is different. In 
this circumstance, all five of these instances were periods of high tension between 
the military and the Government, but only one of them resulted in a coup. Thus, 
the goal of the second component is to determine what was different in each of 
these instances, and therefore reveal the key triggering causes behind the coup. 
To achieve this, four indicators of the motives and the opportunities for intervention 
have been developed based upon Nordlinger’s (1977) theory on the causes of 
coups. The motives consist of threats to the military’s interests and the failure of 
the government. The opportunities are a sufficient deflation of the government’s 
legitimacy and cohesion of the military. Each of the five instances of high civil-
military tension are then tested in Chapter Three  against these indicators to reveal 
how the 2006 coup differed from the other civil-military disputes.  
Background Causes: Civilian Control  
To determine the coup risk of Fiji, the framework proposed by Cottey, 
Edmunds and Forster in their book Democratic Control of the Military in Post 
Communist Europe: Guarding the Guards (2002) shall be used. Their framework 
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was initially developed as a means for assessing the level of civilian control4 
established over the military in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. 
‘Civilian control’ is the measure of the control civilian authorities have over the 
military, and thus the framework also works well in determining coup risk. The 
basic assumption is that a state with poor civilian control is at high coup risk, as the 
state does not enjoy sufficient control over the military. There have been other 
studies in determining coup risk; however, most of these concern themselves with 
large datasets and compile quantitative analyses of only a few major factors (see 
Belkin & Schofer, 2003; Fossum, 1967; O'Kane, 1981). The framework of Cottey, 
Edmunds and Forster has been chosen here because it was developed for 
qualitative research on case studies and thus lends itself well to the investigation 
at hand. Furthermore, it covers all the major positions in the literature on civil-
military relations, and accordingly offers a complete understanding of the important 
factors. Each of Cottey, Edmunds and Forster’s categories shall now be discussed 
in reference to the literature. 
Historical Legacies 
There are two key factors under the historical legacies category: the impact of 
the colonial legacy, and the affect of past coups. A common argument in civil-
military relations research is that the colonial role of the military will impact upon 
the institution under independence (Finer, 1970; Gutteridge, 1964; Thompson, 
1975). Often colonial administrators used militaries as a tool to enforce unpopular 
policies upon unwilling citizens; the military, therefore, became synonymous with 
harshness or violence against its own population, which is a reputation that is hard 
to overcome. In addition,  the past structure of the military, as well as the 
recruitment methods which may have aimed to give military authority to a minority 
group, could cause imbalance in a newly independent state (Gutteridge, 1964:15-
17). Furthermore, in developing states not only is it difficult for the civilian 
 
4 Cottey et. al. refer to this as ‘democratic control’: this is similar to civilian control but it also entails 
the extra, and in this case unnecessary, burden of determining democratic strength. Thus for the 
sake of simplicity it shall be referred to as “civilian control” in this research.  
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authorities to create an apolitical military and gain civilian control, but the military 
itself has a desire to assume a greater role in society. In developing states the 
military has often had an important role in the establishment of the state. 
Therefore, it will feel strongly associated with the further development and 
modernisation of the country, and thus will have a greater inclination towards 
involvement in politics, especially if the civil authorities fail to solve economic or 
social problems (Gutteridge, 1964: 177). 
Other works also look at the affect of history, but rather than the colonial past 
they look at past civil-military relations, particularly a history of coups, as an 
influence of the likelihood of further coups (Belkin & Schofer, 2003; Finer, 1962; 
Londregan & Poole, 1990; Zimmerman, 1983). Several reasons are presented for 
this connection. First, after a coup civilian institutions such as courts and 
legislatures will often be disempowered, and much of their control lost. This 
increases the likelihood of further coups, because the strength of these institutions 
is a key aspect in deterring military intervention. Thus, when the institutions have 
been damaged this barrier is reduced (Finer, 1962). Second, previous coups have 
the effect of lowering the moral barrier to overthrowing a democratically elected 
government. They legitimise the act of gaining power through the means of a 
coup. This has a profound impact on the society at large, who will accept another 
coup more readily, and for the military, who would become aware of its ability to 
overthrow the government (Belkin & Schofer, 2003).  
Domestic Political, Economic and Social Context 
The domestic political, economic and social context gives a good indication of 
the background civilian environment. If signs of weakness are shown here then it 
will make civilian control much more difficult, and open the way for a potential 
coup. The first aspect to be examined is the political context, where the focus is on 
the weakness of civilian political institutions. One of the most influential works in 
this literature came from Huntington in his book Political Order in Changing 
Societies (1968). Huntington argues that military intervention is most likely in what 
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he terms a ‘politicised society’. A ‘politicised society’ is prone to intervention in 
many forms, such as corruption, clericalism or praetorianism. “These causes lie 
not in the nature of the group but in the structure of society. In particular they lie in 
the absence or weakness of effective political institutions in the society” 
(Huntington, 1968: 196). Simply, the strength of political institutions and 
governance can be a determinant of the risk of a coup. In addition, the interrelated 
factors of government failures and a lack of legitimacy could also be considered 
here. However, for this research these factors shall be considered as triggering 
causes and will thus be discussed below.  
Economic context is also a common cause among the literature, particularly in 
relation to economic decline (Fossum, 1967; O'Kane, 1981). These authors take 
the assumption that maintaining a strong economy is the primary responsibility of 
government, and thus during periods of economic decline the government is open 
to accusations of poor governance or corruption, whether or not it is the truth. 
Since such accusations are often either a motivation for intervention or used later 
as justification, they open the way for a military overthrow (O'Kane, 1981).  
Social context is also an important contributor to coup risk. It is commonly 
argued that divided societies are far more prone to conflict (Horowitz, 1985). A 
coup is just another way that this conflict is played out. Often a coup will be 
motivated in some respect by upholding ethnic supremacy or sometimes for a 
minority to gain control. This is a defining factor for Fiji, as the country is strongly 
divided, and every coup has had some ethnic rhetoric.  
International Context 
There are two factors to consider from the international context: the existence 
of an external threat, and contagion. The significance of an external threat was first 
presented by Lasswell in his essay ‘The Garrison State’ (1941), where it was 
argued that militaries that face high external threats are more prone towards 
domestic intervention. This is because there is a need for the military to gain a 
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stronger hold in domestic affairs in times of crisis, combined with the increased 
militarization of the battle-hardened soldiers. This was written during the Second 
World War, as an observation of the increased role the militaries around the world 
were gaining during this time. However, as is noted by Desh (1999), subsequent 
events have proven this wrong. The best examples of this can be seen through 
Russia and America. During the Cold War when the external threat was high, 
control of the military was fairly easy, as it knew its role. Naturally, there were 
incidents of disagreement between the civilian authorities and the military but 
these were rather minor. However in the years directly following the end of the 
Cold War, the external threat was somewhat negated, both countries have since 
faced much greater problems of civilian control over the military. Thus, Desh 
essentially theorises that ‘idle hands do the devil’s work’, where a military without 
an external threat to focus on will more likely focus its attention inwards on the 
civilian government (Desh, 1999).  
Contagion from other conflicts is another common cause of coups in the 
literature (Li & Thompson, 1975; Pitcher, Hamblin, & Miller, 1978). The basic 
argument is that violence can often be experienced vicariously through 
geographically or socially close states. The crucial point is that for this to work the 
conflict has to be in a similar state, and the conflict similar in nature. Thus, much 
like the above factor of past coups, the state becomes more prone to intervention 
by way of public acceptance and military realisation of the possibility of overthrow. 
As such, while this is a factor that should not be ignored, neither should it have too 
much emphasis placed upon it, because it is impossible to know accurately how 
much, or how little influence other conflicts have.  
Institutional Factors 
The institutional arrangement for the interaction between the military and 
civilian institutions is a central factor in civil-military relations literature. Traditionally 
it has been argued that the best form of institutional arrangement is separation, 
where the military is separated from politics. In countries where the military is 
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involved in politics there is a high risk of a coup (Born, Caparini, & Haltiner, 2002; 
Huntington, 1957; Kohn, 1997). However, recently there has been a growing 
amount of research which argues a different perspective, that the military does not 
necessarily have to be separated from politics, but only that the institutional 
arrangement, and role of the military must be agreed upon (Bland, 1999; Fitch, 
1998; Lopez, 2001; Schiff, 1995). This comes from an understanding that most 
militaries are involved in politics in some way or another, which renders the 
separation argument obsolete. Militaries will commonly be involved in politics to 
secure their budget, and often have some influence over foreign policy, particularly 
when it involves sending troops to foreign locations. Additionally, in some 
developing countries the military may have an even larger role in ensuring the 
proper development of the state. One commentator has even gone as far to say 
that “armed services are involved in policy is not, a priori, a value of judgement but, 
a posterior, statement of fact (Edmonds, 1988: 94). In other words, the military is 
involved in politics whether this is liked or not. Hence, this school of thought tries to 
divert away from the normative prescription that the military should stay out of 
politics, and rather looks at the problem from a more pragmatic point of view. 
One of the first and most interesting pieces of work in this area is Rebecca 
Schiff’s “Concordance Theory” (1995). In this essay Schiff proposes a new 
analytical perspective, which she coins ‘concordance theory’ in which the “three 
partners – the military, the political elites, and the citizenry – should aim for a 
cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation but does not 
require it” (Schiff, 1995: 7). So rather than simply adhering to the separation 
ideology, cooperation and agreement are the key aspects. A military may be 
involved in politics but its role must be agreed on by the government and the 
populace. Douglas Bland (1999) follows a similar line of reasoning, and presents a 
‘theory of shared responsibility’, where the responsibility of control is shared 
between the military and the civilian institutions along predetermined lines, which 
have evolved over time. Therefore, when there is agreement between the parties 
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there is a low risk of a coup, whereas in a society where there is much 
disagreement military intervention is highly likely.  
This factor shows that a military must either adhere to the separation ideology, 
or, if they are intrinsically involved in politics, the military and civilian institutions 
must be in agreement over the institutional arrangement between the two, and the 
role of the military. Where neither of these criteria are fulfilled, there will be poor 
civilian control as a result of disagreement and bickering between the military and 
civilian institutions, which will result in an increased coup risk.  
Military Culture and Professionalism 
This category considers those factors that relate to the military. The strongest 
of these are the closely related factors of military culture and professionalism, but 
the relative strength of the military, and the makeup of the officer corps are also 
important factors. Military culture was first considered in Janowitz’ seminal work 
The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (1960). Janowitz studied 
the impact of historical forces and theatres of influence on a military, which he 
claimed would result in either an absolutist or pragmatist approach to military 
doctrine. The basic difference between the two doctrines is the focus on total 
versus limited warfare (Janowitz, 1960: 300). The absolutist approach views 
warfare or the potential for warfare as the basis of international relations, with ‘total 
victory’ the goal of all wars. The pragmatic approach views warfare as only one 
aspect of international relations that must work in tandem with the economic and 
ideological aspects, thus limited warfare is emphasised (Janowitz, 1960: 303 - 
311). The absolutist approach adheres most closely to the general civil-military 
relations rule that the military should abstain from entering politics, as they are only 
interested in military affairs. However, militaries that ascribe to the pragmatist 
approach often attempt to become involved in international and domestic politics, 
as they see this as necessary to secure the safety of the nation, which can often 
result in intervention (Janowitz, 1960: 372-374). While this theory is old, the 
fundamental principle behind it still holds valid: that the driving ideology behind the 
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military and its view of the duty to uphold the security of the nation will influence its 
propensity towards domestic intervention. 
Military professionalism is a concept that originated from one of the first, and 
perhaps most famous work in all of civil-military relations literature, Huntington’s 
Soldier and the State (1957). Here military professionalism is described as a 
special type of vocation, such as a doctor or a lawyer, which entails some degree 
of expertise, but also has a special social responsibility attached. Huntington 
asserts that in modern developed states the military shows these characteristics. 
Thus, when discussing the central question of civilian control, Huntington’s 
preferred method is to maximise military professionalism. This, he argues, makes 
the military a politically neutral and sterile tool of the state (Huntington, 1957). In its 
most basic form, when this theory is applied to the problem of coups, states with a 
non-professional military are far more likely to have coups than those with a 
professional military. Many scholars still hold to Huntington’s view that 
professionalism is the best way to inhibit military intervention (see Born, Caparini, 
& Haltiner, 2002; Kohn, 1997; Schwam-Baird, 2000). Huntington himself has more 
recently reinforced this point in relation to the new ‘third wave’ democracies, which 
he, in general, commends for their high level of military professionalism and 
comparatively stable civil-military relations (Huntington, 1995). Thus, the degree to 
which a military perceives itself to be a professional institution should have an 
impact on coup risk.  
However, at the same time there is some research that takes a different view 
of professionalism. In particular, Finer (1962) notes that “the military’s 
consciousness of themselves as a profession may lead them to see themselves as 
the servants of the state rather than of the government in power” (22). Thus 
professionalism may make the military view itself as a servant of the abstract 
concept of a continuing community or state, rather than a servant of the temporary 
holder of power. Finer follows on to say:  
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“[t]he moment the military draw this distinction between nation and the government in 
power, they begin to invest their own private notion of the national interest, and from 
this it is only a skip to the constrained substitution of this view for that of the civilian 
government” (Finer, 1962:23). 
If the military holds to some abstract concept of the ‘state’ that it tries to defend 
then the military will establish its own view on what is best for the ‘state’, which will 
often conflict with that of the civilian institutions. This will then lead to confrontation 
between the two groups, poor civilian control and an increased coup risk.  
The relative strength of the military is another recurring factor in the literature. 
This was most famously studied by Janowitz (1964). He describes the wider 
involvement of the military in domestic, economic, social and political affairs: “it is 
the result of the sheer quantity of resources that the military establishment, in 
comparison with other bureaucratic institutions and professional groups, has been 
able to accumulate” (Janowitz, 1964: 4-5). Thus, he theorises that it is easy for the 
military to gain control in developing states simply because of its comparative 
institutional strength. (Janowitz, 1964). The composition and makeup of the officer 
corps, which was first analysed by Huntington (1957), is also a common factor in 
the literature. This includes analysis of the social and ethnic makeup of the military, 
to evaluate its internal mechanics, which may predispose it towards intervention.  
Assessing Coup Risk 
The aforementioned factors shall be discussed in the following chapter. Each 
factor will be qualitatively analysed in relation to Fiji, particularly for the 2000-2006 
inter-coup period. From this it will be demonstrated that Fiji had poor civilian 
control, and was thus at a high coup risk. Moreover, the analysis shall provide a 
thorough background of information to better understand the situation in Fiji during 
the inter-coup period, and provide the foundation for the later analysis on the 
triggering causes.  
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Triggering Causes 
The above factors will determine the coup risk that Fiji faced in the period 
between the 2000 coup and the 2006 coup. However, determining risk represents 
only half the issue; there must be some attention paid to the specific triggering 
causes that set the coup in motion. To address this, the classic “motive” and 
“opportunity” categories will be used, largely based on the theory set out by 
Nordlinger (1977), with some modifications to better suit this case study. This will 
then be applied to the four previous incidences of high tension between the military 
and the Government in Fiji: the 2004 reappointment of Bainimarama, the 2005 
Unity Bill, the January 2006 coup threat and the 2006 election. These will then be 
compared to and contrasted with the December 2006 coup. From this analysis 
there will rise some clear points of difference between the situations that did not 
lead to a coup, and the coup itself.  
Nordlinger argues that the military, much like every other public institution, is 
concerned with enhancing or protecting its corporate interests. Moreover, because 
of its incredible power derived from its hierarchical structure and monopoly of 
arms, it has become particularly adept at this, especially through the coup d’état. 
This enhancement or protection of corporate interests, Nordlinger argues, is the 
primary reason for a military intervention. While coups are usually justified as being 
necessary for the public good because of incompetent or corrupt governments, 
Nordlinger states that this is normally not the real reason for an overthrow. 
However, because of the military’s close affinity to the nation they can often justify 
to themselves that their actions are necessary, as they believe that what is good 
for the military is good for the nation. The general populace often holds a similar 
view: the nation identifies itself with the military, through ideas of national honour, 
sovereignty, and power. This parallel thinking further justifies and reinforces the 
logic of the military (Nordlinger, 1977). As will become clear throughout this thesis 
Fiji is certainly one of these societies, where there is much association between 
the military and society, and thus this theory prevails.  
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While Nordlinger largely discounts the motivating influence of performance 
failures of governments, he understood that they often precede coups, and thus 
must hold some explanatory value. Nordlinger asserts that one of the key reasons 
performance failures are connected to military intervention is that incompetent or 
corrupt governments will help galvanise the military’s resolve to intervene, but only 
when the motivating factor of protecting military corporate interests is present. 
More importantly, when there are severe government failures it will result in the 
loss of legitimacy of the government, which opens up the opportunity for 
intervention (Nordlinger, 1977: 85-86). There are three reasons for this. Firstly, 
overthrowing a legitimate civilian government is viewed as usurpation, which will 
raise a moral barrier for the military. Secondly, it will often result in public 
resistance that the military will have to subdue, and fighting untrained unarmed 
fellow citizens goes against the general ideology of the military. Thirdly, fracturing 
within the officer corps becomes likely, as there will be some officers who adhere 
to the principle of civilian supremacy, and will therefore oppose any coup attempt 
against a legitimate government. This, Nordlinger argues, means that any attempt 
to overthrow a legitimate government is likely to fail, which will stop military action 
before it even starts (Nordlinger, 1977: 93-95). As such, for a coup to occur there 
must be both the motivating influence of protecting the military’s corporate 
interests, and the necessary legitimacy deflation to open the window of 
opportunity.  
When applying this theory to the current research the motives will consist of 
threats to the military’s interests and failures of the civilian government. The 
military interest’s factor is based on Nordlinger’s analysis of threats to the military’s 
corporate interests, with the inclusion of personal interests of high-ranking officers, 
as this has been important in the case of Fiji. Failure of the civilian government has 
also been included as a motivating factor, and while Nordlinger rightly asserts that 
it is rare for a military to be motivated by this, it is not unheard of. Thus, it is 
prudent to include this as part of the motive to be tested in a singular case study. 
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As such, this will be tested to see if it holds any value, or is simply a galvanising 
factor, as Nordlinger argues.  
The opportunity to intervene can look very similar to the above explanation on 
coup risk. However, ‘coup risk’ refers to the underlying structural problems that a 
society faces, whereas the opportunity to intervene is focused on the specific 
events that allow for an intervention. Nordlinger argues that the only necessary 
opportunity is a legitimacy deflation to the point where the entirety of the military 
officer corps and the general populace will readily accept a military intervention. 
However, on top of this it is necessary for the military to be cohesive, as fracturing 
within the military will either inhibit intervention, or greatly lower its chances of 
success. This factor has been of particular importance for Fiji in the period studied, 
as there were often problems with cohesion, which appears to be a significant 
factor.  
The underlying assumption is that there should be a convergence of strong 
motive and strong opportunity in the lead up to the 2006 coup, far more so than 
any of the other disputes between the RFMF and the Fiji Government. Below, a 
summary of the literature surrounding each of the factors, followed by a description 
of the indicators used to identify them, is given. 
Motive 
The first factor to be considered as a motivating force will be threats to the 
military’s interests. While Nordlinger’s analysis has been primarily used for this 
research, a focus on the corporate and personal interests of the military is not 
uncommon among the literature (Adekson, 1981; Carlton, 1997; Decalo, 1976; 
Horowitz, 1980; Needler, 1975; Thompson, 1973). The general argument is similar 
to that of Nordlinger, that while a military will often cite reasons of governmental 
failure, often there are far more complex motivations at play. These can either be 
to protect military corporate interests (Thompson, 1973), to advance the military as 
an institution (Decalo, 1976), or simply to advance the career of the commander of 
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the military (Adekson, 1981). Nordlinger’s focus on protecting corporate interests 
holds the greatest value in the case of Fiji, as there were no instances of the 
RFMF trying to gain extra privileges, or of any senior officer trying to advance into 
a political career. To elaborate on the idea of military interests the indicators set 
out by Nordlinger will be discussed below, namely: budgetary support, military 
autonomy, the absence of functional rivals and the survival of the military, as well 
as the extra criteria of personal interests.  
The first corporate interest identified by Nordlinger is budgetary support. 
Preceding many coups there is a drop in military expenditure, usually as a result of 
lessening importance of the military in comparison with other social or modernising 
institutions. This motivates the military into action, and it is a common theme in 
such situations for the military budget to sharply increase after the coup 
(Nordlinger, 1977: 66-67).  
The second interest, military autonomy, is often the most important, and will 
almost certainly generate a strong interventionist motive. This refers to the 
exclusion of civilian involvement in the educational and training curriculum, the 
assignment of officers, the promotion of all but the most senior officers, the 
formation of defence strategies, and any attempt to penetrate the military with 
political ideas or personnel (Nordlinger, 1977: 71).  
Civilian interference has a multiple and decided impact on the officers. Such actions 
generally lower the professional competence and self-image of the officer corps by 
substituting political for achievement criteria, call into doubt the soldiers’ identities as 
independent and respected officers, factionalize an otherwise cohesive officer corps, 
warp the hierarchical structure and weaken the officers’ power to defend their other 
corporate interests. Considering the several important ways in which civilian 
interference adversely affects the military, we can begin to appreciate why it almost 
always inspires interventionist motives (Nordlinger, 1977: 71). 
This has taken on a particular significance in Fiji. If military autonomy is 
summarised as non-interference by the government in the affairs and role of the 
military, then retaining the perceived expanded political role of the RFMF5 must 
 
5 For a discussion on the perceived expanded role of the RFMF see Chapter Three in the section 
on Military Culture and Professionalism.   
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come into consideration. Essentially, the military in Fiji believes that it has a 
political role, and that this is part of the function of the military. Thus if the 
government attempts to remove this role then they are encroaching into the affairs 
of the military, and this will help garner motivation towards intervention. So, both 
the interference of civilian authorities into the internal affairs of the military, and any 
attempts to forcibly change the perceived role of the military must be considered.  
The absence of functional rivals is the next interest the military will defend. 
The emergence of a militia, with the purpose of national security, is often viewed 
as an insult to the worth of the military. This can also result in a dilution of the 
power of the military, through a potentially reduced budget, and the loss of the 
monopoly of the use of arms (Nordlinger, 1977: 75). While this can cause 
interventionist motives, what is even more dangerous is the formation of a palace 
guard, which is set up to try to stop military intervention. This will often only harden 
the military’s resolve.  
The survival of the military can often be the follow-on from the creation of a 
separate militia with the purpose of national security, which shows that the military 
is replaceable. This then generates the strongest of corporate interests, and with 
the survival of the military threatened an intervention almost becomes a certainty.  
The last military interest to be considered is the personal interest of high-
ranking officers. Nordlinger discounts the importance of the personal interests of 
officers. This makes sense when constructing a grand theory, as personal 
interests should fade into obscurity over a large number of cases. However, when 
considering a singular case study it should be included to give a greater 
understanding of the situation and pressures at play (Adekson, 1981). As noted by 
Decalo, it is impossible to accurately explain the incidence of coups “if one of the 
key variables – the idiosyncratic element, or personal ambitions of military officers 
– is not taken into account” (1976: 22). For this research this indicator does not 
relate so much to the political ambitions of the officers, but more to retaining the 
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status quo, and in particular an effort to keep their position and stay out of prison. 
This is particularly important for Fiji, as Commander Bainimarama had become a 
central figure in the RFMF, and so his personal interests had a large part to play in 
the motive for intervention. This is not to say that Bainimarama necessarily had 
any personal political ambitions, but because of this central role in the RFMF it was 
often difficult to distinguish between his interests and those of the military. Thus, 
this research must consider any personal interests in an assessment of 
motivations. 
There is no set extent to which these criteria must be fulfilled, rather through 
careful qualitative analysis and solid argumentation it will be determined when 
there have been sufficient threats to the military’s interests to generate the 
motivation for intervention. The comparative nature of this analysis should 
increase the clarity here, as it should be easy to compare each of the disputes and 
the coup itself to find the instances where military interests were the most 
threatened. 
The other factor this research will consider as a motivating force is the failure 
of the civilian authorities, which is a common explanatory factor within the literature 
(Germani & Silvert, 1961; Huntington, 1968; Kennedy, 1974; McWilliams, 1967; 
Perlmutter, 1969; Welch, 1976; Welch & Smith, 1974). ‘Failure’ here refers to the 
breakdown of proper governance through corruption, mismanagement, 
malpractice, or failure to obtain the goals of modernisation. Armos Perlmutter in 
“The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army” (1969) summarises this view well.  
The army’s presence in civilian affairs indicates the existence of corruption that is not 
expected to disappear in the near future; that material improvements and ideological 
perspectives do not match; that traditional institutions are unable to bring about 
material improvement; and that modernized elites are incapable of establishing 
political institutions and structures which will sustain the momentum of social 
mobilization and modernization. (Perlmutter, 1969: 384).  
Therefore, when civilian governments fail, then the military, which will often be 
intrinsically tied to the development of the state and its politics, will become 
motivated to intervene.   It has been theorised that in situations where the civilian 
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institutions could not fulfil their duties to the population the military would be forced 
to intervene for the good of the nation.  
Accordingly, instances of government failure such as corruption, illegal 
activities, discrimination, economic downturn and simply failure to govern 
effectively shall be discussed to see if they motivated the military in this instance. 
To determine this, a government failure must not only be identified, but the military 
must also object to the failure. This should not be too difficult to demonstrate for 
Fiji, as the Commander, throughout the period in question, was outspoken on 
government actions and policies that he saw as failures. To show if these were 
significant in motivating the military, a qualitative comparative analysis will be 
done. The assumption is that if this is a significant factor, then it should peak at the 
2006 coup, or at least be the only time that government failures occur together 
with the appropriate opportunity for intervention.  
From assessing both military interests and government failures the key 
motivating factors should be determined. These will be the factors that peaked in 
the lead up to the coup, or the first time that they were paired up with the 
appropriate opportunity was the 2006 intervention. One of the propositions to be 
tested in this research is whether the motives for intervention came most strongly 
from the military’s interests, or if it was for the more altruistic and stated reason of 
governmental failures. This analysis will uncover the truth of this argument, or at 
least reveal some interesting points of discussion.     
Opportunity 
The opportunity for intervention consists of a decrease in the legitimacy of the 
government combined with military cohesion. A decrease in legitimacy is a 
common factor among the literature on coups. Finer (1962) was among the first to 
propose this, through what he termed the ‘level of political culture’. This theory 
ranks states on their attachment to civilian institutions and claims that those states 
with a low level of political culture are far more likely to suffer from coups. From 
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here this evolved to take a central role among the early literature (Kennedy, 1974; 
Welch & Smith, 1974). It is argued that a government that has lost the support of 
the population is more prone to intervention, as its power is not consolidated. 
Alfred Stepan presented an interesting take on the legitimacy crisis thesis in his 
book The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (1971). He theorised, in 
relation to Brazilian civil-military relations, that the likelihood of the military to 
initiate coups, as well as the success of these coups, was linked to the civilian 
population’s attitudes about the appropriateness of such actions at the time. In 
other words, if military intervention is socially acceptable then it is more likely to 
occur and more likely to succeed. This is most likely to be the case in a state 
where the civilian authorities have a low level of legitimacy. 
At this stage it is necessary to give a more accurate definition of legitimacy, as 
it is one of the terms in the social sciences that is both commonly used and highly 
ambiguous. Most definitions stem from Max Weber who theorised that power is 
legitimate when the people who are subject to it believe it to be legitimate (Weber, 
1968). Thus the focus has been on the populace’s belief in the legitimacy of 
government, or the right to govern. This has been further extended by various 
theorists to a requirement of a majority belief in the legitimacy of government, 
which is best tested through democratic elections (for example see Friedrich, 
1963). 
However, this formulation has some flaws. Firstly, as pointed out by Beetham 
(1991), this is an inadequate definition because it puts too much focus upon 
‘beliefs’. The definition separates out the belief in legitimacy from the reason that 
people hold this belief. Furthermore, the Weberian definition tends to speak in 
absolutes: a government is either legitimate or illegitimate based upon the majority 
belief of the populace. Yet it is far more logical to look at the degree of legitimacy 
that a government holds, as there will always be differing opinion among different 
groups within a state on the legitimacy of government (Stillman, 1974). This is 
particularly the case in Fiji, as it is such a highly divided society. This brings into 
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question the requirement of majority consent. Is a government legitimate, if it 
upholds the beliefs and values of 50% plus 1 of the population, while it oppresses 
the rest? Are the views of the minority insignificant enough to simply not come into 
consideration? Instead, for the purposes of this thesis, rather than only considering 
the simple criteria of a majority believing in the legitimacy of the government, the 
government will be considered to be having legitimacy problems if a significant 
proportion of the population believe the government to not be legitimate.  
The literature on legitimacy has evolved from the initial theory, and most of the 
more interesting and significant work considers legitimacy to be measured by the 
extent to which the government adheres to the norms and values of the general 
population (Alagappa, 1995a; Beetham, 1991). This refers to an ideology that 
specifies how things ought to be, thus determining the political system and the role 
of the government. While such ‘norms and values’ are present and easily 
identifiable in developed states, many developing countries have not yet matured 
to the extent that there are universal norms and values. This is the case in Fiji, as it 
is such a diverse and fractured society. Many crucial aspects of the state’s norms 
and values are contested, such as the political system, and particularly the rights 
and treatment of the various social and ethnic groups. As such, this is not a good 
measure of legitimacy. Thus Alagappa has identified that legitimacy, in such 
states, is rather conferred from normative and performance elements (Alagappa, 
1995b). As such, when the government does not perform in advancing the country, 
or in some way damages the country either economically or socially, then it is likely 
to suffer from a deflation in legitimacy. This is very similar to the above discussion 
on government failures, except here instead of focusing on how these failures 
motivated the military to intervene, the focus is upon how these failures lower the 
public acceptance and belief in the legitimacy of government.  
To get testable indicators, once again Nordlinger’s analysis will be used, as 
this will ensure consistency and it covers most of the suggestions within the 
literature. Nordlinger argues that such de-legitimatising failures can come from 
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illegal behaviour, economic downturn, and the inability to handle discontent or 
opposition to the point of erupting disorder and violence (Nordlinger, 1977: 85). To 
this, the extra criteria of political crisis shall be added. Illegal behaviour is the most 
common form of governmental failure; it refers to breaking the law, creating new 
unconstitutional laws, the arbitrary application of laws, flouting the Constitution, 
and widespread corruption (Nordlinger, 1977: 86). Economic downturn, as 
explained above with reference to background causes, can result in a lowered 
confidence in the ability of the government by the public, which will contribute to a 
lowered legitimacy (Nordlinger, 1977: 88). As opposed to the background cause, 
where the focus will be on the overall trends of the economy, here the focus will be 
on more specific economic crisis and the affect that this has upon public 
perception of the government. If a country faces political problems that erupt into 
disorder and violence, then the legitimacy of the government comes under 
extreme criticism. “They are unable to fulfil their most basic responsibility: the 
preservation of public order, protecting life and property” (Nordlinger, 1977: 90). 
Political crisis is another government failure that can lead to a legitimacy deflation. 
Nordlinger overlooked the significance of this, probably because he believed that 
one of the several other factors would address it. However, in Fiji there have been 
several instances of political crisis that do not fit well within the other categories, as 
they do not constitute illegal behaviour, economic downturn, or disorder and 
violence. The literature argues (Finer, 1962; Hibbs, 1973) that political crises will 
open the door, making intervention much easier as there will only be fractured 
political resistance, and a growing disassociation from the public, suggesting a 
legitimacy deflation.  
However, many of these failures are subjective; what may constitute an ‘illegal 
act’ for one person may not for others. As mentioned above, there will be no 
requirement for majority discontentment, rather, just a significant proportion of the 
population. This may seem a bit vague, but in such a diverse society as Fiji, it is 
not wise to discount minorities’ perspectives. So the question becomes: is the 
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failure of government severe enough and felt by a significant enough proportion of 
the population to say that a legitimacy deflation has occurred? This is difficult to 
measure, but instances of public outbursts against the legality of the regime or 
questions about their right to govern will give a strong indication that there were 
legitimacy problems.   
The other factor to be considered as part of the opportunity for intervention is 
the cohesion of the military, particularly the officer corps. Several theorists see this 
as a crucial prerequisite to a successful military coup (Barracca, 2007; Fossum, 
1967; Mendeloff, 1994; Thompson, 1976). While coups do occur when there is low 
cohesiveness, these coups are much more likely to fail (Thompson, 1976). This is 
because other factions of the military may act to impede the coup, or the fractured 
group may simply not have the necessary organisational strength to perform a 
coup. If the military is viewed as a rational actor, then the likelihood for failure will 
impede intervention. Similarly, an un-cohesive military will have little confidence in 
their own capabilities, and thus potentially even exaggerate their lack of ability to 
overthrow the government (Mendeloff, 1994). Low cohesion will then impede 
intervention because of the low chances of success, and because of the lack of 
self-belief that the military is capable of overthrowing government.  
In the first 1987 coup and the 2000 coup the RFMF was largely un-cohesive. 
In 1987 Rabuka was the third in command of the RFMF, and it was only a small 
faction of the military behind him. This coup was largely successful, but it had 
strong backing by various groups throughout Fiji, specifically the nationalists. 
Furthermore, there was no resistance from other parts of the military, which simply 
stepped aside, and soon after the coup Rabuka appointed himself as Commander. 
In this way the nationalists boosted the RFMF’s organisational strength, and there 
was little in the way of resistance. Still, after this coup Rabuka had a difficult job 
securing his goals, which is often the result of a coup performed with low 
organisational strength (Thompson, 1976). Because of this he had to perform 
another coup, which he did from a much stronger position, allowing him to dictate 
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terms. The 2000 intervention was a civilian coup, although it had some military 
elements particularly from the Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit (CRW). Again, 
nationalists boosted the organisational strength, which was an important aspect 
allowing the coup to be performed. The fracturing within the military made the 
situation much more complex, and they did have resistance from the rest of the 
organisation, led by Bainimarama. In the end this coup was a failure, and a 
significant factor in this was the resistance from the rest of the military who were 
not part of the intervention.  
When considering the 2006 coup, the situation is different. This time there 
was no large external support from nationalist groups. This was because the 
nationalists supported the government in power, and the views espoused by 
Bainimarama often conflicted with the nationalists’ ideologies. While some 
suggested there were actors behind the scenes, such as political figures trying to 
gain positions of power, it does not appear that this group significantly bolstered 
the organisational strength of Bainimarama’s coup plot. Thus, in this coup there 
was a much larger requirement for a cohesive military, as there was no strong 
external group manufacturing a strong organisational strength, and fracturing 
within the military had proven to be an impediment in 2000. So for this coup, the 
requirement for a cohesive military is seen as essential for an appropriate 
opportunity. This will be measured by any vocal dissenters within the military, a 
spate of unexpected dismissals, or a mutiny.   
When assessing the opportunity for intervention it is necessary for there to be 
both a legitimacy deflation and cohesion within the military, particularly the officer 
corps, as a lack of either one of these has the ability to impede an intervention. 
The more difficult question is to what extent each of these criteria must be fulfilled. 
As argued above, the history of coups and strong military cohesion reduces the 
requirement for a legitimacy deflation, but it does not replace it. Thus there must 
be some legitimacy problems, but the amount is uncertain, and can only be 
answered through careful analysis, and comparison to the other disputes. The 
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military must be cohesive, but how much so? Does there only need to be a tight 
group within the officer corps, or does the whole military need to be on side? Again 
this will only be answered through proper analysis, and will be indicated by any 
internal problems, the absence of which will suggest cohesion.  
Conclusion 
Together the background causes and triggering causes will determine the 
reasons Fiji had its fourth coup on 5 December 2006. Both the background and 
triggering causes are necessary in explaining why there was a coup, but 
individually and on their own they are not sufficient. Thus they are mutually 
dependent in gaining a full understanding. The theoretical framework used to 
determine coup risk covers most of the major propositions in the literature on 
coups in developing countries; therefore, it gives a good understanding of the 
forces at play that resulted in the military intervention. However, most of these 
forces had been an issue for some time before the coup. Therefore, they do not 
give any specific reasoning for when the coup occurred, and they do not explain 
the specific events that set the coup in motion. Thus, there is a need to analyse 
the triggering causes as well, which are far more difficult to determine in this case. 
To do this, the common motive and opportunity categories will be used, largely 
based upon Nordlinger’s theory on third world coups. For the motive both the 
military’s interests and the failure of government will be analysed. The opportunity 
will be based upon a legitimacy deflation of government and military cohesion. A 
comparative analysis of the several disputes preceding the coup, and the coup 
itself shall be done using these criteria. From this it will be demonstrated that the 
intervention was the only time that both the motive and opportunity came together 
resulting in a military coup.  
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e  
FIJI’S COUP RISK 
 
Before embarking on an analysis of the events leading up to the 2006 coup 
the background causes must first be examined to gain some context to the 
environment in Fiji and understand some of the underlying pressures. The analysis 
will be based upon Cottey, Edmunds and Forster’s (2002) framework as explained 
in the preceding chapter. The historical legacy of Fiji shows that the colonial 
regime used the military as an internal suppressor; there was a close connection 
between the military and the ruling chiefly elite, and there were three previous 
coups. All this has made Fiji a coup prone state, with an intrinsically politicised 
military. The political, economic and social context demonstrates the general 
weakness of the political institutions, the potential for future economic crisis, and 
the fractured nature of Fijian society. The international context had little influence 
upon the 2006 coup, but the possibility of contagion from other regional conflicts is 
discussed. The institutional arrangements between the civilian authorities and the 
military have had a large impact upon the difficulties faced since 2000, because of 
the disagreement over the role of the military and the poor mechanisms of control. 
Finally, military culture and professionalism explains the political interventionist 
ideology of the military along with its relative strength, and the issue of indigenous 
Fijian dominance.  
Historical Legacy 
This is one of the most important factors in determining the coup risk of Fiji, 
and therefore will be given a correspondingly large proportion of attention in this 
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analysis. In Fiji’s early history the British colonial regime primarily used the military 
as an oppressor against uprisings within the country. However, it was the two 
coups in 1987 that turned the military into an active political player. The 2000 coup 
had a large impact upon the current military as Bainimarama intervened into the 
political scene. On top of this, Bainimarama was personally attacked in the 
November mutiny, which has had an impact upon his actions ever since. 
Colonial Past of Fiji Military 
When the Fiji Military first emerged in 1871 it consisted of 1000 men, led by 
an English settler. At this stage it was little more than a group of mercenaries, 
hired by the pre-colonial Government to suppress an uprising by European settlers 
in Levuka (Derrick, 1957: 201). In October 1874, when Fiji became a colony of the 
British Empire, administered by Seru Epenisa Cakobau, the Crown inherited the 
military (Derrick, 1957: 202). Not long after, it was renamed the Armed Native 
Constabulary, which was separate from the police until 1905 when the two forces 
were amalgamated. In this early period the primary purpose of the military was to 
pacify uprisings against the new Government, which lacked legitimacy in the eyes 
of many of the populace. In doing this, Sanday (1989: 3) argues that the historical 
role of the military was to support the chiefly establishment and defend the 
infrastructure established by the colonial Government to create a capitalist 
economy. Gutteridge (1964) theorised, that it is common for a military initially set 
up as an enforcer of a colonial regime to become politicised when the country 
becomes independent. Thus, this early role of the Fijian military set it up to be a 
politicised actor and gives good context to its future interventionist nature.  
When World War One broke out in 1914, the Fiji Defence Force (FDF) was 
established. Initially the Government restricted enlistment in this new military to 
those of European descent; however, after a few years Fijians were slowly filtered 
in as well (www.rfmf.mil, 2006). Fiji’s involvement in the First World War was slight; 
however, its presence in the Second World War was much greater, especially in 
the Pacific arena. It was this involvement that fostered the growth of the Fiji Military 
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Force (FMF) into a large and powerful organisation (www.rfmf.mil, 2006). After the 
war the FMF was involved in some external operations, however the Colonial 
Government predominantly used them for internal security operations, which 
mainly stemmed from Fijian-Indians protesting for democratisation and improved 
labour conditions. This was played out through various strikes and protests, which 
the military was brought in to suppress. Thus, the FMF became strongly 
associated with in the capital-labour conflict, which pitted Fijian owners against the 
Indian labourers, and has been one of the central aspects of the ethnic tensions of 
the country (Sanday, 1989: 10). In 1970 Fiji was given independence and the 
Military, now called the Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF), came under the control 
of a civilian government. The first 16 years of independent history were uneventful 
as far as civil-military relations are concerned, and thus the next important 
landmark in civilian control history was not till 1987.   
1987 Coups 
The national election in Fiji in April 1987 brought about a massive change. 
The newly formed Fiji Labour Party (FLP)6 entered into a coalition with the Indian 
dominated National Federation Party (NFP), ousting the previously dominant 
Alliance party. Timoci Bavadra, an ethnic Fijian, became Prime Minister of what 
was in many respects an Indian dominated government.  
Around this time several ambitious commoner Fijians on the fringes of power 
came together to create the Taukei Movement. The purpose of this group was to 
gain positions of power and influence in order to uphold indigenous Fijian rights.7 
There is strong evidence that this group was the primary backer for the 1987 coup, 
and as a result many of its members entered positions of power in the years 
following (R. Robertson & Tamanisau, 1988).  
                                         
6 The Labour party was formed in 1985, as a response to a growing dissatisfied urban working class.  
7 The altruistic goal of upholding indigenous Fijian rights is somewhat questionable, as ambitious self interest 
was often the driving factor.  
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Soon after the elections on 14 May 1987 the Land Force Commander 
Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, the third in command of the RFMF, staged 
Fiji’s first military coup. The new government was announced at one o’clock the 
next morning and included Rabuka, eleven Alliance parliamentarians including 
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara8 and four from the nationalist Taukei Movement. The 
speed at which Rabuka was able to form the new government, as well as its 
composition, strongly suggested that both the Alliance party and the Taukei 
Movement were heavily involved or at least knew in advance of the coup (Lal, 
1988: 79-80).  
The Fijian High Court ruled the coup unconstitutional, and as a response the 
Head of State, the Governor-General Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau tried to assert 
executive control. He opened a series of negotiations known as the Debua Talks, 
between the deposed Labour-NFP Government and the Alliance party. This 
resulted in the Debua Accord on 23 September 1987, which proposed a 
government of national unity in which both parties would be represented under the 
leadership of Ganilau. This sparked Rabuka back into action. Fearing the gains of 
the first coup were to be lost he staged a second coup on 25 September 1987, and 
declared Fiji to be a Republic, leaving the influence of the Commonwealth, and 
leaving Ganilau with little power.  
After the second coup Rabuka set up a military regime; however, after only a 
few months it became clear that it was incapable of holding the country together in 
such a difficult period. Rabuka decided to hand control over to Ganilau, who in turn 
appointed Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara as Prime Minister. He headed an interim 
regime that would hold power until 1992 when a general election was once again 
held.  
 
8 Mara was one of the founding figures of independent Fiji, and had ruled for a long time under the Alliance 
party. He was a central figure in Fijian society and brought with him much respect.  
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After these coups the military, now named the Republic of Fiji Military Forces 
(RFMF), increased its connections to the Government. This was initially done 
through the appointment of military officers into cabinet positions, the most notable 
of which was the coup leader Rabuka, who in 1992 under the Soqosoqo ni 
Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) party won the general election and became Prime 
Minister. Furthermore, Rabuka set up the CRW, headed by Ilisoni Ligairi. The 
CRW was created essentially as a palace guard to protect the government and the 
ideologies it stood for as established through the two coups. Thus, this group was, 
from its formation, politically motivated, a fact that would become painfully clear in 
2000.  
The stated reason for the takeover was that it was racially motivated and 
against Indian rule. However, as accurately surmised by Rory Ewins (1992), class, 
custom and personal interests probably played a more important role. The FLP 
consisted largely of the dissatisfied urban working class. Ewins (1992) believes 
that when they came to power, the ruling upper class saw the FLP as a challenge 
and thus used Rabuka to regain power. The ‘custom’ explanation is much more 
complex and revolves around two key areas. First there is the East-West divide, 
where the Polynesian East has traditionally dominated the Fijian political scene 
over the Melanesian West. The Labour party represented the West which 
challenged the East’s power, which gave them reason to support the coup (Ewins, 
1992). The second focus is on the chiefly system. Because of the increasing 
urbanisation of Fiji, the traditional chiefs had begun to lose power by 1987, 
especially with the election of the FLP which epitomised this movement away from 
traditional structures. Thus, Rabuka easily gained support from the chiefs. Since 
this time the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) has reasserted its power in Fijian 
society, and upholding a strong traditional presence is still a priority (Ewins, 1992). 
The last explanation offered for these coups is one of personal interests. It seems 
that it was Rabuka’s personal wish to overthrow the Indian dominated government, 
for career advancement and a personal grudge, more so than for the national 
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good, which was his stated motivation (Ewins, 1992). These extra hidden 
motivations are important as they continue to play a role in Fiji’s political scene.  
However, for this thesis the most important legacy of the 1987 coups is the 
affect that they had upon the military as an institution in Fiji. While prior to 1987 the 
military was politicised, the coups were the first instance of direct intervention in 
the internal affairs of Fiji since independence. This has left a continuing legacy of 
intervention and involvement, which has become ingrained as part of the collective 
identity of the RFMF (Halapua, 2003: Ch2). Since 1987 the military has become a 
political actor, as evidence from the more extreme examples of the 2000 coup and 
the 2006 coup. Moreover, in-between these instances the military played an 
important and defining role in much of Fijian politics. Thus the statement that 
“armed services are involved in policy is not, a priori, value of judgement but, a 
posterior, statement of fact” (Edmonds, 1988: 94) holds especially true in the Fijian 
context. The Western ideal of separation was lost at this point, and trying to form a 
normative argument will not stand, as from this point on the military became an 
integral part of politics, and should be treated as such.  
2000 Coup and Mutiny 
This coup had its origins in the 1999 election, which was the first election held 
under the new 1997 Constitution of Fiji. This election produced an unexpected 
result, which shocked the old establishment which had been so dominant since the 
1987 coups, bringing to power the FLP, and Mahendra Chaudhry, an ethnic 
Indian, as Prime Minister. In his time in office, Chaudhry tried to tackle various 
issues, most crucially the land reform problem. A great number of land leases by 
Fijians to Indian sugar farm workers were coming up for renewal, but many Fijians 
wanted their land back or more value for it. He tried to establish a Land Use 
Commission, which riled the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) which administers all 
Fijian land, and began a shockwave of backlash against the FLP. One important 
aspect of this backlash was the reformation of the Taukei Movement which had all 
but disbanded during the 1990s as a result of the dominance of Rabuka’s SVT 
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party that essentially took its place. Once the public sentiment began to grow 
against the FLP Apisai Tora, one of the original founders of the ‘Movement’, 
declared the Taukei reformed and began hosting rallies; one particular rally in 
Suva on 28 April 2000 brought together over eight thousand followers. In the face 
of this backlash Chaudhry continued down the same path, which turned many 
politicians against him, both from the opposition and within his own party. By early 
2000 there were plans by the FLP to remove Chaudhry as leader which were to be 
carried out after his first year in office on 20 May. There were also plans from 
opposition parties, led by the SVT, to call a vote of no confidence, however neither 
plan had a chance to be followed through (R. T. Robertson & Sutherland, 2001: 5-
11).   
It was the CRW unit of the military, organised by their former leader and long-
term mentor Ilisoni Ligairi, who initially conspired the coup. They managed to talk 
several prominent figures, politicians and nationalist leaders into their plan, making 
a complex conspiracy. The last link in the chain was George Speight, a failed 
businessman, who had some connections to the political scene and a personal 
grudge against the Chaudhry Government. He was brought aboard because of his 
leadership, authority and communication skills, to act as an acceptable front to the 
public and the media. On the morning of 19 May 2000 Fiji faced its third coup, 
almost exactly 13 years after the first. The rebels entered parliament at 11:00am, 
handcuffed Chaudhry and his deputy Tupeni Baba, and rounded up the rest of the 
government members taking them hostage (R. T. Robertson & Sutherland, 2001: 
11-15).  
At the same time, Ligairi was at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks in Nabua trying 
to convince soldiers to join the coup; he expected success, however the soldiers 
were not persuaded. On top of this, the coup plotters failed to secure Rabuka as a 
supporter, who they initially expected to have as president of the new regime. 
Rabuka instead took up the role of mediator. From these two setbacks it looked as 
if the coup might fail before it even started. However, supporters of the coup began 
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entering the parliamentary complex which gave the intervention a second wind. 
The first group numbered around 300, and many more came, including some 
members of the military and other influential figures. They gained further support 
from outside parliament from the disaffected lower class, who, with some 
guidance, rioted and looted throughout the streets of Suva, and would continue to 
create a climate of disorder throughout the crisis (R. T. Robertson & Sutherland, 
2001: 17-18).  
While this coup is often simply explained as an ethnic rivalry between the 
Indigenous and Indian Fijians, this is far too simplistic; this coup showed a different 
problem, pitching Fijians against Fijians. The best explanation of this has come 
from Robertson and Sutherland (2001), who argue the primary reason for the coup 
was Fijian socioeconomic disadvantage, built up over years of ineffective 
governance. While the majority have faced economic downturn, the elite, often 
represented by the chiefly establishment, have prospered. Thus a large disaffected 
class emerged, to whom the elite often told that the reason for their position was 
Indian economic dominance, reinforcing the ethnic struggle. As such, while at first 
it may have been over Indian domination, as the coup progressed the fight 
became between the Fijian elite and the economically disadvantaged ethnic 
Fijians. 
Soon after the coup Ratu Mara, in his capacity as President, stepped in to try 
to resolve the crisis, with Rabuka as his intermediary to Speight. Mara, in 
consultation with the GCC conceded to many of the demands of Speight and his 
group. This included appointing several of the coup plotters in a proposed interim 
administration headed by Mara, a full pardon for all involved in the coup and giving 
urgent attention to the grievances raised by the rebel coup group and their 
supporters. However, Speight was still not happy. He was cautious of Mara’s 
political experience and cunning, which could have threatened any future regime. 
Furthermore, he represented the ruling elite, who the coup rebels were beginning 
to realise was their real enemy (Lal, 2000: 289 -290). Thus, as Mara followed 
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through on his plans to set up the interim regime, Speight and his supporters 
planned to march to Parliament and demand that Mara resign. However, under the 
advice of the military they called off this action. Instead, on 29 May four army 
soldiers including Bainimarama and Mara’s son-in-law Ratu Epeli Nailatikau asked 
Mara to step aside. Bainimarama then took executive control of the country, acting 
as the President, imposed martial law, abrogated the 1997 Constitution and 
installed a new interim civilian regime headed by Laisena Qarase to govern until a 
new election. This action is often referred to as a coup within a coup (M. Field, 
Baba, & Nabobo-Baba, 2005: 136), however, in the author’s opinion this was a 
necessity at the time, but set a negative precedent that would underlie much of the 
justification of the 2006 coup.  
Unfortunately, the military’s actions did not have the desired effect upon 
Speight and his group, who did not agree with the makeup of the new 
administration (Lal, 2000: 291 - 292). This caused a deadlock, and the danger of a 
violent confrontation became a real possibility. Then on 15 June Ratu Josefa Iloilo, 
Western High Chief and Mara’s Vice President, offered to negotiate discussion 
between the military and the rebels at his residence in Muanikau. The rebels 
dominated these talks, and again almost all of their demands were met, yet when 
they were supposed to sign the Muanikau Accord on 24 June, they instead 
appeared with new demands, wanting more of their group in the interim 
administration. This caused the talks to break down and a more confrontational 
approach between the RFMF and the rebels to emerge. This played out when 
supporters of the coup seized control of the Sukanaivalu Barracks and its armoury 
at Vaturekuka in Vanua Levu. Two hours later in retaliation soldiers entered into a 
skirmish with the rebels outside Parliament, where the military wounded five 
rebels, killing one, and arrested fourteen. In response the rebels started a mass 
campaign of civil disobedience, which in the end forced the military to concede. 
They agreed the GCC should elect a President, who would then choose his own 
interim administration and give the rebels immunity from prosecution, for which the 
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rebels agreed to lay down their weapons and release the hostages. Finally, under 
these conditions the Muanikau Accord was signed on 9 July (R. T. Robertson & 
Sutherland, 2001: 29-33). This was an interesting decision as, admittedly under 
duress, the military conceded to most of the rebel demands, including immunity 
from prosecution. This stance contrasts the position taken by the military in the 
following years, where ensuring the proper prosecution of the coup perpetrators 
became a key objective.  
On 14 July the GCC met to fulfil its part of the Muanikau Accord where they 
elected Josefa Iloilo as President; he was not a rebel, but he was the next in line to 
the position. More importantly however, the GCC elected rebel supporter Jope 
Seniloli as Vice President. With 80-year old Iloilo suffering from Parkinson’s 
Disease, and often considered to be a weak leader, it appeared that Seniloli would 
be able to have a strong input into forming the new government. Speight was 
pleased; he released the rest of the hostages after 57 days in captivity, handed 
over their sizable armoury to the military, and moved out of the Parliament 
buildings to the Kalabu Fijian School. However, the rebels may have acted too 
soon, as on the next day, after a convincing presentation, Iloilo named Qarase as 
the interim Prime Minister, with only minor inclusion of Speight’s supporters (R. T. 
Robertson & Sutherland, 2001: 35-36). Speight and his group were less than 
satisfied, and made their dislike of the situation apparent, while Bainimarama 
indicated the rebels had not returned all the weapons. This again raised the 
possibility of further hostilities (M. Field, Baba, & Nabobo-Baba, 2005: 229-231).  
In response to the rising tensions, the military acted decisively. On the night of 
26 July the military arrested Speight, Josefa Nata, and their lawyer Tevita Bukarau 
at a military checkpoint. The next day the military launched a major offensive. First, 
they raided the Kalabu School arresting 369 men including Ligairi, and found a 
stockpile of arms that the rebels had not returned. Then they went after the rest of 
the rebels and other supporters, often using fierce tactics; one man died from the 
effects of tear gas and a further 40 were wounded. However, some remnants of 
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the rebels remained; on 8 August they ambushed a patrol of ten soldiers and one 
policeman, resulting in the death a soldier and the policeman, while at various 
locations Speight’s supporters continued to harass Indians (M. Field, Baba, & 
Nabobo-Baba, 2005: 232-235). 
While tensions between the military and the remaining rebels continued the 
judicial process began. The first major case started on 11 August, when the state 
charged Speight and two men from the CRW with treason. Not long after, in an 
appeal by the State against a quashed attempted murder charge, the High Court 
ruled the immunity decree was invalid. This was because the rebels invalidated it 
when they failed to return all the stolen military arms. This was a key ruling which 
allowed for a mass of convictions, which, as will become evident in latter sections 
of this thesis, dragged on for years after, and became a real burden upon Fiji (M. 
Field, Baba, & Nabobo-Baba, 2005: 238-239).  
Nevertheless, the hostilities still simmered and it appeared that another major 
confrontation was imminent. This occurred on 2 November 2000 when the 
remaining members of the CRW unit, who had strong connections to the rebels, 
mutinied against the military. The CRW justified their action as avenging the rebels 
who were often barbarically rounded up by the military. In many respects this 
mutiny boiled down to an attempted assassination of Bainimarama, which he only 
narrowly escaped. After a bloody skirmish which claimed the lives of 8 soldiers and 
wounded 30, the military managed to suppress the mutiny. Five of the dead were 
from the CRW, and upon a Coroner’s examination it was determined that many of 
them were first tortured then killed, which has left a cloud of suspicion over 
Bainimarama ever since (M. Field, Baba, & Nabobo-Baba, 2005: ch23). This 
event, more so than any other, had a profound impact upon Bainimarama. He now 
holds a degree of paranoia that his life is under threat, from further dissenters 
within the military, or more likely from the families of those tortured and killed in the 
attempted mutiny. This has affected the way he has conducted himself ever since. 
He now takes a band of armed bodyguards with him on most journeys, and, as will 
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become more relevant in latter sections of this thesis, he has reshaped the officer 
corps based upon personal loyalty. 
At this stage, the coup was over; most of the rebels were arrested or in hiding 
and the threat of further uprising was quickly diminishing after the attempted 
mutiny. However, the country was in limbo; it was only an interim regime in power, 
the planned elections were still years away, and the 1997 constitution lay in tatters. 
In a remarkable series of events the judicial system took effect and returned Fiji to 
democracy. This process initially began back on 4 July 2000, when an Indian 
farmer Chandrika Prasad filed an action in the High Court of Fiji against the 
Republic of Fiji and the Attorney-General of the Interim Government. The case 
challenged the legality of the regime and the abrogation of the 1997 Constitution. 
Justice Gates heard the case on 23 August 2000, and returned a ruling on 15 
November, finding for Prasad. Gates ruled that the revocation of the Constitution 
was illegal and that the Parliament of Fiji as prior to 19 May was still in being, 
reinstating Mara as the president and charging him with appointing a new Prime 
Minister and Government. However, Mara felt he could not uphold this 
responsibility, and a month later officially resigned from the presidency. At first it 
appeared that this ruling would have little affect upon the current political 
arrangement in Fiji, however instead of simply ignoring the decision, the interim 
government decided to take the ruling to the Court of Appeal. A five-Judge panel 
heard the appeal from 19 to 22 February 2001. They returned on 1 March 
dismissing the appeal. While disagreeing upon some points of technicality the 
panel agreed in principle with the original ruling, adding that the 1997 Constitution 
was still the supreme law of Fiji, and that Mara’s resignation was valid, making 
Iloilo the rightful President. Almost immediately after this decision Qarase 
announced the country would return to democratic rule, and his government 
resigned. Iloilo then dissolved the previous Parliament, reinstated Qarase’s interim 
regime as a caretaker Government, and called for a general election (G. Williams, 
2003). The election was held between 25 August and 5 September 2001. 
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Qarase’s newly formed Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) Party, which 
largely consisted of the interim regime, formed the new government in coalition 
with the controversial Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua (CAMV) party, which 
consisted of many of the political supporters of the 2000 coup.  
History is thus important in determining the coup risk Fiji faces. The colonial 
legacy of the military as the suppresser of uprisings, and connections to the Chiefly 
establishment, set the military up as a politicised institution. The criterion of past 
coups has been fulfilled in Fiji, which has significantly raised the possibility of 
further intervention. In particular the 1987 coups, which were military interventions 
as opposed to the ‘civilian coup’ in 2000, opened the possibility for the military to 
intervene when it saw the government failing to do what it believe to be right. 
Furthermore, the 2000 coup has had a profound impact upon the current 
leadership of the RFMF. Bainimarama’s overthrow of the president, abrogation of 
the Constitution and installation of martial law all set a negative precedent, and 
gave the Commander a far too powerful position. The installation of Qarase in the 
interim regime also created a strange dynamic between the two men, and to a 
degree it can be assumed that Bainimarama expected Qarase to do his bidding. 
This has not been the case, and may hold some explanatory value for the difficult 
relationship between these two men. The attempted mutiny also left lasting scars, 
with Bainimarama continuously suspicious of those around him, and this paranoid 
trait may have led to a distorted view of the world.  
Domestic Political Economic and Social Context 
The political, economic and social context of Fiji goes a long way to explaining 
why there are such difficulties in the country, as each of these factors have 
massive problems associated with them. There is a general weakness of 
governance in Fiji, and a political power sharing relationship that constrains and 
complicates the political process. Economically Fiji has been fragile since the 2000 
coup, and faces problems specifically in the garment and sugar industries.  The 
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various social divisions paint a picture of a fractured society, which always makes 
any conflict much more likely.  
Political 
To measure the political strength of Fiji the Governance Index compiled by 
Gani and Duncan (2004) shall be used. This index covers the period from 1985-
2002 and shows that throughout this period Fiji’s governance index was on 
average 0.421, with 0 being poor governance and 1 strong governance. Thus it 
does show some weakness, however it is not especially low for a developing 
country. Interestingly, it appears that weakness in governance, rather than being a 
precursor to military intervention, is more a consequence of intervention. In 1986 
before the first two coups the index was at 0.470, where as in 1988 one year after 
the coups it had dropped down to 0.324. After this it made consistent gains right 
up to the year 2000 when it sat at 0.568, but again dropping down the next year 
after the coup to 0.417 (Gani & Duncan, 2004). Thus there was no dip in 
governance in the lead up to any of the previous coups, but there was a noticeable 
drop afterwards. While the general overall weakness of governance probably 
allows for the possibility of a coup, it does not serve well as an indicator for when a 
coup is likely to occur.  
There is a unique aspect to Fijian politics which has made the country 
unstable. Fiji has three almost equally influential groups, the Native Land Trust 
Board, the military and the government. The Government must balance each of 
these groups’ power and influence to be able to govern effectively. In 2000 when 
Chaudhry stepped on the toes of the NLTB this quickly generated resentment 
across much of the country, resulting in the reformation of the Taukei Movement, 
who laid much of the groundwork for the intervention. In 2006 the Government 
probably went a step too far in challenging the military’s authority, which, as shall 
be argued in this paper, was part of the motivation for intervention. Thus in Fiji 
there is a difficult balance for a government as their power is far from absolute.  
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Economic 
The Fijian economy has had a difficult time recovering since the coup in 2000. 
While it is partially on the way back to some stability, it is still fragile, and is 
susceptible to further shocks (Beloni, 2004). The most immediate issue in the 
period leading up to the 2006 coup was the increasing trade deficit problems. At 
the end of 2005 the trade deficit was at F$1.53 billion (US$0.76 billion), driven by 
increasing consumerism, deflated exports, and increasing oil prices (Tabureguci, 
2006). This looked likely to start to show in a drop in living standards. Additionally, 
there were other significant economic problems on the horizon for two of the 
country’s top earners: the garment and sugar industries.  
The garment industry is entering a difficult stage as both New Zealand and 
Australia, who were previously preferential markets for Fiji, have committed to 
adopt free trade in the industry by 2010. On top of this the Fiji Government 
suspended the tax-free zone the garment industry operated within. These 
problems have revealed much inefficiency, and without these preferential 
treatments the industry is likely to fail (P. K. Narayan & Prasad, 2003).  
However, the most imminent economic problem that Fiji faces is the sugar 
industry, which holds an important place in the Fijian economy. In 2001 it made up 
7% of the total gross domestic profit (GDP); it is the most important source of cash 
income for rural Fijians and it makes up 22% of all merchandise exports (Levantis, 
Jotzo, & Tulpule, 2005). Importantly, the sector as a whole employs about one 
quarter of the economically active population (Prasad & Akram-Lodhhi, 1998). As 
such it is intrinsically intertwined into the Fijian economy and holds an important 
social role, as well as providing a lifestyle for much of the rural population. For a 
long time Fiji has received an inflated price from the European Union (EU) for its 
sugar. However, in October 2004 after a long legal case the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) ordered the EU to stop giving subsidies on sugar, and the 
Appeal Court upheld this ruling in 2005. This meant that the price that Fiji had 
been receiving for sugar from the EU would drop by 39%. The 39% cut was not to 
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occur immediately though; at the beginning of 2007 the first five percent was taken 
off and subsequent cuts are proposed to be made until 2010 when the full 39% will 
be fulfilled. A study done at the University of the South Pacific simulated the 
economic impact of a 30% reduction in sugar production, which is similar to what 
is expected after the loss of the preferential EU market. The study revealed that 
this would cause a decline of 1.8% of GDP and 1.5% of welfare for the entire 
country. The article goes on to say that such a decline has the potential to cripple 
the sugar industry (P. K. Narayan & Prasad, 2004). Furthermore, a report done for 
the Steps Toward Conflict Prevention Project, on the ‘Constraints and Contributors 
to Violent Conflict in Fiji’ found that one of the major factors that would increase the 
likelihood of violent conflict would be a collapse in the sugar industry (Doughty, 
Daryn, & Prasad, 2003). 
Thus in the lead up to the coup there were several economic problems which 
would have put extra pressure upon the Government. Also, the failure to find any 
real solution to these problems would have also begun to play on the minds of the 
civilian population, lowering their trust in the regime. When the military began 
talking about the failures of Government, it would have played on the 
apprehension felt by the whole country, and both raised support for the military 
and lowered support for the Government.  
Social 
Fiji has various social divides. There is the prominent divide between Indian 
and Indigenous Fijians, which permeates the entire society. There are separate 
schools for each ethnic group, in the larger cities there are different business and 
residential areas for each ethnic group, and throughout much of the country there 
are Indian dominated or Indigenous dominated towns. There is very little 
intermingling between the groups and the Indigenous often consider Indians to still 
be visitors to the country, and thus do not belong. Of crucial importance is that this 
ethnic divide reaches right up to the national level of politics. The largest two 
parties, instead of being divided along socio-economic grounds as is common in a 
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Westminster system, are divided along racial lines. Since the 2000 coup the major 
Indigenous party has been Qarase’s SDL party, and the major Indian party has 
been Chaudhry’s FLP. Because this is the strongest political divide often policies 
are formulated according to which bias the ethnic group of the party in power has 
in order to appease their support group (Davies, 2005). This became evident in the 
lead up to the 2006 coup, with the proposed ‘Promotion of Tolerance 
Reconciliation and Unity Bill’, the ‘Qoliqoli Bill’, and the ‘Fijian Tribunal Bill’. All of 
these heavily favoured the Indigenous community, and were central to the 
controversy surrounding the takeover.  
There is a divide between the East and West of the country. Traditionally the 
Polynesian East has dominated over the Melanesian West. This has led to some 
resentment from the West, which has played out through calls for independence. 
While such action is unlikely to occur it has been necessary to pander to the 
West’s interests (Ewins, 1992). The most recent and pertinent example of this is 
the appointment of Ratu Josefa Iloilo as President, and then his reappointment in 
the middle of 2006. Iloilo is a high chief of the West, and had worked his way up 
through the political ranks to the point where he was next in line to be the 
President. However, it was widely known that he is a weak leader, and easily 
manipulated, but because of his Western Chiefly title there was no way that he 
could be passed over without serious consequences (Kotobalavu, 2006). This had 
implications for the 2006 overthrow, as it was often evident that the military was 
able to manipulate Iloilo. This gave Bainimarama much more power in the years 
leading up to the intervention, and in the end made the intervention a much easier 
task.  
There are several divides among the Chiefly system. Often there are several 
contenders for a single chiefly title. In Fiji such a title brings a great amount of 
social respect and power, particularly the Bau title that has a direct lineage to the 
first Fijian leader Cakobau and is ranked as the top in the country. The title has 
been vacant since 1989; before the 2006 coup the front-runner to take the position 
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was Senator Ratu George Cakobau, a supporter of the Qarase Government. 
However, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, a former RFMF Commander and less than subtle 
supporter of Bainimarama also had a claim to the title. Similarly, Ratu Naiqama 
Lalabalavu, a government minister who has been convicted of involvement in the 
2000 coup, holds the Tui Cakau title, usually considered to be the third most 
powerful in the country. In 2001 Lalabalavu gained the title over Ratu Epeli 
Ganilau, one of the strongest political supporters of Bainimarama. It has been 
suggested that some of the motivation behind the 2006 intervention was, for these 
men and others like them, to gain powerful chiefly titles (Kotobalavu, 2006). This 
adds an interesting dimension to the conflict; however, a full examination of this 
potential cause is beyond the scope of the current research; it is suffice to say 
there is substantial rivalry for the high ranking chiefly titles.   
The socio-economic divide is an important factor and as explained above was 
in large part to blame for the 2000 coup. There is a growing gap between the 
‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ in Fiji. The squatter settlements around the major cities 
are constantly growing, and there is a degree of resentment, which boiled over 
during the 2000 coup and resulted in much of the most damaging riots and 
violence. Closely associated with this is the urban-rural divide. Much of the rural 
community is subsistence based, usually Fijian Chiefly tribes, or Indian farmers. 
There is a degree of resentment between this group and those in the urban 
centres; they perceive that there is more wealth, more opportunities and a higher 
standard of living in the cities. In reality much of these assumptions prove to be 
wrong, but nonetheless there are still tensions (R. T. Robertson & Sutherland, 
2001). 
These social divides make Fiji a conflict prone state. While most of these 
social issues lie dormant, it would only take a catalyst to bring them into full force. 
Of particular concern is the racial divide; there was concern before the coup that if 
Bainimarama overthrew the Government then there would be open hostility by 
Fijians towards Indians, as much of the population would see the coup as 
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favouring Indian interests. Thus the lack of social cohesion and disunity among the 
country make for a conflict prone society and definitely raises the potential for a 
coup.   
International Context 
The international context did not play much of a role in the 2006 coup. There 
was not, nor has there ever been in recent history any external threat, which, as 
noted by Desh (1999) may increase the propensity of the military to intervene 
domestically. The large size of the military may further exaggerate this. Thus, there 
is a large military force with no external focal point, which goes someway to 
explaining why the Fiji military is so volatile.   
The idea of contagion, or the spread of conflict from neighbouring states, is 
something that has become rather common in research on the Pacific region. This 
stems from the “arc of instability” argument (Reilly, 2000), which purports that the 
arc of countries above Australia from Indonesia right through all of Melanesia and 
now stretching onto Tonga are unstable and becoming increasingly so. One of the 
fundamental underlying assumptions here is that the increasing instability in the 
region is self-reinforcing, as when neighbouring countries become unstable then it 
is more likely for the country in question to become unstable. While this theory is 
disputed, as it takes little to no account of the particular reasons for each of the 
conflicts, it does still offer some value and may have had some influence upon Fiji.  
Within the Pacific region 2006 was a particularly unstable year, with riots in 
the Solomon Islands and Tonga as well as the coup in Fiji. The riots in the 
Solomon Islands occurred soon after the election held on 5 April. The result of the 
election meant that Snyder Rini was elected as Prime Minister, and he brought 
back into power many of the members involved in the previous and largely 
unpopular Kemakeza Government. When this was announced a riot broke out in 
Honiara, which targeted the Asian community, which many of the public suspected 
had corrupted the process of selecting a Prime Minister. The Solomon Islands, 
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Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands and an extra contingent of 
Australian police were deployed to quell the situation, which ended fairly quickly, 
but nonetheless was the worst public destruction in the history of Honiara 
(Kabutaulaka, 2007). Tonga also saw problems in 2006. Following on from the 
public servants’ strike in July of 2005, on 11 November 2006 when the Legislative 
Council adjourned for the year without having made any progress towards 
promised democratic reforms, democracy advocates took to the streets in protest. 
The protest quickly degenerated into a riot in the streets of Nuku’alofa. The targets 
of the riot were initially government buildings, and then businesses, especially 
those with connections to the royal family, and later people began openly looting. 
This resulted in the destruction of somewhere between 60% and 80% of the 
central business district, and eight deaths (theage.com.au, 17/11/2006). However, 
it is unlikely that either of these events had much impact upon Fiji. The coup was 
of a different type of conflict altogether, and formed out of its own steam rather 
than an instantaneous inspiration from other instability.  
Furthermore, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Helen Clark suggested that 
Bainimarama may have been influenced by the coup in Thailand (The New 
Zealand Herald, 5/12/2006). In September of 2006 the Thai military overthrew the 
civilian government, in a bloodless and generally well accepted coup (Ockey, 
2007). The suggestion here is that upon seeing the relative ease of the Thai coup, 
Bainimarama became inspired that similar events could happen in Fiji. Again this 
is unlikely, as Fiji is a very different country to Thailand and the situations 
surrounding the coups were very different. As such, the surrounding instabilities 
may have had some influence upon the RFMF, and made the act of overthrowing 
the civilian government seem more acceptable; however, this is impossible to 
measure this in any way and it seems the surrounding conflicts were of a different 
nature or in a too dissimilar country to have much influence.  
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Institutional Factors 
From the historical legacies analysis it should be obvious that in practice the 
institutional arrangement between the RFMF and the Fiji Government is not one of 
separation. The military is a political actor whether the civilian authorities and 
international observers like it or not. Thus, the second definition of institutional 
arrangements, that there must simply be consensus over the role of the military 
and its institutional arrangement with the civilian authorities, is much more 
pertinent. The Constitution of Fiji defines these arrangements. Upon independence 
in 1970 the first Constitution was brought into force; however it was abrogated in 
the first coup in 1987. Soon after the coup discussions for a new constitution 
began, with the general purpose of upholding the Fijian nationalist gains of the 
coup. This finally resulted in the 1990 Constitution, which was sympathetic towards 
the Chiefs’ perspective with some consideration given to the views of the Taukei 
Movement (Robert T. Robertson, 1998: 54-61). This Constitution gave political 
dominance to Indigenous Fijians. The seats were divided along racial lines and an 
unrepresentative majority given to Fijians, and in general made it difficult for an 
Indian to gain any real position of power (Premdas & Steeves, 1991: 160-161). 
This met with widespread criticism internationally, and some locally, for its political 
suppression of the Indian community, that at the time was formed the majority of 
the population. The role of the military was set out in this Constitution under 
section 94 (3): “[i]t shall be the overall responsibility of the Republic of Fiji Military 
Forces to ensure at all times the security, defence and well-being of Fiji and its 
peoples” (Fiji Constitution, 1990). This gave the RFMF a large mandate, going 
beyond the common military role of security and defence and giving them the 
responsibility over “the well-being of Fiji and its peoples,” thus reinforcing the 
political role.  
The 1990 Constitution was seen by its drafters as a temporary measure, to 
hold the country together during a difficult time; as such, under section 161 they 
ordered that it be reviewed within seven years. After a comprehensive review by a 
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Government commission, the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee wrote up what 
was essentially a new constitution, which was passed on 3 July 1997 (Lal, 1998). 
There were several wide-ranging changes the 1997 Constitution; however, they 
kept several seats allocated to ethnic voting but made these far more 
representative. In terms of the military’s role, this Constitution is very vague. Under 
section 112 (1) it states that “[t]he military force called the Republic of Fiji Military 
Forces established by the Constitution of 1990 continues in existence” (Fiji 
Constitution, 1997). Thus the military argues the bold mandate set out in the 1990 
Constitution carries over, and it is therefore its constitutional right to be politically 
active, to secure the security, defence and well-being of Fiji and all its citizens. 
Conversely, the Fiji Government argued that the 1997 constitution overrides the 
1990 constitution and that section 112 only stated that the RFMF continued to 
exist. Furthermore, they believed that the military should have no political role, but 
rather be an instrument of the state (Laisenia Qarase, 9/11/2006).  The institutional 
arrangement for the interaction of the military and government is also rather weak. 
The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the RFMF; however, he is only 
supposed to act upon the advice of the Ministry of Home Affairs, thus leaving the 
Prime Minister out of the whole process. Of course, this was conceived in a time 
when the military was not aggressive towards the Government; however this 
system has been shown to be shaky during the period 2000 – 2006.  
Thus, there was much disagreement between the RFMF and the Government 
over the role of the military, and the institutional arrangement for the interaction 
between the two was weak. This was a strong underlying theme for many of the 
disputes, and is one of the core reasons for the poor civilian control, and thus the 
high coup risk.  
Military Culture and Professionalism 
The culture of the RFMF can easily be described as adhering most closely to 
Janowitz’s (1960) pragmatist approach. The RFMF ascribes to a larger view of its 
role that means that it must be involved in politics to ensure the proper provision of 
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‘security defence and well-being of Fiji and its peoples.’ This is largely a result of 
the historical role of the military, which has placed it close to the creation of the 
state, and its continued evolution. In the period from 2000 – 2006 this has 
manifested itself in a rather specific way. The RFMF sees ensuring the prosecution 
of those involved in the 2000 coup as part of its larger role. There are two 
competing reasons for this; a personal feud by Bainimarama against those who 
conspired to have him killed in the November 2000 mutiny, and a more altruistic 
attempt to ensure justice was done and to set a precedent against further action. 
Over the years it seems that these reasons became twisted; as in the end 
Bainimarama overthrew the Government, which contradicts the second reasoning. 
However, it is most likely that both of these reasonings influenced this ideology. 
This is one of the fundamental underlying problems of civilian control in Fiji. The 
RFMF by its very nature believes it needs to be involved in politics to fulfil its role 
properly, which can obviously conflict with the civilian authorities.  
While there is definitely a politically-minded culture, the current RFMF does 
consider itself to be a professional institution. In the middle to latter part of the 
1990s the Fijian military underwent a massive change, where it began 
disentangling itself from the Fijian establishment in what has become known as the 
“re-professionalization” of the RFMF. Previously the RFMF was intrinsically linked 
to the Chiefly system, and supportive of the indigenous status quo. Through re-
professionalization it began to diverge from  this and create its own separate 
identity, which to an extent favoured a more multicultural society (Ratuva, 2006a; 
www.rfmf.mil, 2006). As part of this movement, and potentially its biggest indicator, 
Vorque Bainimarama was appointed as the new Commander of the RFMF in 
1999. As a Naval Commander he appeared to be an odd choice for an army-
dominant institution. However, it appears that this was part of the general 
movement of the military away from being the lapdog of the ruling elite to a 
separate but still politically motivated institution; it is this that Bainimarama has 
been particularly successful in achieving (Ratuva, 2006a). Consequently this 
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‘professionalism’, did the complete opposite to what Huntington (1957) described; 
rather than making the military a servant of the civilian government it has 
increased the likelihood of intervention. In defence of Huntington’s theory, the 
professionalism described by the RFMF is not what he had in mind when coining 
the term. However, when relating this to his base criteria of a special vocation that 
requires some expertise and a special social responsibility, it does not look too 
dissimilar to what the RFMF have illustrated. Thus Finer’s (1962) explanation has 
more relevance in this context. The focal point of the professionalism is to uphold 
the well-being of Fiji and its peoples, thus their loyalty is to the abstract concept of 
the State, rather than the specific civilian rulers; which, as Finer theorised, has led 
to a creation of their own principles, which often conflict with the civilian 
Government’s. When this is coupled with their perceived politically active role, it is 
easy to understand why they openly criticise the Government over any 
disagreements. This helps explain the outspoken nature of the RFMF in the years 
leading up to the coup, and the poor civilian control witnessed in this period.  
This culture and ideology is then compounded by the relative strength of the 
RFMF, which by comparison is far stronger than any other institution in Fiji. The 
military consists of 3500 men, with 2950 active soldiers (www.rfmf.mil, 2006), 
which is disproportionate to the security threat that Fiji faces. There are two key 
reasons for the large size. The first is that the military offers opportunities often not 
seen in the rest of Fiji. There is a lot of money to be made through the military, 
particularly in foreign deployments to which many young Fijians will aspire in order 
to support their extended family group. Furthermore, the military offers a stable 
career and high social prestige. The second reason, as outlined above, is that the 
historical role of the RFMF was to be the tool of the Fijian elite to maintain their 
power, and thus those in power actively encouraged the large size. The 1987 
coups also helped ensure a large size, as in the years following the coups the 
military swelled in size. In 1987 it was just under 2,000 men strong, soon after it 
reached a peak of just over 8,000. The military budget also drastically increased, 
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from F$16.7m in 1987 to F$29.8m just two years later (Sanday, 1989: 15). After 
this it slowly lessened in size again, settling around 3,000 men. Furthermore, as is 
common among all militaries in coup prone states. It is difficult to reduce the size 
or budget of the military, as this will result in hostilities towards the government. 
This large size relative to the population, high status, and the obvious monopoly of 
arms has meant the military has become a powerful institution in Fiji. It is more 
powerful than the civilian institutions, which has made overthrowing them an easy 
process; obviously, this contributes to the coup risk. 
Another interesting and important aspect of the military culture is the composition 
of the RFMF. Since its establishment it has been composed mainly of indigenous 
Fijians (Sanday, 1989: 11). Throughout the early 1980s cadet training was 
introduced in five schools throughout Fiji, four of which were ethnic Fijian. This 
demonstrates the deliberate goal of ethnic Fijian dominance (Halapua, 2003: 59). 
Furthermore, the officer corps was mainly composed of Fijian Chiefs who had 
strong ties to the ruling elite. In effect this worked to politicise the military as their 
influence was strong within the military and their voices heard and taken account 
of by the government of the day (Sanday, 1989: 12). While the officer corps was 
Fijian, it continued to have a British Commander until 1982 when Ratu Epeli 
Nailatikau was named as the first Fijian Commander of the RFMF, further 
reinforcing the traditional chiefly value system in the military. Thus, in this period 
the RFMF became increasingly politicised, and, as argued by Halapua, they were 
in effect  agents of the ruling Alliance Party (2003: Ch2).  This ethnic dominance 
helps explain the 1987 military coups, which were largely to secure power for the 
Fijian elite. The theory of ethnic dominance also holds value for the 2000 coup 
which through the CRW Unit had some connections to the military and also had 
racial overtones. However, the significance of the Indigenous Fijian dominance 
within the military has had only a small impact upon the 2006 coup. If anything, the 
military was standing up for the rights of the Indian community, who are an 
insignificant part of the composition of the RFMF.  This dramatic change in focus 
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iji’s Coup Risk 
 factors explain the poor civilian control that Fiji faced during the 
may in itself have caused some disharmony within the military. Many of the 
soldiers and officers would have still held to the old value system, where the 
military was there to protect the Fijian elite. The change in focus may have caused 
some of them to distrust Bainimarama resulting in internal rifts, which in turn may 
have been the reason behind some of the difficulties in military cohesion, however, 
the truth behind this has never been revealed.   
 
F
Together all these
inter-coup period 2000 – 2006, and thus the high coup risk the country faced. Fiji’s 
civil-military history shows that through its colonial role of suppressor of uprisings, 
and later its connection to the chiefly elite, the Fiji Military became a politicised 
institution. This was further reinforced in the 1987 coups, with the 2000 coup giving 
some context to the sentiments surrounding the civil-military disputes from 2000 – 
2006. While Fiji’s political institutions were not as strong as would be preferred this 
did not indicate that a coup would occur. The looming economic problems put 
extra pressure upon the civilian regime, and possibly lowered their legitimacy in 
the eyes of many. The various social divisions give some context to the difficulties 
that Fiji faces as well as showing why the country is inherently conflict prone. 
International context did not play a large part in this coup, although there is the 
possibility that there could have been some contagion from the regional conflicts in 
the Solomons and Tonga, as well as the well-accepted coup in Thailand. The 
institutional arrangements were a fundamental problem for this period, and 
fostered a dispute over the proper role of the military and made it difficult for the 
civilian authorities to control the military.  Lastly, the military culture and 
professionalism has meant that the RFMF believe that it has a larger political role, 
to secure the security, defence and well-being of Fiji and its peoples. Its loyalty is 
to the abstract concept of the State rather than the ruling government, which has 
fostered much dispute. This is reinforced by the relative strength of the military 
over any civilian institutions in Fiji, and complicated by the Fijian dominance of the 
institution, which may have been the cause of some of the problems of cohesion. 
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From this it can be deduced that the possibility of a coup was always there, 
although individually these factors do not explain why and when the coup 
specifically occurred. So now the analysis must turn to the events leading up to the 
coup in search of some triggering causes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART III 
 
TRIGGERING CAUSES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Causes of Fiji’s 5 December 2006 Coup  Brett Woods 
Part III: Triggering Causes 
Chapter Four – 2004 Reappointment of Bainimarama 
 
 
 
C h a p t e r  F o u r  
2004 REAPPOINTMENT OF BAINIMARAMA 
 
The Commander of the RFMF is appointed for a five-year term, and it is 
customary that he/she serves two terms. In early 2004 Bainimarama came to the 
end of his first term and was therefore due for reappointment. As this was the end 
of his first term he rightfully felt entitled to be reinstated. However, in the lead up to 
this it was suggested by many within the Government that he would not keep his 
job, which sparked a tense dispute. In the end Bainimarama was reappointed, 
however this was the first real incidence of open hostilities between the 
Government and the military. When looking at this dispute the motivation for 
intervention was probably there during most of the conflict. The military’s interests 
were initially threatened over government interference in the Labasa mutiny court-
martial, the central issue of the Commander holding his position, as well as some 
budgetary worries. Furthermore, there were some minor governmental failures that 
the military was beginning to criticise. Yet in the end the Government did reappoint 
Bainimarama, thus negating the greatest motivator and significantly reducing the 
motivation for intervention. The other major factor stopping intervention was that 
the opportunity was not always present. The legitimacy of the SDL/CAMV 
Government was somewhat deflated, primarily as a result of difficulties 
surrounding the multi-party cabinet; in addition, there were concerns over 
corruption, and the beginnings of suspicion over deliberate attempts to impede 
investigations into the perpetrators of the 2000 coup. Crucially though, the 
cohesion of the military was suffering. Bainimarama dismissed several officers 
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upon the basis of disloyalty; these officers later accused him of planning to take 
over Government.  Thus, the possibility of a coup was relatively high as a result of 
the strong military interests at play and the legitimacy of Government being 
somewhat deflated. However, the threats to the military’s interests were eventually 
resolved negating the motivation for intervention; additionally, the military was 
fractured, this lack of cohesion preventing the opportunity. These factors ultimately 
meant that no intervention occurred.  
Description of Events 
This dispute set the tone for the civil-military relations in the years to come. 
The tensions that drove it first began back in 2000, as Bainimarama generated a 
strong position for himself through his attempts to resolve the coup, in particular 
his dismissal of the President Ratu Mara, .The strength of this position was far 
beyond the normal bounds of a military commander. On top of this, there was a 
strange relationship between Qarase and Bainimarama, as Bainimarama initially 
put Qarase into the interim Government after the 2000 coup. Thus, Bainimarama 
had an unusual degree of authority, which many within the SDL/CAMV 
Government saw as inappropriate and therefore actively attempted to have him 
removed. There were several initial attempts at this where he was offered 
diplomatic postings to New Zealand and the United Kingdom, all of which he 
turned down. At one stage he was even put forth to be the next United Nations 
(UN) force Commander in Kuwait, a post which was well out of his reach, and one 
which he did not receive (The Review, 1/7/2003). In the end, the Government 
decided to simply not renew Bainimarama’s contract when it came up for review in 
early 2004. However, this sparked a tense dispute and in the end only resulted in 
Bainimarama gaining further power and authority that would define the subsequent 
disputes ending in Fiji’s fourth coup.  
In order to describe this dispute accurately, first the Labasa Court Martial will 
be discussed, as this set up much of the civil-military tensions. Secondly the multi-
party cabinet dispute will be considered, as this indicated a weakening of the 
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Government, and suggested at least a small deflation in legitimacy. Finally, 
attention will turn to the events surrounding Bainimarama’s reappointment.  
Labasa Court Martial 
The events surrounding the Labasa Court Martial were the first clear 
instances of a rift between the Government and the military. On 15 January 2003, 
56 soldiers pleaded guilty to mutiny for removing the commanding officer and 
taking control of the northern military camp at Labasa during the 200 coup. Two 
Lieutenants, Rupeni Vosayaco and Nemani Valeniyasana, pleaded guilty to the 
further charge of inciting the other 54 soldiers to mutiny against their commanding 
officers. For these crimes the two Lieutenants were sentenced to life 
imprisonment, with the remaining 54 soldiers given lesser terms ranging up to 10 
years (Radio Australia, 15/1/2003; Radio New Zealand International, 29/1/2003). 
Almost immediately after the sentences were handed down the Government 
began to criticise the length of the prison terms, as they were far more excessive 
than the terms given to the mutineers at Suva (Radio New Zealand International, 
31/1/2003). The Government therefore began a concerted effort to reduce the 
sentences of all 56 soldiers, to which the military was strongly opposed (Radio 
New Zealand International, 22/4/2003).  
The conflict was born when the Government submitted draft committal 
warrant papers, which reflected what they viewed to be more consistent sentences 
for the Labasa mutineers. However, the military did not agree with the reduced 
sentences, or the lack of consultation, and therefore refused to sign (The Review, 
1/7/2003). In early April the dispute became more confrontational with the 
withdrawal of military personal guarding Qarase’s residence and Government 
House (Fiji Daily Post, 15/4/2003). Bainimarama then stamped his authority; on 15 
April he visited Qarase, on 22 April he went to the President and on 24 April he 
saw the Minister of Home Affairs Jonetani Cokanasiga (Fiji Daily Post, 15/4/2003, 
25/4/2003; Radio New Zealand International, 22/4/2003). In all of these meetings it 
has been reported that the Commander made his opposition to the shortening of 
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the mutineers’ sentences apparent. These efforts eventually saw the Government 
capitulate and the original sentences handed down at the court-martial to stand 
(The Review, 1/7/2003).   
After the Labasa mutiny sentences ordeal, Bainimarama became much more 
outspoken against the Government and throughout 2003 he made several stabs at 
the administration. This upset many people, and it created a number of powerful 
enemies for the Commander, from within the Government, the Great Council of 
Chiefs and even within certain sections of the military. Thus, when his contract as 
Commander of the RFMF came up for renewal in early 2004, many people saw 
this as the opportunity they needed to get rid of what was becoming an increasing 
problem.  
Multi-Party Cabinet Dispute 
At the same time as the Labasa Court Martial dispute the Government was 
facing a serious constitutional issue surrounding the formation of a Multi-Party 
Cabinet that threatened to bring down the SDL/CAMV Government. The dispute 
dates right back to the formation of the SDL/CAMV Government in 2001. In the 
1997 Constitution it is stipulated under section 99(5) that:  
In establishing the Cabinet, the Prime Minister must invite all parties whose membership in 
the House of Representatives comprises at least 10% of the total membership of the House 
to be represented in the Cabinet in proportion to their numbers in the House (Fiji Constitution, 
1997).  
However, Qarase did not allow any members of the FLP into cabinet even though 
the party far exceeded the ten percent threshold. His basic argument was that it 
would bring two parties together with differing views and that this would only cause 
problems for Fiji. The FLP took the matter to the High Court, which ruled in their 
favour. The Government then took the matter to the Court of Appeal, which upheld 
the ruling. However, Qarase was still adamant and decided to take the final step 
and appealed to the Supreme Court (Radio New Zealand International, 
30/9/2002). However, it was made clear by the Supreme Court that this case was 
not urgent (Radio Fiji, 28/8/2002), so it lingered for some time. Eventually the court 
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date was set for 18 June 2003, and it looked as if the result would have a major 
impact upon the political landscape, with some speculation even going as far as to 
say that if the ruling went against Qarase’s Government then it would force a snap 
election (Radio New Zealand International, 3/6/2003). While the case only took two 
days to be presented it took the Supreme Court a month to return with a decision, 
which once again upheld the initial ruling and ordered the Government to include 
several members of the FLP in cabinet. The Court said that the notion of power 
sharing was central to the 1997 Constitution, so the multi-party cabinet provision 
could not be ignored (Fiji Daily Post, 19/7/2003).  
Qarase at this point had no option but to adhere to this ruling and he began to 
set up a multi-party cabinet. Qarase’s proposal was to give the FLP 14 ministerial 
positions, all of which were for minor portfolios and instead of replacing current 
ministers he decided to expand cabinet to from 22 to 36 seats. This caused much 
criticism from around the country, particularly from Chaudhry, other senior 
members of the FLP and opposition leader Mick Beddoes. It was argued that 36 
cabinet seats was ridiculous as this would make up almost half of parliament, and 
within such a large cabinet the FLP ministers would have minimal or even no say 
(Radio New Zealand International, 27/7/2003). Qarase was unwilling to budge, 
which resulted in a political deadlock; since there was no clear ruling on the 
numbers of seats to be given to the FLP or the size of cabinet, there was growing 
sentiment that the dispute needed to return to the Supreme Court to resolve the 
crisis (Radio New Zealand International, 7/8/2003). Chaudhry then inflamed the 
situation further by calling for support from the Pacific Islands Forum over the 
standoff (Fiji Daily Post, 16/8/2003). The conflict then degenerated to Chaudhry 
and Qarase exchanging comments through the media over the dishonest practices 
the other was using. After a few weeks of this feuding the two parties came 
together again for further talks. This time the discussions focused not on the 
bloated size of cabinet but whether the FLP should have fourteen or seventeen 
seats (Radio Fiji, 26/8/2003). However, they did not reach an agreement. Qarase 
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then offered fourteen seats to Labour members but they refused to take them, 
causing the conflict to continue.  
After further deadlock the case was finally taken to the Supreme Court (Radio 
New Zealand International, 17/9/2003). Once again, the case took a long time to 
come before the court, which eventually happened on 11 May 2004, and returned 
a ruling in early July. The judgement was split, and thus the Supreme Court simply 
called for the parties to come together for consultation and agree upon a solution 
(Fiji Live, 9/7/2004). However, each party took the same stance as before and the 
deadlock continued. Eventually, the FLP formally rejected Qarase’s offer to enter 
into a multiparty cabinet, for the stated reason that they did not want to be part of 
the deception and corruption that defined the SDL Government (Radio New 
Zealand International, 24/11/2004).  
Thus, the multi-party cabinet dispute put the country into political limbo and put 
the Government in a weak position. It was at the height of this crisis in the latter 
part of 2003 that the dispute over the reappointment of Bainimarama first 
emerged. As such, the Government was already in a weak position and beginning 
to lose the confidence of much of the public.   
Bainimarama’s Reappointment 
It had been no secret that ever since the 2001 election the Government 
wanted to remove Bainimarama. Still, it took the standoff over the Labasa 
mutineers to make the Government actually state that they would not renew his 
contract in early 2004. Bainimarama made it clear that he was not going to go 
quietly. On 16 December he stated his intention to keep the post of military 
Commander (Fiji Daily Post, 17/12/2003). Furthermore, the statement went on to 
strongly accuse the Government, and specifically those with ties to the 2000 coup, 
of trying to remove of him so they would not have to stand trial for their crimes 
(The Review, 1/1/2004). In early 2004 Bainimarama began to focus his attention 
upon the Ministry of Home Affairs, the body which advises the President on the 
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appointment of the Military Commander, stating that certain advisors were behind 
the attempts to have him removed (Fiji Sun, 6/1/2004). This was further fuelled 
when the Ministry revealed that it was keeping a close watch on the military 
because of recent high level meetings within the RFMF which were suspected to 
be a threat to national security (AFP, 12/1/2004). This infuriated the military which 
soon retaliated, stating that it was the role of the military to monitor national 
security, not the Ministry of Home Affairs (PACNEWS, 13/1/2004). On top of this 
the Government also severely cut the size of the military budget for 2004 (Radio 
New Zealand International, 17/11/2003). This brought the conflict to its height, and 
an intervention seemed like a real possibility.   
It was later revealed that, in the aforementioned high-level meetings within the 
RFMF, Bainimarama was attempting to rally his troops to gain support for his 
reappointment. However, the situation was not that simple. In an effort to gain 
cohesion Bainimarama dismissed several officers who were not showing loyalty 
and promoted those who would support him (Cabenatabua, 21/1/2004). This was 
a significant change in the military, as prior to this move there were still some 
individuals who did not agree with Bainimarama’s approach to the Government. 
With this one act the military became a much more unified and therefore more 
powerful force in Fijian society and politics. It was after this move that Qarase 
finally capitulated and assured Bainimarama that he would retain his position.  
As a further effort by the Government to smooth over relations with the military 
and diffuse the potential for intervention, the Chief Executive Officer for the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Jeremaia Waqanisau, was made a scapegoat for the 
Government’s position in the matter. Throughout much of this dispute the military 
directed most of its animosity at Waqanisau, primarily because he chaired the 
panel that would decide who the next Commander would be (Lewa, 7/1/2004). 
Furthermore, it was known that he opposed the reappointment of Bainimarama 
and as such it became a personal vendetta of the Commander to get rid of him. 
Tensions became especially heated in mid January; in one particular meeting it 
77 
 
The Causes of Fiji’s 5 December 2006 Coup  Brett Woods 
Part III: Triggering Causes 
Chapter Four – 2004 Reappointment of Bainimarama 
 
 
                                           
was alleged that Bainimarama actually threatened Waqanisau, for which the 
Ministry lodged a criminal complaint against the Commander, although he was 
never charged (Lewa, 20/1/2004). Soon after Bainimarama’s reappointment, the 
Government placed the blame for the messy incident on Waqanisau. On 3 
February it was announced that he would be posted to China as Fiji’s 
ambassador9 for the sake of national security because of irreconcilable differences 
with the Commander of the RFMF (Lewa, 5/2/2004).  
The previous fractures within the military became evident on Friday 7 May 
2004 when three of the officers who were dismissed due to disloyalty released a 
joint statement alleging that Bainimarama wanted to overthrow the Government 
during the confrontation over his reappointment (Fiji Live, 10/5/2004a). They 
claimed that Bainimarama dismissed them because they did not agree with his 
plans to take over Government. The next Monday the military denied any such 
plans, and reiterated its backing of the Government; meanwhile, several meetings 
were held between Government officials, as well as with the police to discuss the 
overthrow claims (Fiji Live, 10/5/2004a, 10/5/2004b). Soon after, Qarase decided 
to convene an urgent meeting of the National Security Council, which decided to 
refer allegations to the Government, which in turn decided to have a commission 
of inquiry into the Commander (Radio Fiji, 12/5/2004, 18/5/2004). Bainimarama 
warned the Government that such a commission of inquiry may backfire, as they 
may not want all he would say to be made public (Fiji Live, 20/5/2004). Qarase 
then stated that the commission of inquiry would go ahead and no-one could stop 
it (Radio Fiji, 21/5/2004). To add further intrigue to the issue it was claimed by the 
FLP that Qarase was only using the opportunity for a commission of inquiry as an 
excuse to once again try and get rid of Bainimarama (Fiji Times, 20/5/2004). In 
mid-July 2004 it was reported that a three-way tussle was underway behind closed 
doors, between the military, the President’s Office and the Prime Minister’s Office, 
 
9 It is fairly common in Fijian politics for an unwanted official to be posted overseas instead of 
actually being fired from their position.  
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over the terms of reference for the inquiry. Even more revealing was that the 
military had tried to get the President, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of 
the military, to drop the inquiry altogether (Radio New Zealand International, 
12/7/2004). Only a matter of days after this was reported the President announced 
that the Government would not proceed with the inquiry (Fiji Live, 16/7/2004).  
Discussion 
The importance of the dispute over Commodore Bainimarama’s 
reappointment as Commander of the RFMF should not be overlooked, as it was 
one of the closest incidents to fulfilling all the necessary triggering causes, and 
was thus very close to resulting in an intervention. There were plenty of motives, 
mostly stemming from the threat not to reappoint Bainimarama. There were issues 
in legitimacy because of the multi-party cabinet dispute, and when Bainimarama 
manufactured cohesion by dismissing those disloyal to him, the appropriate 
opportunity appeared to be present. However, at this stage when tensions had 
reached their highest point and an intervention appeared a real possibility, it forced 
Qarase to act. He conceded and reappointed Bainimarama, thus negating the 
central motivating force. Therefore, all the factors for intervention only came 
together for a very short period of time, and when Qarase capitulated he removed 
the primary motive.  
 Motive 
There was the appropriate motive for intervention in this dispute. This was 
largely generated by attacks on the military’s interest. While there were some 
Government failures that the military spoke out against these were relatively minor 
compared to several of the following disputes, and thus most likely had little 
influence. Three military interests were threatened. First, the pre-cursor dispute 
over the sentences of the Labasa mutineers threatened military autonomy. It was a 
mutiny and as such it was dealt with through court-martial, which is the realm of 
the military. When the Government attempted to interfere this sparked the military 
into action, as it was encroaching on their territory. While there may have been 
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some real motivation to ensure that the mutineers got the prison terms they were 
sentenced to, there was probably a much stronger motivation by the military to not 
allow interference in their affairs. Second, the central issue over the reappointment 
of Bainimarama attacked military autonomy and personal interests. As mentioned 
above it is customary for the RFMF Commander to serve two terms. Thus, when 
the Government stated that it was its intention not to renew Bainimarama’s 
contract it was interfering in the normal running of the military and as such it 
threatened the military’s autonomy. Closely related to this were the personal 
interests of Bainimarama. Much of this dispute centred on Bainimarama, it was the 
growing discontent with his actions that motivated the Government to attempt not 
to renew his contract, and it is presumable that it was his wish to retain his position 
that drove much of the military’s actions. Furthermore, all this was compounded by 
the reduction of the military’s budget for the upcoming year threatening the military 
interest of budgetary support. This suggested that the Government was trying to 
find a way to weaken the military, or at least assert some control over the military 
through one of the only tools they had.  
There were some Government failures that the military spoke out against 
during this dispute, however at this stage they were minor compared to the 
disputes that followed. There were several stabs at the administration; when the 
Government announced that it was not going to renew Bainimarama’s contract, he 
retaliated by saying that it was only because those who had connections to the 
2000 coup did not want to stand trial for their crimes. In addition, when the 
Government suggested a Commission of Inquiry, Bainimarama said that the 
Government would not want all he has to say to be made public, suggesting that 
there were issues of corruption, or connections to the 2000 coup that he would 
reveal. However, it is difficult to reconcile Government failures with a motivation to 
intervene. At this stage much of this talk appeared to be more rhetoric than failures 
so bad they would force the military to overthrow the Government for the good of 
the nation.  
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This shows that there were strong ‘military interests’ at play, but only minor 
‘Government failures’ motivating the military. Because of the strength of the 
military interests surrounding the reappointment of Bainimarama, there was a 
strong enough motivation for this dispute.  
 Opportunity 
The SDL/CAMV Government had some difficulties that would have weakened 
their legitimacy during this period. They suffered a political crisis over the multi-
party Cabinet Case. Due to the ongoing nature of the dispute and because the 
Government seemed to have no way to solve it, many people would have begun 
to question their ability to govern. As such, they began to lose support and 
confidence from many around the country. This was particularly evident when it 
was said that if the Government lost the case it might result in a snap election, 
presumably because they would have lost the support of the population, and would 
need to reaffirm their right to govern. Thus, this was a clear incidence of a 
legitimacy deflation.  
Furthermore, the Government had continuing problems over the ever-present 
issue of corruption, and efforts by the Government to impede investigations into 
the perpetrators of the 2000 coup, which much of the population saw as illegal 
acts, further damaging their legitimacy. In early 2003 the Opposition leader Mick 
Beddoes accused the Government of trying to cover up people connected to the 
2000 coup. It was an emerging sentiment at the time that the Government was 
deliberately impeding investigations, as evidenced through the lack of results, or 
even any strong action to find and prosecute those behind the coup (Radio New 
Zealand International, 4/3/2003). Later in the year the Attorney-General released a 
report which accused the Government of misusing $41,783,301 of trust money (Fiji 
Daily Post, 20/10/2003). Several reports emerged over corruption in the Public 
Works Department (Radio New Zealand International, 13/11/2003). Near the end 
of the year a scandal emerged over the issue of fishing licences, which also 
pointed to massive corruption; Chaudhry even went as far as to ask for a public 
81 
 
The Causes of Fiji’s 5 December 2006 Coup  Brett Woods 
Part III: Triggering Causes 
Chapter Four – 2004 Reappointment of Bainimarama 
 
 
inquiry, although he did not get his wish (Radio Fiji, 24/12/2003). All of these 
incidences together certainly lessened the public’s approval of the Government 
and thus damaged its legitimacy. 
While there was some legitimacy deflation, military cohesion was not at its 
strongest during this dispute. It appears that early on in this conflict the military 
suffered from some internal fracturing. This would have held Bainimarama back 
from implementing any intervention plans. Later when he consolidated his power 
by dismissing disloyal officers and therefore generating a cohesive military, 
Qarase finally yielded to allowing his reappointment, avoiding the possibility of 
intervention. Thus, military cohesion was a crucially important factor in this dispute, 
and was the key reason that an intervention did not occur. 
Conclusion 
Thus, the reason that this dispute did not occur comes down to a matter of 
timing. All of the factors were present at one stage or another, but they were never 
present together, or at least not for long enough for an intervention to occur. The 
motive for intervention was present from the threats to the military’s interests, 
namely the involvement of the Government in the Labasa Court Martial, the 
insistence not to reappoint the Commander, and the compounding issue over the 
reduced budget. Also the threats to Bainimarama’s personal interests played a 
crucial role. Yet in the end, the Government capitulated and gave Bainimarama his 
reappointment, which in effect nullified the greatest threat to the military’s interests, 
and furthermore Jeremaia Waqanisau, who the military perceived to be its greatest 
enemy, was sent overseas. The opportunity, on the other hand, was not present 
during much of the dispute. The legitimacy of the Government was deflated 
because of the multi-party cabinet dispute and some corruption. Yet it appears that 
throughout much of the dispute the military was fractured. In the end, Bainimarama 
was able to manufacture cohesion through dismissing the disloyal officers, which 
brought the potential for intervention to its highest. This was probably also the 
action that forced Qarase to give in and allow Bainimarama to be reinstated for his 
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second term. Thus, there was no period where both the motive and the opportunity 
came together, which is a necessity for a military coup.   
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C h a p t e r  F i v e  
THE “PROMOTION OF RECONCILIATION TOLERANCE AND UNITY BILL 
2005” DISPUTE 
 
The dispute surrounding the ‘Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and 
Unity Bill 2005’10 hit headlines all around the world and saw a growth in the 
boldness of the Commander. Through the Unity Bill, the Government attempted to 
start a process of national healing to put the events of the 2000 coup behind them. 
As part of this they proposed to give perpetrators of the coup amnesty for their 
crimes. This caused a dispute with the military that vehemently disagreed with the 
premise of this bill. Throughout this dispute the Commander became much more 
vocal, and began to put his stamp upon the political scene in Fiji. For this dispute 
most of the triggering causes were present; there was a motivating force coming 
from the early release of prisoners convicted of involvement in the 2000 coup, and 
the potential increase in prisoner releases though the proposed Unity Bill. 
Furthermore, there were some military interests threatened through potential 
discipline of Bainimarama, and his concern that the Reconciliation Commission 
may reveal his misconduct during the 2000 coup, including the removal of Ratu 
Mara and the brutal suppression of the November mutineers. There was also a 
degree of opportunity. There was some legitimacy deflation; this came from the 
early release of prisoners, which amounted to illegal behaviour. Additionally there 
was also bias in the actual Bill that alienated much of the population and caused a 
political crisis. In addition, the military appeared to be relatively cohesive. However, 
 
10 Hereafter this will be simply referred to as the Unity Bill for the sake of brevity. 
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there was no coup largely because the threats to the military’s interests were 
merely speculative and as such did not give a strong enough motivation for 
intervention.  
 
Description of Events 
To gain some context, firstly instances of the Government intervention shall 
be discussed, highlighting how coup investigations were impeded and how the 
Government implemented the early release of the most high profile prisoners 
convicted of involvement in the 2000 coup, who often had direct or indirect 
connections to the SDL/CAMV Government. This is necessary as it contributes to 
much of the motivating governmental failures and also were viewed by many as 
illegal acts contributing to a legitimacy deflation. After this the events surrounding 
the Unity Bill will be discussed.  
Seniloli, Vakalalabure, Leweniqila, Volavola, Rinakama and Savu Case 
The case of Senioli, Vakalalabure, Leweniqila, Volavola, Rinakama and Savu 
included many prominent Fijians. Ratu Jope Seniloli was the Vice-President at the 
time of the trial, but more importantly he was the candidate put forward by George 
Speight and the rebels for the post-coup interim Government to represent their 
interests. Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure was the Deputy Speaker of Parliament; Isireli 
Leweniqilia was the Minister of Sports; Peceli Rinakama was a former Member of 
Parliament; Viliame Volavola was a former Lieutenant Colonel Army Officer; and 
Viliame Savu was an already jailed nationalist. The group were suspected of being 
sworn in as ministers under Speight’s administration, for this they were charged on 
the night of 7 May 2003 with one count of taking an unlawful oath to commit a 
capital offence, and one count of engaging in a seditious enterprise, to which they 
all pleaded not guilty (Fiji Live, 8/5/2003; Radio New Zealand International, 
8/2/2004). As will become evident throughout this chapter the legal process in Fiji 
is often tediously slow, and it was not until more than a year later on 5 August 
2004 that all five men were convicted and given various sentences according to 
their level of involvement in the coup. Seniloli was given four years, Vakalalabure 
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six years, Rinakama and Volavola three years each, and Savu twelve months 
(Radio New Zealand International, 6/8/2004).  
However, it was only after their conviction that this case became interesting. 
On 23 August 2004 the Mercy Commission11 made it clear that they did not back a 
presidential pardon for Seniloli or any of the others convicted, and on 11 
November the group’s appeal was rejected by the Court, making an early release 
seem unlikely (Fiji1, 24/8/2004; Fiji Live, 11/11/2004). Nonetheless, on 25 
November, only a matter of days after the appeal was dismissed, Seniloli was 
released from prison by Attorney-General and Minister for Justice Qoriniasi Bale, 
under a compulsory supervision order, stating that it was for health reasons (Fiji 
Sun, 29/11/2004).12 On 29 November the military began to voice its opposition 
against the early release of Seniloli, with military spokesperson Captain Neumi 
Lewneni stating that the early release amounted to an endorsement of the 2000 
coup, and that it made a mockery of the military, the Police and more importantly 
the judicial system (Fiji Sun, 30/11/2004). This opposition continued well into early 
2005 and was the basis of much of the tension between the Government and the 
military during this period.  
Despite the controversy the early releases continued. On 18 January 2005 
Viliame Savu was released to serve the remainder of his sentence extramurally 
(Radio New Zealand International, 18/1/2005). Later on in the year, on 17 
December Volavola and Rinakama, were also released from jail six months early 
(Ragi, 17/12/2005). Finally Vakalalabure was also released early on 29 June 2006 
(Fiji Live, 29/6/2006). 
 
11 The “Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy” (or Mercy Commission) is set up under Section 
115 of the 1997 Constitution. It is the body which advises the President on pardoning convictions, 
it is headed up by the Attorney General and has two other members appointed by the President. 
12 Later the sickness of Seniloli was brought into question, as it was revealed, that in a sworn 
affidavit for his bail application signed in May 2004 Seniloli himself stated that "I do not suffer from 
any serious illness" (Elbourne, 23/12/2004) 
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Tarakinikini  
Lieutenant Colonel Filipo Tarakinikini rose to notoriety during the coup as the 
Spokesman for the RFMF. Speight then named him Military Chief in his rebel 
Government, thus, Tarakinikini became under suspicion of involvement. Yet it was 
not until New Zealand’s Foreign Minister Phil Goff accused Tarakinikini of 
involvement in the mutiny of 2 November 2000 that any attention was paid to him 
(Pacific Islands Report, 6/11/2000). Soon after, Tarakinikini, along with Colonel 
Ulaiafi Vatu, were placed under house arrest as the investigations into the mutiny 
began (ABC, 8/11/2000). However, within a few days both men were cleared of 
any involvement (Pacific Journalism Online, 17/11/2000). While the police cleared 
Tarakinikini of any connection to the mutiny, Bainimarama continued to allege 
involvement.  
In early 2001, after some persistence by Qarase, the United Nations 
appointed Tarakinikini to the post of planning officer in the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, a position that he eagerly accepted. (Fiji Daily Post, 
9/3/2001). Then in December 2001, during the court-martial of 15 soldiers accused 
with the coup and mutiny, Tarakinikini was implicated in evidence given by former 
Police Officer Jim Koroi (Radio Australia, 6/12/2001). This further kindled the 
military’s interest in bringing Tarakinikini to ‘justice’, and plans began to try and get 
him home (Wise, 13/3/2002). Because of this renewed interest, in early March 
Tarakinikini handed in his resignation to the military, citing that he no longer 
wanted to be victimised and saw no future in the military under the current 
leadership (Wise, 12/3/2002). However, the military refused to accept his 
resignation, while at the same time Qarase was again working the diplomatic 
channels in an effort to get Tarakinikini’s term at the UN extended (Fiji Daily Post, 
17/3/2002; Radio Fiji, 22/3/2002).  
Over the next four years the military continued to try and bring Tarakinikini 
home, most likely to face a court martial over his suspected involvement in the 
coup. Meanwhile Tarakinikini took the military’s decision to not accept his 
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resignation through the legal system, initially winning in the High Court but then 
having the decision overturned in the Appeal Court, which was further reinforced 
through the Supreme Court. Then in February 2005 the President officially rejected 
Tarakinikini’s resignation and called for him to return to Fiji (Lewa & Ali, 5/2/2005). 
In the middle of April 2005 Tarakinikini filed an affidavit suing the President Josefa 
Iloilo, Commander Voreqe Bainimarama, and Attorney General Qoriniasi Bale over 
the refusal to accept his resignation (Marau, 15/4/2005). Tarakinikini once again 
lost this case and the military persisted in its efforts to bring him back to Fiji, which 
is where the case stood in the lead up to December 2006, no nearer resolution 
than in 2002 when it first emerged.   
It was clear, from Qarase’s persistent efforts to make sure Tarakinikini was 
appointed to the UN and that his contract be renewed, that the Government did not 
want Tarakinikini to be brought to trial. Later in 2005 after the military had gained 
the support of the President, the Government would not back an effort to bring him 
home, further stifling the military’s efforts.  
Lalabalavu and Dimuri Trial 
The case of Lalabalavu and Dimuri is closely connected to the Labasa court-
martial dispute, as outlined in the previous chapter. The two senior ministers were 
convicted in a criminal court for their involvement in the Labasa mutiny; however 
they were released early from their jail term on orders from the Government.  
Two members of the controversial CAMV party, the Minister for Lands, Ratu 
Naiqama Lalabalavu, and Senator and Labasa Chief Ratu Josefa Dimuri, along 
with two other Chiefs, were charged with mutiny-related offences in early 2003 
(Radio New Zealand International, 18/3/2003). This is another case that 
demonstrates the often painfully slow legal process in Fiji, as it was not until May 
2004 that they stood before Court and entered their not guilty pleas (Katonivualiku 
& Nand, 25/5/2004). It took until August for the trial to actually begin (Radio New 
Zealand International, 31/8/2004), which dragged on until 3 April 2005 before they 
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were finally convicted for the crime of unlawful assembly and were sentenced to 
eight months imprisonment (Latunagauna, 5/4/2005).  
Yet, after serving only ten days of those eight months Lalabalavu and Dimuri 
were released extramurally on a compulsory supervision order by the 
Commissioner of Prisons Aisea Taoka (Fiji Live, 14/4/2005). Bainimarama was 
quick to criticise the releases, stating that the hype over reconciliation was a waste 
of time if those responsible for the political turmoil were being let loose (Fiji Times, 
19/4/2005), which was a reference to the dialogue surrounding the Unity Bill. For 
this criticism Vosanibola said he was considering disciplining the Commander, to 
which Bainimarama retaliated by stating that he would not be gagged (Fiji Live, 
20/4/2005). This did not amount to much, but it did add to the tensions between 
the military and the Government. Later on in the year when Lalabalavu and 
Dimuri’s sentences were up they were both allowed back into the House 
(Lutunauga, 13/9/2005). This was the first time that convicted ministers had been 
able to return to Parliament, which further infuriated the military.  
Expulsion of Peter Ridgeway 
In late June 2005 Qarase demanded that the ex-Deputy Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Peter Ridgway, leave the country immediately. Ridgeway had earlier 
in the year resigned from his position and had only returned to help with some 
cases which were connected to the 2000 coup. There were some irregularities in 
his contract, to which Qarase, rather than trying to mend them, cancelled his 
contract altogether and ordered him out of the country or he and his family would 
be sent to jail (Fiji Sun, 22/6/2005). While the military did not make any public 
comments about this, probably because they were focused more on the Unity Bill 
at the time, this once again shows the deliberate attempts by the Government to 
impede the investigations into the coup. 
Apisai Tora plus Twelve Trial 
Apisai Tora is an interesting character who has a history of involvement in 
Fijian politics and has been a thorn in the side of the RFMF. This case is no 
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different. In 2000 before the coup Tora was the leader of the hard line nationalist 
‘Taukei Movement’13 and soon after the coup he became a Senator. Because of 
his involvement with the Taukei movement, suspicion followed him around and on 
28 January 2003 he was charged, along with twelve others, with unlawful 
assembly, which related to the seizure of an army checkpoint and the blocking of 
Sabeto Junction on the Queens Highway during the height of the coup (Fiji Live, 
30/1/2003). On 24 February he appeared before the Court and pleaded not guilty, 
and was released on bail (Radio New Zealand International, 25/2/2003). When it 
finally came time to hear the case, Magistrate Sayed Mukhtar Shah found that 
there were huge discrepancies in the witnesses accounts and a general lack of 
evidence, and therefore decided to acquit Tora and his twelve accomplices of all 
charges (Fiji Sun, 4/11/2004).  
The case did not stop there, as on 5 September 2005 Tora and his twelve 
accomplices once again appeared in front of the Court as a result of an appeal by 
the Director of Public Prosecutions (Naivaluwaqa, 6/9/2005). This resulted in Tora 
and his accomplices finally being convicted, as it was found that the Magistrate’s 
Court misdirected itself on the onus of proof (Seema Sharma, 20/9/2005). On 27 
September 2005 Tora was given eight months in jail, while his accomplices were 
sentenced to four months each (Seema  Sharma & Mereseini, 28/9/2005). Yet, 
less than a month later Tora’s twelve accomplices were set free to serve their 
sentences extramurally, and in the middle of November Tora himself was also set 
free on a compulsory supervision order by Qoriniasi Bale (Fiji Times, 19/11/2005; 
Mereseini, 14/10/2005).  
Together these cases represent the most prominent examples of the early 
release of prisoners and the stifling of investigations for high profile suspects of the 
2000 coup by the Fijian Government. This became one of the military’s principal 
 
13 See Ch3 Background > Historical Legacies> 1987 Coups, for a description of the Taukei 
Movement.  
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focuses with the goal to ensure this pattern was ended. It was in this climate that 
the ‘Unity Bill’ was introduced.  
The Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill 
The “Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill” was introduced on 
4 May 2005, and it quickly stirred up much debate. Much of the controversy 
surrounded the amnesty provision for the perpetrators of the 2000 coup outlined in 
part 2 section 5(1)e: 
Facilitating the granting of amnesty by the President to persons who make full voluntary 
disclosures of all facts relevant to acts or omissions constituting or causing a violation of 
human rights associated with a political objective committed during the designated 
period ("Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill", 2005). 
The important points here are that if persons who were involved in the 2000 coup 
fully admit to their crimes, and can prove that they were politically motivated then 
they receive full amnesty. This was to be administered by the Reconciliation 
Commission, which was to be appointed by the President on the advice of the 
Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. This was 
presented by the Government as necessary to uncover the truth about what 
happened in 2000 and therefore begin the process of national healing. This ties in 
with the overall purpose of the Bill, which is to promote restorative justice rather 
than retribution, and to forgive and move on as a nation (L. Qarase, 2005). 
However, many did not accept this reasoning. Various concerns were raised 
about the power of the Reconciliation Commission which, because of its proposed 
appointment method, would essentially be a political body. There were also issues 
over the granting of amnesty to the perpetrators of the coup (Chandrasekharan, 
2005a; , 2005b; , 2005c; Lal, 2005). Opposition was raised from many corners 
against the Bill including several legal and humanitarian organisations, but the 
most venomous resistance came from the military that saw the Bill as a 
destabilising influence upon the country and an escalation of the trend of early 
releases from prison of those involved in the coup (Bainimarama, 2005). 
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It was not long after the Introduction of the Unity Bill that Bainimarama first 
spoke out against it, calling it ‘reconciliation bull’ on 13 May (Fiji Live, 14/5/2005). 
Then on 29 May Bainimarama and over 20 other military officers dressed in 
uniform sat in the visitors’ gallery in Parliament in a silent protest against the Bill 
(Kikau, 1/6/2005). In late May the United States ambassador David Lyon first 
entered into the discussions by condemning the Bill, saying that it would set a 
precedent for further coups, for which he was heavily criticised by the Fijian 
Government (Fiji Live, 31/5/2005). 
At about this time a personal dispute emerged between Bainimarama and the 
new Minister of Home Affairs Josefa Vosanibola. Vosanibola was appointed in 
December 2004 to replace Joketani Cokanasiga due to the increasing difficulties 
that he was having controlling the military (Radio New Zealand International, 
16/12/2004). The new Minister took a much more combative approach to dealing 
with the military than previous ministers had taken. The first obvious notification of 
this came in mid-April 2005 when Vosanibola warned Bainimarama over his public 
statements against the Government (Fiji Live, 19/4/2005), and again in May when 
he condemned the military’s comments and actions concerning the Unity Bill (Fiji 
Times, 28/5/2005b). In early June Vosanibola told Bainimarama to ‘toe the line’ 
after the sit-in at Parliament; the military simply replied by defending its right to 
speak publicly, and furthermore the military challenged the Government to try and 
discipline the Commander (Fiji Live, 1/6/2005; Radio New Zealand International, 
7/6/2006). Vosanibola took up this challenge. He publicly stated that the 
Commander would be disciplined for his outbursts against the Unity Bill (Marau, 
10/6/2005). However nothing eventuated and soon after it was revealed that the 
President was asked to dismiss Bainimarama, to which he refused, and asked the 
parties to resolve their differences (Radio New Zealand International, 20/6/2005).  
In an address to his soldiers on 23 June Bainimarama warned of continued 
political instability and the possibility of upheaval in the future (Mereseini, 
24/6/2005). At the end of the month the military gave its first parliamentary 
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submission against the Bill, claiming that it would undermine the integrity of the 
military if the perpetrators of the 2000 coup and mutiny were set free (Fiji Times, 
30/6/2005). 
July brought tensions to their peak polarising the entire country along ethnic, 
political, and socioeconomic lines.14 Early in the month, the FLP aligned itself with 
the military in opposition to the Bill, galvanising the strong political backlash (Fiji 
Live, 11/7/2005). Then on 11 July Bainimarama released an eight-page statement 
against the Bill, stating that it would send the country into anarchy and warning that 
the military would take action against any who act to ‘destabilise’ the country 
(Biumaiono, 12/7/2005). This was met with intense criticism from many, including 
the US Ambassador David Lyon who said that any action against an elected 
government by the military would be ‘unacceptable’ (C. Wilson, 12/7/2005). The 
situation became even more serious the next day when a draft copy of the 
statement signed by Bainimarama was leaked, in which the Commander 
threatened to remove the Government (P. Williams, 13/7/2005). In this draft copy, 
Bainimarama stated “The RFMF must then stop the Bill from passing or get rid of 
the Government if it is passed. We can recover without this Government, we 
cannot recover from this Bill” (Bainimarama, 2005). This heightened the conflict 
and forced Qarase and Vosanibola to begin discussing what to do about 
Bainimarama (Fiji Live, 13/7/2005b). From these discussions, it was decided not to 
remove Bainimarama but to seriously consider disciplining him (Biumaiono, 
16/7/2005). Later in the month Vosanibola stated that he would use his 
constitutional powers to discipline the Commander, (Fiji Live, 25/7/2005) however 
this required the consent of the President, which they were never able to attain; as 
such, in the end no action was taken. In early October 2005 the military proclaimed 
victory by stating that the Ministry of Home Affairs had no power to discipline the 
Commander (Radio New Zealand International, 6/10/2005). By this stage it was 
becoming obvious that Bainimarama had a good deal of influence over the 
 
14 As a generalisation the rural poor accepted the government’s presentation of the Bill, while the 
educated urban working class rejected it. 
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President, and thus there were particular difficulties for the Government in 
controlling the military.  
However, soon after the release of Bainimarama’s statement Qarase made 
his first concessions. On 13 July 2005 he released a three page statement of his 
own in which he said that the Bill would be reviewed in light of the public reaction 
(Fiji Live, 13/7/2005a). However, tensions did not cool down that easily, and on 14 
July it was reported that an ex-RFMF soldier, Viliame Raqio, now a member of the 
Tel Aviv-based mercenary company Global Security International, offered to 
defend the Government if the Bill was passed (Radio New Zealand International, 
14/7/2005). This was refuted by the Government, and at a National Security 
Council meeting soon after they rejected the idea altogether (PACNEWS, 
19/7/2005). At the end of the month support began to rise again for the Bill, as all 
14 provinces officially supported it. Soon after the Great Council of Chiefs also 
gave their endorsement, although they left the door ajar by requesting that the 
Government also consider the concerns raised by the various groups opposed to 
the Bill (Fiji Times, 19/7/2005).  
By August the tension began to ease; first, Qarase stated that the best way to 
resolve the increasing crisis would be through open dialogue with the military, 
which was a general weakening of the Government’s approach (Fiji Live, 
1/8/2005). Not long after, the Lower House decided to extend the time given to 
hear submissions on the Bill (Fiji Live, 17/8/2005). Then, in early October Qarase 
announced that the Bill was to have a major make-over to appease its critics (Fiji 
Live, 4/10/2005). Still, the military did not budge in its staunch opposition to the Bill, 
stating that it would fight it all the way, even if the amnesty provision was amended 
(Fiji Times, 28/11/2005).  
At the beginning of December the Parliamentary Sector Standing Committee 
on Justice, Law and Order, headed by Manasa Tugia, tabled the 
recommendations to amend the Bill. The Committee recommended restricting the 
powers of the Reconciliation Commission so as it would not have the ability to 
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determine which cases to pursue in the court process, or have the power to drop 
pending cases at its discretion. However, crucially, it did not recommend 
eliminating the amnesty provision, but it did restrict its application to only cover 
crimes of non-violent illegal assembly and illegal demonstration, during and after 
the 2000 coup (Fiji Times, 2/12/2005).  
In spite of these changes, opposition to the Bill continued into the new year. In 
February the Government began expediting the process of rewriting the Bill before 
the election, which caused the military to warn the Government against pushing its 
will upon the people (Fiji Live, 16/2/2006). Once again, though, the Bill was put on 
hold, this time because of the early election called by Qarase which was set for 
May, forcing the Government to refocus its attention (Fiji Times, 2/3/2006). After 
the election win the Government again pushed the Bill back into light, with it 
appearing on the Presidents ‘Address at the Opening of the New Parliament’ as a 
goal for the new Government to implement, taking into consideration the 
recommendations by the Standing Committee (Uluivuda, 2006). In late June it was 
confirmed that the Government was in the process of presenting a re-written form 
of the Unity Bill (Vunileba, 30/6/2006). This is where the Bill stood in the lead up to 
the coup.  
Discussion 
This was a particularly tense dispute, which set up the civil-military problems 
that would eventually result in the 5 December 2006 coup. There were some 
motives at play here largely from Government failures, such as the early release of 
coup convicts, and the actual Unity Bill itself. There was also the appropriate 
opportunity because of the legitimacy deflation as a result of the political crisis 
surrounding the Unity Bill and the illegal early release of prisoners. Cohesion also 
appeared at this stage to be relatively strong. Yet there was no coup. It is argued 
here that the reason for this is that the Government failures on their own were not 
sufficient to motivate the military to intervene. They were sufficient for the military 
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to protest over the Bill, but because of the lack of any substantial threats to its 
interests, the military were never going to go as far as a coup at this stage.  
Motive 
There were only minor threats to the military’s interests, and while there were 
some strong Government failures it does not appear that these were sufficient to 
garner the motive for intervention. There were three military interests threatened in 
this dispute, two coming from Bainimarama’s personal interests, and the third from 
a potential functional rival from the offer to protect the Government by Viliame 
Raqio. First, the disciplinary measures threatened by Vosanibola against 
Bainimarama were directly challenging the Commander’s interests. If these had 
been followed through then the motivation for intervention would have dramatically 
increased. As it was, the constitutional structure forced Vosanibola to go through 
the President, who at this stage appeared to be very susceptible to influence by 
Bainimarama, thus making the likelihood of disciplinary measures very slim. The 
second and more pertinent personal interest was that Bainimarama felt that the 
Reconciliation Commission would unveil the truth over his actions during the 2000 
coup and November mutiny. The actions included his dismissal of Ratu Mara and 
assumption of the role of President during the coup, and the treatment of the 
captured soldiers after the November mutiny, which appeared to have amounted 
to torture, in many cases resulting in death. The suggestion that this was a 
motivating factor became popular among observers of Fiji’s politics after the 
military announced that it would fight the Bill even if the Government removed the 
amnesty provisions. The rhetoric from the military was that this was their only 
objection to the Bill, and thus when they said that they would fight it regardless of 
the amendments observers began looking for other potential motivating influences 
(Lal, 2005, 2007a).  
However, neither of these were overt threats, rather they were potential 
threats. Bainimarama was never disciplined, and since he had such a tight rein 
over Iloilo at the time it was unlikely that he was ever going to be. The other 
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interest, of the Reconciliation Commission’s potential investigation into 
Bainimarama’s actions, is only speculative. There is no solid evidence to suggest 
that Bainimarama was motivated by this. Furthermore, even if he was so affected it 
was only a potential threat. Such a threat was a long way off from materialising, 
and as such it probably was not strong enough to motivate the military into action.  
There was another potential threat to the military’s interests from the offer by 
Viliame Raqio to protect the Government if they passed the Unity Bill. This 
represented a potential functional rival, and it really brought the possibility of 
intervention to its peak. As noted in Chapter Two the emergence of a functional 
rival, especially one taking on the role as a ‘palace guard’, will usually antagonise a 
military and harden their resolve to intervention. However, the Government did not 
take up this offer and thus its effect was quickly diminished.   
Government failures that may have influenced the military were particularly 
high in this dispute. The early release of high profile coup convicts and efforts by 
the Government to impede coup investigations were repeatedly discussed in the 
media by the military. This was probably the strongest motivator for this dispute. In 
addition, in October the military accused the Immigration Department of corruption 
(Radio New Zealand International, 5/10/2005). Interestingly, this was one of the 
only times before the December 2006 coup that the RFMF openly accused the 
Government of corruption. Later this would result in a full restructure of the 
Immigration Department, as a result of years of suspected corruption (Radio New 
Zealand International, 9-11-2005). The last Government failure that the military 
spoke out against was the actual Unity Bill itself, which it saw as an intensification 
of the Government’s leniency towards the perpetrators of the 2000 coup. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, the military, led by Bainimarama, had the proper 
conviction of the perpetrators of the 2000 coup as one of its main priorities at this 
time, whether this was for the good of the country or a personal grudge by 
Bainimarama is difficult to say. Nonetheless, it had a particularly high interest in 
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ensuring that this Bill was not passed, and it is hard to dispute that this was one of 
the key motivating factors behind this dispute.  
These failures by the Fijian Government certainly motivated the military to 
speak out against it, and were probably the chief motivating factor behind the 
threat to remove the Government in the draft statement leaked in July. However, in 
comparison with the other disputes that had much stronger threats to military 
interests, this was a relatively subdued intervention threat. The threat only came in 
a leaked draft, not in an emphatic and repeated statement. It is therefore the 
contention of this research that in this case the military never intended to 
overthrow the Government, because the crucial intervention motivator, of threats 
to the military’s interests, was missing.  
Opportunity 
While the motive for intervention was not present in this dispute, the 
opportunity was. There was a significant legitimacy deflation as a result of several 
illegal acts, continuing corruption and some economic problems; military cohesion 
also appeared to be stable. In this dispute, the Government committed many acts 
that much of the population considered illegal. The early release of prisoners jailed 
over connections to the 2000 coup and efforts to impede investigation into those 
involved exhibited signs of preferential treatment, flouting the law and showing 
disregard for proper practice. Thus, many people around Fiji were beginning to 
question the legitimacy of these acts, and it brewed a growing distrust of the 
Government’s objectives. However, the most important illegal act was the drafting 
and promotion of the Unity Bill itself, which raised concerns for many citizens, 
including the Indian community, the legal community, and some from the 
indigenous community. These people considered the Bill to run contrary to the 
1997 Constitution. Such accusations are a strong indicator that these people saw 
the Bill as illegal, which would have lowered the legitimacy of the Government. 
As always, there were issues over corruption. Corruption within the Fisheries 
Ministry over the illegal issuance of licences was once again raised, and police 
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investigations began (Radio New Zealand International, 31/3/2005). A suspended 
police officer claimed that the Police had him removed because he was revealing 
too much information about the agricultural scam (Catanasiga, 3/4/2005). This was 
widely suspected to have been a vote-buying scheme by the SDL party in the 
2001 election, and thus once again raised old concerns over the legality of their 
election win and thus the legitimacy of the regime. The Auditor-General’s report 
released in August stated that there were tens of millions of dollars wasted through 
various departments from mismanagement of funds and corruption (Radio New 
Zealand International, 22/8/2005). The aforementioned issue over corruption in the 
Immigration Department added to this list of corrupt Government practices. 
Furthermore, the Government faced a growing economic problem. The price 
cut ordered on the EU by the WTO for sugar from certain developing countries, 
including Fiji, was upheld in the WTO Court of Appeal in May 2005, during the 
height of the dispute over the Unity Bill. This confirmed the reality of a dramatic 
drop in earnings for this vital industry (Fiji Live, 4/5/2005).15 Then later in the year 
in the Auditor-General’s report it was claimed that the rampant spending of the 
Government meant that Fiji’s debt was growing faster than the economy 
(Biumaiono, 20/8/2005). This raised serious questions over the Government’s 
handling of the economy, which further added to the deflation in legitimacy.  
As such, there were several performance failures. As with all of the disputes 
discussed in this research it is difficult to tell whether there was a significant 
enough legitimacy deflation for a military intervention. In this instance though, the 
strong resistance to the Unity Bill and the support that the military was beginning to 
gain during this period suggests that there was either a sufficient legitimacy 
deflation or enough significant factors to be very close to it. If the military had 
attempted to overthrow the Government it appears that they would have had the 
support of enough of the country for it to be a success.    
 
15 For more on the sugar reform see Chapter 3 > Domestic Political Economic and Social Context > 
Economic 
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As for the other criteria for the opportunity for intervention, military cohesion 
was relatively stable in this dispute. The offer by Viliame Raqio to protect the 
Government against the military shows some of the past weakness coming back to 
haunt the military. Yet it does not show any current problems. However, since this 
dispute occurred only months before the attempted mutiny by Baledrokadroka, it 
does suggest that there were some internal rifts, which may have come to the 
surface if Bainimarama had attempted a coup. However, the attempted mutiny was 
still several months off so treating it as evidence starts go get into the realm of 
speculation which should be avoided. So, for the purpose of this discussion it will 
be considered that there were no problems of military cohesion, which along with 
the deflation in legitimacy resulted in an adequate window of opportunity for an 
intervention to be a success.   
Conclusion 
It appears that there was probably the necessary opportunity for intervention 
from the Government’s performance failures which resulted in a deflation in 
legitimacy, along with the apparent stability of military cohesion. There were also 
some motivating factors; the strongest of these was probably the governmental 
failures surrounding the proper investigation into, and prosecution of suspects of 
the 2000 coup. In addition there were some threats to the military’s interests from 
the personal interests of Bainimarama, to not be reprimanded or to face scrutiny 
for his actions in the 2000 coup and November mutiny. Yet these are only 
speculated by observers of Fijian politics to be motivating factors, and furthermore 
they were both far from being realised. While there were plenty of governmental 
failures the lack of threats to the military’s interests meant that there was not the 
motive for intervention. The military was certainly motivated to publicly criticise the 
Government but the fact that it did not even attempt an intervention even though 
the opportunity to intervene was present during this dispute suggests that they 
were not sufficiently motivated. Thus, it is the conclusion of this chapter that there 
was no military intervention because there was not a strong enough motive 
because of the lack of threats to the military’s interests. Therefore, military 
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interests appear to be a crucial aspect to generate the appropriate motive. While 
the failures of the civilian Government may be enough to motivate the military into 
publicly speaking out against the Government, it does not seem sufficient to push 
the military that one step further to instigate a coup. 
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C h a p t e r  S i x  
JANUARY 2006 COUP THREAT 
 
In early January 2006 the RFMF stated that it would not hesitate to overthrow 
the Government if they kept up their racist policies. This was certainly a bold 
statement, which in retrospect was an ominous warning, but why then did the 
military not overthrow the Government in January? This was primarily because 
there was not the appropriate opportunity for intervention. As will be shown, there 
was plenty of motive: military interests were threatened by surcharges put upon 
Bainimarama for overspending, and there were difficulties in carrying out a military 
court-martial as a result of Government interference. There were also some 
Government failures, stemming from the Unity Bill, as well as the Fisheries Bill and 
Fijian Court System Bill; the military also continued its objections to the early 
release of prominent figures convicted of involvement in the 2000 coup. However, 
there was no opportunity; the legitimacy of the Government had largely recovered 
from the difficulties felt during the height of the Unity Bill dispute, and there was an 
election to be held later in the year that helped ensure the legitimacy of the 
Government. Furthermore, there were difficulties in military cohesion, indicated by 
an attempted mutiny staged by Baledrokadroka, which meant that there was no 
opportunity for the military to intervene. 
Description of Events 
This dispute was the culmination of three ongoing civil-military tussles. The 
first of these was the continuing Unity Bill dispute, described in the preceding 
chapter. The other two were the surcharges put upon Bainimarama by the Finance 
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ministry, and the difficulties faced in the CRW mutiny court martial which will be 
examined below. The analysis will then move on the actual coup threat and 
Baledrokadroka’s attempted mutiny.  
 Surcharge 
In a memorandum from the CEO of Finance and National Planning, 
Bainimarama was informed, as the Chief Accounting Officer of the RFMF, that the 
Ministry intended to surcharge him F$116,379.95, for over-expenditure of over 
F$3m incurred by the military without proper authority during 2003. Bainimarama 
appealed this decision in January 2005, however he was informed that the 
surcharge would stand, but that the amount would be reduced to F$49,590.11, to 
be deducted from his salary at F$300 per fortnight beginning on 1 March 2005 
(High Court of Fiji, 2005). This was part of a larger undertaking by the Finance 
Ministry, which was trying to get tough on the over-expenditure that was crippling 
the fragile economy. The Finance Ministry personally surcharged six government 
CEOs and six heads of departments for exceeding their budgets, of which 
Bainimarama was one (Radio New Zealand International, 31/1/2005).  
After it was confirmed by the Finance Ministry in early 2005 that the surcharge 
against Bainimarama would stand, the Commander reacted angrily and threatened 
to withdraw the soldiers acting as the Prime Minister’s personal security guards 
unless the surcharge was dropped (Lewa, 3/2/2005). A week later on 10 February 
the military followed through on this threat. However, the police quickly picked up 
the security of Qarase, and the Prime Minister’s Office said that they had reached 
the point of no return and would not request army security again (Fiji Live, 
11/2/2005). Soon after, the Government held a National Security Council meeting 
where the possibility of disciplining Bainimarama over his actions was discussed, 
but nothing eventuated from this (Kikau, 13/2/2005). 
The RFMF then began a legal battle to have the surcharge revoked. In late 
February military lawyers filed a legal challenge in the High Court, arguing that the 
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budget was simply too small hence the military was always going to exceed it 
(Radio New Zealand International, 21/2/2005). This argument focused on the 
unaccounted costs from the return of 300 soldiers from UN peacekeeping missions 
in the Middle East as well as the extra cost associated with the court-martial for 
soldiers associated with the coup and mutiny (Radio New Zealand International, 
31/1/2005). The military received further questioning, this time from the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC), who called the military, among several other 
departments, to answer for its overspending (Fiji Times, 8/3/2005). The RFMF 
were supposed to meet with PAC on 9 March, but the military’s accountants 
boycotted the meeting, ostensibly because of the pending case over the 
surcharge, however this merely served to show, once again, who was in charge 
(Fiji Times, 10/3/2005). In mid-April they finally met with PAC, and they pleaded 
the military’s case, maintaining that it was forced to overspend because of 
increased commitments that Cabinet required from the RFMF, a justification that 
the Committee chairman Poseci Bune found to be reasonable (Fiji Times, 
16/4/2005).  
In late May the High Court granted leave for an order to stay the proceedings, 
so that Bainimarama could apply for a judicial review on the surcharge, for which a 
substantive hearing was set for 10 June. The Judge also required the Finance 
Ministry to stop surcharging the Commander and refund the money already 
deducted (Fiji Times, 28/5/2005a). At the conclusion of this case on 14 October 
2005 Justice Jiten Singh ruled that the charges were brought under improper 
financial regulations, and were therefore unlawful (High Court of Fiji, 2005). Thus, 
the surcharge was reversed by the High Court.  
This was not the end of the dispute though; in late 2005 it was revealed that 
the Finance Ministry had defied the Court’s ruling and was still deducting the 
F$300 per fortnight from Bainimarama’s salary (Radio New Zealand International, 
7/12/2005). The military, after some failed efforts to meet and discuss the issue 
with the Finance Ministry, filed a contempt of court proceeding in the High Court 
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(Radio New Zealand International, 13/12/2005). The High Court quickly 
responded, and ordered the Ministry to reimburse the Commander (Lalakato, 
24/12/2005). However, it was not until after the height of tensions between the 
military and the Government in January 2006 that the Ministry finally gave in, 
stopped the surcharge and repaid Bainimarama (Radio New Zealand International, 
30/1/2006).  
 Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit Mutiny at Queen Elizabeth Barracks, Court-Martial 
On 2 November 2000 members of the disbanded Counter Revolutionary 
Warfare Unit (CRW) of the RFMF staged an attempted mutiny at Queen Elizabeth 
Barracks, the army headquarters in Nabua, Suva. In the ensuing gunfight eight 
soldiers were killed, five from the CRW and three loyal to the military, a much 
higher number of casualties than during the actual coup which took place almost 
six months earlier. In the following months all those suspected of involvement were 
rounded up and charged with mutiny, and were tried by military court-martial. This 
was a slow process and it was not until two years later that the first convictions 
were ruled upon and sentences handed out. Fifteen soldiers were charged and 
sentenced; the leader of the mutiny, Shane Stevens, was given life imprisonment 
with the rest receiving terms ranging from ten months to ten years (Radio New 
Zealand International, 14/11/2002). 
However, this was only the beginning of what was to become a long and 
tedious legal process. On 13 February 2003 a second court-martial began of 
former CRW soldiers charged with mutiny at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks (Radio 
New Zealand International, 13/2/2003). Two of the soldiers pleaded guilty and 
were given sentences of five and a half years and three years respectively while 
the remaining 21 went to trial (Radio New Zealand International, 20/7/2003). Again 
the slow legal process in Fiji hampered the trial, and it was not until July 2004 that 
it concluded, finding all 21 guilty, and sentencing them to terms ranging from three 
to six years (Lutunauga, 7/8/2004).  
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This should have been the end of the matter. However, 20 of the convicted 
CRW members from the second court-martial appealed their sentences (Marau, 
24/2/2005). On the conclusion of this case the Court of Appeal ruled a land mark 
decision, ordering the retrial of all 20 soldiers due to irregularities in the way that 
the court-martial was conducted (Fiji Live, 16/8/2005). As a result nine solders 
were released from prison but were then quickly re-arrested by the military in 
anticipation of a quick retrial; the remaining eleven were kept in prison as they 
were serving sentences for other coup-related crimes (Ragi, 18/8/2005).  
It was at this stage that the situation began to have an influence on the 
already tense civil-military relations. In early October 2005 a new ten-member 
panel was announced for the retrial, led by Judge Advocate Graham Leung (Fiji 
Live, 5/10/2005). A dispute then emerged in late October; the President, in one of 
the rare instances of defiance against the RFMF, withdrew the convening order for 
the court-martial because of what he described as a “procedural anomaly” in the 
appointment of Graham Leung (Ragi, 20/10/2005). After outcry from the military 
claiming that this was simply because Leung was the choice of the military, not the 
Government, President Iloilo re-appointed Leung and set the date for the court-
martial for 25 November (Ragi, 27/10/2005). Yet, there were further delays and 
adjournments in proceedings and in mid-December the trial had still not begun. 
This began to frustrate the military, and on 20 December they remonstrated, 
saying that the continuing delays were the result of Government interference, and 
called for the resignation of the Home Affairs CEO Lesi Korovavala, as they 
believed that he was the primary instigator of this interference (Fiji Live, 
20/12/2005). The next day the Ministry of Home Affairs retaliated, saying that it 
could not afford to pay Leung the F$130,000 offered to him by the military, instead 
offering F$30,000 (Qalo, 21/12/2005). The military responded, by calling on senior 
bureaucrats to stop meddling in the affairs of the military, as Leung’s pay was 
equal to that of the last Judge who presided over the case, and that the money 
would come from the military’s budget, not the Ministry’s (Ragi, 22/12/2005). This 
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dispute caused the already shaky relations between the Government and the 
military to come near breaking point. However, tensions were relieved on 4 
January 2006 as the Ministry of Home Affairs finally gave in and approved Leung’s 
appointment on a salary of F$130,000 to be paid out of the military’s budget (Ali, 
5/1/2006). 
When the court-martial eventually began in mid-January 2006 it suffered from 
several further adjournments, which spread the case out until August. Ten soldiers 
pleaded guilty, and were given relatively lenient sentences ranging from one to 
three years (Fiji Times, 11/2/2006), while the remaining mutineers went to trial and 
were all found guilty and sentenced to terms from three to six years, the same as 
the original court-martial (Fiji Live, 11/8/2006). 
 Coup Threat and Baladrokadroka 
Tensions between the military and the Government were high in December 
2005 because of the continuing dispute over the ‘Unity Bill’, the budget surcharges 
put upon Bainimarama, and the dispute with the Ministry of Home Affairs over the 
pay of Judge Advocate Graham Leung. Further adding to these tensions 
Bainimarama asked to relocate his office to Government Buildings, for the stated 
purpose of being closer to the Minister of Home Affairs to improve the lines of 
communication. Vosanibola strongly opposed this request, as it would have 
condoned the RFMF’s political role and consolidated the Commander’s political 
presence. Therefore, the Government rejected the idea. Bainimarama reacted 
angrily, stating that the military would no longer consider itself under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry because it did not receive any recognition from the 
Minister (Biumaiono, 31/12/2005). This was certainly a bold statement; however, 
probably more relevant was that in the latter part of his spiel Bainimarama first 
accused the Government of trying to introduce racist laws, pointing specifically to 
the well publicised Unity Bill, but also to the Fisheries Bill and the proposed 
indigenous Fijian court system Bill (Biumaiono, 31/12/2005). Vosanibola 
responded by declaring the proposed move illegal, and Bainimarama’s comments 
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unconstitutional (Vunileba, 1/1/2006). This added further fuel to the issue, and on 3 
January Bainimarama called the Qarase Government and Vosanibola 
‘incompetent’ and asked them to resign (Radio New Zealand International, 
3/1/2006). This resulted in a to-and-fro tussle that came to a head on 9 January, 
when Bainimarama said that if the Government kept up its racist policies the 
military would not hesitate to take control of the country (Biumaiono, 9/1/2006). 
This caused uproar in Fiji, as the statement amounted to a coup threat. Vosanibola 
called on Bainimarama to respect the elected Government, but for the first time 
admitted that he did not have the power to discipline the Commander (Radio New 
Zealand International, 4/1/2006). Bainimarama continued to present a 
confrontational stance challenging the Government to ‘sack’ him, to which it had 
no response (Radio New Zealand International, 5/1/2006). 
The situation was further complicated on 12 January when the army 
headquarters suddenly closed as Lieutenant Colonel Baledrokadroka staged what 
has since been referred to as an attempted mutiny (Fiji Live, 13/1/2006b). This is 
an event with two distinct sides: Bainimarama claimed that Baledrokadroka had 
personal aspirations to take control of the military, to which end he tried to 
overthrow Bainimarama and actually threatened the Commander’s life (Rarbici & 
Ragi, 15/1/2006). On the other side Baledrokadroka claimed that Bainimarama 
was positioning himself for a coup, and he questioned the wisdom of this act, and 
refused to be part of the plans (Biumaiono, 17/1/2006). In either event, 
Baledrokadroka countermanded the Commander’s orders and was subsequently 
put on leave pending resignation. The military then began setting up a board of 
inquiry to look into the events and flush out any further dissenters within the ranks 
(Fiji Live, 14/1/2006).  
Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, who at the time was the acting President as Iloilo was 
out of the country, then stood up and took much of the burden of responsibility for 
mending this complicated situation. Initially he held separate meetings with 
Bainimarama and then with Vosanibola and Qarase to discuss the impasse (Fiji 
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Live, 13/1/2006a). Then on 16 January he got both parties together for a meeting, 
which resulted in the “Government House Agreement”, in which Qarase agreed to 
deal directly with Bainimarama and Bainimarama agreed to recognise the elected 
Government and to take his disputes directly to Qarase rather than through the 
media (Fiji Live, 16/1/2006). As part of this agreement regular talks were organised 
between Bainimarama and Qarase. While these talks helped temper the situation, 
they did not last. On 5 March Bainimarama decided to cancel the talks with the 
Prime Minister because he thought they were not achieving what the military 
desired (Fiji Live, 5/3/2006). 
At the same time, the situation surrounding Baledrokadroka continued. First, 
in a show of support for the military, FLP President Jokapeci Koroi stated on Fiji 
TV that Qarase, Vosanibola and Korovavala influenced Baledrokadroka to 
challenge the Commander. Qarase then filed an official complaint to the Police 
against Koroi for inciting violence and disturbing the peace (D. Narayan, 
18/1/2006). Nevertheless, Bainimarama continued Koroi’s argument stating that he 
had evidence of a phone call between Baledrokadroka and someone else outside 
of camp pertaining to the attempted mutiny (Rarabici, 16/1/2006). Subsequently 
the military re-instigated its bid to have the CEO of the Ministry of Home Affairs 
Korovavala removed, as it was suspected that he was the primary actor 
influencing Baledrokadroka (Fiji Live, 17/1/2006). Then in late January, a military 
Board of Inquiry set up to investigate Baledrokadroka’s attempted mutiny began its 
investigations. Even though the process was continually hampered by non-
cooperation from Government personnel and the refusal of Baledrokadroka to 
return from New Zealand, the inquiry concluded in late February, finding that three 
senior army officers including Baledrokadroka would face a court-martial for mutiny 
(Fiji Live, 13/3/2006; Fiji Times, 28/2/2006). However, because Fiji does not have 
a Treaty of Extradition with New Zealand the military was unable to bring 
Baledrokadroka back to Fiji and the case stagnated.  
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Discussion 
During this dispute the military began to gain the upper hand in the civil-
military relations battle. As such, many people around Fiji began to think that an 
intervention was a real possibility. Yet, this did not occur. It appears that there was 
sufficient motive from several threats to military interests, but there was no 
opportunity to intervene. This resulted in the military being either sufficiently 
deterred, or stopped in their tracks by the attempted mutiny led by 
Baledrokadroka. 
 Motive 
The strongest motive at play in this dispute was the military’s interests. While 
there were some governmental failures that the military pointed to, these did not 
appear to be significant in generating an interventionist motive. The military 
interests of military autonomy, individual interests and budgetary support were all 
threatened at various stages in these disputes. The precursor dispute over the 
surcharges upon Bainimarama primarily threatened budgetary support and 
individual interests. The charges, while not specific to the RFMF, would have been 
considered an unjustified attack on the military’s budget, particularly as they were 
overturned in the High Court. As the surcharge directly affected Bainimarama’s 
income, it can also be assumed that he was fighting to retain his personal 
interests, particularly when the Finance Ministry continued to charge him after they 
were ordered stop by the High Court. The surcharges could also be considered to 
have affected military autonomy, as this was impinging on the normal functioning 
of the military. The second precursor dispute, over the appointment of Judge 
Advocate Graham Leung, was a clearer affront to military autonomy. A court-
martial is the realm of the military; the involvement, first of the President, and then 
later the Ministry of Home Affairs certainly affected the normal running of the 
military. These two disputes were the motivating force behind the war of words that 
emerged in early January. The combative stance taken by Vosanibola intensified 
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the already present sentiments and sparked the call for the removal of the 
Government.   
There was one further threat to the military’s interests that came from the 
suggestion that people from within the Government influenced Baledrokadroka to 
mutiny against the Commander. Such infiltration into the high-level ranks of the 
military is a classic example of an attack on military autonomy. The Government 
strongly refuted this, and there is little evidence to back up the claim. However, 
when examining motivating forces, beliefs are more important that facts and from 
the military’s statements at the time there is strong evidence to suggest that they 
believed that there was government interference. However, this emerged when 
tensions had largely dissipated, and therefore did not result in any action, but it 
added to the growing number of threats to the military’s interests.  
There was a distinct lack of noticeable Government failure throughout this 
dispute. However, in the statement in which Bainimarama threatened to overthrow 
the Government he referred to the Government’s racist policies. This focused on 
the Unity Bill, the Fisheries Bill, which was soon to become known as the Qoliqoli 
Bill and the Land Tribunal Bill. The failures present during the Unity Bill dispute of 
the early release of people convicted of coup related crimes were still present, 
although somewhat dissipated. The other two Bills, which would become central to 
the later dispute in the lead up to the coup, had not really matured and except for 
Bainimarama’s statement, did not appear to be on the military’s agenda. Apart 
from this statement the military did not often speak out against the failures of the 
Government; rather, they were speaking out against the lack of recognition from 
the Government, and the involvement of the Government in military affairs.  
Therefore, the primary motivating force was from the attacks on the military’s 
interests. In this instance the military was motivated further than simply speaking 
out against the Government, as during the Unity Bill dispute. As evidenced from 
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the threat to overthrow the Government, which was a bold statement and not 
simply a leaked draft, the military was fully motivated for an intervention.  
 Opportunity 
While the motive was relatively strong, there was no opportunity for 
intervention in this dispute. The Government’s legitimacy was strong relative to 
many of the other disputes, and the cohesion of the military, as witnessed through 
Baledrokadroka’s attempted mutiny was particularly low. Much like the 
aforementioned lack of Government failures, there was little evidence of a 
legitimacy deflation in this dispute. Some of the legitimacy deflation from the illegal 
acts in the Unity Bill dispute may have lingered; however, by this stage their effect 
had dramatically decreased, most probably because of the effort by the 
Government to make concessions on the Bill because of the public disapproval. 
The issue of corruption was still present. Senior political figures were accused of 
corruption over the harvest and processing of mahogany forests (Rarabici, 
16/12/2005), and investigations began into corruption in the Social Welfare 
Ministry (Biumaiono, 13/1/2006). Yet neither of these factors were very significant 
compared to the performance failures in many of the other disputes, and it did not 
appear to fuel notable discontent.  
Furthermore, the election, which was to be held later in the year, would have 
helped secure the Government’s legitimacy. A government’s adherence to 
generalised norms and values is usually a poor measure of legitimacy for 
developing countries as the norms and values are often very diverse, which is 
certainly the case in Fiji with the country often split along ethnic lines. However, it 
is a general assumption that fair and free elections are one of the few generally 
held norms and beliefs. Since the Government was to hold an election later on in 
the year, allowing the possibility of it being defeated legally, then any delegitimizing 
discontent would have been significantly reduced.  
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Therefore, in this period it is observed that there was very little public 
discontent, and the only significant dissatisfaction directed at the Government 
came from the military. As noted above, this was probably motivated by military 
interests, rather than any Governmental failures that could have also generated 
the necessary deflation in legitimacy. Consequently, the Government had, 
compared to the other disputes, a strong hold on its legitimacy. This would have 
helped impede intervention, as the military would not have had the support of the 
public and potentially not everyone in the military would have felt an intervention 
justified.  
Military cohesion certainly had some problems during this period, as was 
witnessed from the attempted mutiny led by Baledrokadroka. Furthermore, after 
this the military held extensive internal investigations to flush out any further 
dissenters among its ranks, and it found a few, suggesting that the problems 
stemmed further than Baledrokadroka alone. The attempted mutiny can be seen 
as an impediment to intervention from either side of the story. If Bainimarama’s 
assessment of the situation is accurate and the mutiny was a grab for power, then 
this internal disunity and confusion would have put a stop to any growing 
interventionist objectives, as the military would not have been in a strong enough 
position to successfully overthrow the Government. Conversely, if 
Baledrokadroka’s version was the reality, then he stopped a coup in its tracks. 
Nordlinger argues that one of the reasons that a legitimacy deflation is necessary 
for a military intervention is to secure the cohesion of the military as there will often 
be some officers who strongly adhere to the ethic of civilian supremacy. If 
Baledrokadroka was telling the truth, then it appears that because of the relatively 
high legitimacy of the Government at the time, several members of the RFMF, led 
by Baledrokadroka, were trying to stop an intervention in its tracks. Thus, for this 
dispute there was not the opportunity for intervention. There was neither a 
legitimacy deflation nor military cohesion, which either resulted in the military being 
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sufficiently deterred from following through on its coup threat, or an attempted 
coup was stopped before it even began by internal disunity. 
Conclusion 
This dispute was the culmination of the continuing Unity Bill dispute, along 
with surcharges put upon Bainimarama, and the difficulties of the CRW court 
martial, which resulted in a coup threat. It appeared that the potential for 
intervention was very high. There was a strong enough motivation for intervention 
resulting from the numerous threats to the military’s interests in the lead up to the 
dispute. Furthermore, the stated motivation of the Government’s racist policies and 
Bills first emerged, although at this stage it appears that this motivator was not fully 
matured, as they were seldom discussed, with most of the attention put upon the 
improper way the Government was dealing with the military. This again highlighted 
the importance of military interests as central to generating the appropriate 
motivation for intervention. However, in this instance there was no intervention. 
This was because there was a distinct lack of opportunity; the Government, 
relative to most of the other disputes, held a great deal of legitimacy, and there 
were problems with military cohesion, which was dramatically demonstrated with 
Baledrokadroka’s attempted mutiny. This lack of opportunity either resulted in the 
military being deterred from intervention because of the low likelihood of success 
due to the high legitimacy of the Government and the lack of cohesion, or 
Baledrokadroka physically stopped a planned intervention in its tracks with the 
attempted mutiny upholding the supremacy of Government.   
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C h a p t e r  S e v e n  
2006 ELECTION 
 
After the dispute in early 2006 civil-military relations in Fiji were very low, with 
frequent comments in the media from both the military and the Government. As 
such the elections looked to be defining moment, which would test the support of 
the Government, and also once again raise the possibility of a military coup. 
Qarase announced an early election, which in the end meant that it was poorly 
executed, although by all reports free and fair. In an effort to see the SDL party 
beaten at the polls the military launched the truth and justice campaign, which 
travelled throughout the country telling people of the events surrounding the 2000 
coup, and the continued involvement of the SDL party with many of the 
conspirators. This was obviously received badly by the SDL party, and fuelled the 
continued bickering. In the end though Qarase and the SDL party were re-elected, 
and there was no military coup. It is found here that the reason for this is that there 
was neither the necessary motivation nor opportunity for intervention. There were 
some minor threats to the military’s interests from functional rivals, through the 
formation of the police Tactical Response Unit, and military autonomy, through the 
suggestion of a judicial review on the role of the RFMF. There were no new 
specific Government failures, but the accumulation of failures over the last three 
years seemed to be an influence. Together the threats to military interests and the 
accumulated failures motivated the military enough to speak out against the 
Government, and actively campaign against the SDL party, but did not motivate 
them enough to intervene. The opportunity was also simply not there the 
legitimacy of the Government was largely secured because of the election, and the 
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continuing internal investigations into dissenters within the military would have 
lowered the necessary organisational strength. As such there was no intervention.     
Description of Events 
The 2006 elections were much anticipated, they were just the second since 
the coup of 2000, and held promise of reflecting the true state of political thought in 
Fiji. Initially most observers believed that they would be held in the latter part of the 
year, but on 1 March Qarase announced an early election with polling to begin on 
6 May lasting one week and ending on 13 May (Fiji Live, 1/3/2006). Right from the 
time of announcement the military raised concerns with the election. Initially 
because of the huge logistical difficulties in having an early election, including the 
lack of current census data, which they believed could increase the potential for 
vote rigging (Radio New Zealand International, 2/3/2006). Then on 10 March the 
military launched the ‘truth and justice campaign’, which was to use the media and 
travel throughout Fiji, to inform the population the ‘truth’ of the events of 2000 
(Cheerieann Wilson & Ana, 11/3/2006). Essentially though, this amounted to the 
military actively campaigning against the ruling SDL party in the lead up to the 
election. Obviously this did not go down well with the Government, who promptly 
lodged a complaint with the chairman of the electoral committee (Fiji Times, 
14/3/2006). Soon after the electoral commission responded by giving a general 
warning to all parties as well as the military, against intimidating voters or 
interfering with their right to vote (Rina, 16/3/2006). Vosanibola also once again 
attempted to have the Commander punished, but was also once again 
unsuccessful in his appeal to the newly reappointed President (Fiji Times, 
12/3/2006). Again, Bainimarama reacted angrily, saying that he will not bow to the 
Government’s racially divisive policies (Qalo, 20/3/2006). 
A row between the military and the police then emerged, as a result of the 
procurement of high powered weapons by the police for the newly formed Tactical 
Response Unit (TRU). The military believed these weapons were initially meant for 
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them, but were re-directed by the Home Affairs CEO Lesi Korovavala, as a result 
of the intensifying disputes, thus, the military saw this as a direct challenge (Fiji 
Times, 15/3/2006). Furthermore the military was concerned by the emergence of 
the heavily armed TRU, which in many respects began to resemble a palace 
guard. However, this was quickly resolved without incident, after a meeting 
between the military and the police, although these tensions re-emerged later with 
devastating consequences (Fiji Live, 16/3/2006).  
Opposition and resistance to the military’s ‘truth’ campaign then began to 
mount. The first indication of this came from the paramount chief of the Macuata 
province, who banned the military from his land and threatened to remove villagers 
from their homes if they let the military in (Cabealawa, 17/3/2006). This Chief held 
little credibility though, as he was among those convicted of the Labasa mutiny, 
and many of his villagers defied his orders (Cabenatabua, 21/3/2006). Still, this 
trend began to grow, as several more provinces began to voice their concern over 
the military’s tactics, and banned them from campaigning on their territory (Fiji 
Times, 10/4/2006). The military responded through persistence to campaign 
throughout the whole of Fiji (Cheerieann Wilson, 7/4/2006). On top of this, on 23 
March the military was forwarded, from Government House, an interpretation of 
their constitutional role, which was believed to have come from New Zealand. This 
argued that the 1997 constitution did not give the RFMF responsibility over the 
‘security defence and wellbeing of Fiji and all its peoples,’ and thus negated its 
political role. This obviously contradicted the military’s stance, and they quickly 
rejected it, however it showed the growing disapproval of the military’s actions from 
observers outside of Fiji, on top of the objections from within the country (Fiji 
Times, 24/3/2006).  
On 27 March Parliament was dissolved in the lead up to the election. On the 
same day, in what has generally been considered a show of strength and an 
attempt to intimidate both the population and the Government, 500 Military 
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personal lead by Bainimarama, staged a march through the streets of Suva 
(Cheerieann Wilson, 28/3/2006). This received criticism from many within Fiji, 
which was brushed aside by the Commander as “comments from a bunch of 
confused people” (Cited in Cheerieann Wilson, 29/3/2006). At the end of the 
month the Government begun considering going to the Supreme Court, to seek a 
judicial review of the role of the military (Fiji Live, 30/3/2006). The Government 
reaffirmed its position near the end of April, saying that it will go to the Supreme 
Court if they are re-elected (Radio New Zealand International, 24/4/2006b). While 
the military made it clear that it will try to hold up any decision through the appeal 
process (Radio New Zealand International, 24/4/2006c). 
Near the end of April, Qarase began to play the race card when he stated that 
the country would only be able to achieve stability if the leader was an indigenous 
Fijian. The military quickly responded to this saying that the SDL party was using 
unfair campaign tactics and intimidating voters (Semsa, 23/4/2006). To which 
Vosanibola told the military to keep out of matters that don’t concern them (Radio 
New Zealand International, 24/4/2006a). Qarase continued to play on the ethnic 
tensions, stating that the country cannot afford to have another Labour 
Government and risk another coup (Radio New Zealand International, 28/4/2006). 
This time the military inflamed the issue by warning that they will take on any group 
threatening insurrection or instability if a non-indigenous person is elected as the 
new Prime Minister (Radio New Zealand International, 30/4/2006). Furthermore 
the FLP filed a complaint to the Police over Qarase’s comment (Fiji Live, 
1/5/2006). This issue gave the military some traction from certain sectors of the 
community in the lead up to the election. 
As May rolled over Bainimarama restated his commitment to upholding the 
security of the nation, if an ethnic Indian was elected, and went on to say that he 
would meet with the Police to discuss how they could work together to effectively 
maintain security (Fiji Times, 1/5/2006). This was received badly by the Supervisor 
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of Elections, who in response said that the military should take no part in the 
elections, as Fiji was not in a state of emergency to merit such measures (Fiji 
Times, 2/5/2006). After which military professed that it never intended to be part of 
the electoral process, but that it had a commitment to ensure an environment 
conducive to a free and fair election (Fiji Times, 4/5/2006). Later, just before the 
election, the military tried to further justify its position, stating that, while it did not 
have official observer status, that it will take a concerned citizens observer role (Fiji 
Live, 6/5/2006).  
The first day of the elections was messy, many polling stations opened late, 
ballot papers were late, and there was poor voter control and administration. All of 
which the military was quick to point out and declare that it justified their earlier 
prediction that the elections would be a shambles (Fiji Live, 7/5/2006a). To further 
stamp their influence on the electoral process, on the second day of polling the 
military took out a full page add in a local newspaper, explaining that the military 
did have a political role to play, which was far from finished, and that calls for the 
military to remain apolitical were unjustified (Fiji Live, 7/5/2006b). The rest of the 
election was largely uneventful; while there was a low voter turnout of only around 
64 per cent (Fiji Live, 13/5/2006), the poor organisation of the first day was not 
repeated, and in the end the observer missions found that, while there were some 
problems, it was, in general, a free and fair election (Fiji Sun, 15/5/2006). A few 
days later Qarase and his incumbent SDL party were declared the winners, still, 
Bainimarama vowed to continue to fight the Government over its ‘racist policies’ 
(Radio New Zealand International, 18/5/2006). Then in May after the SDL won the 
election they stated that they would now go to the Supreme Court for a Judicial 
ruling on the role of the RFMF (Radio New Zealand International, 24/5/2006).  
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Motivation 
 Military Interests 
There were a couple of military interests at play during the election. The 
formation of the police TRU in many ways represented a functional rival. This was 
described by some as Fiji’s armed defenders squad, however this was not really 
the case. It was the only division of the police that was heavily armed, and most of 
its duties were in picking up the security of the Prime Minister which had been 
abandoned by the military earlier on in the year. Thus it resembled a place guard, 
and a barrier to military intervention. The TRU could not have stopped a military 
intervention, it was far too small, but it would have made the process difficult, and 
potentially caused bloodshed, which might deter intervention. However, as shown 
in the literature, such a rival is more likely to harden the military’s resolve, than 
deter it from intervening.  
 The other military interest threatened during the election was the 
constitutional opinion from New Zealand, which led on to the government 
proposing a Judicial Review of the role of the RFMF which threatened military 
autonomy. As outlined in Chapter 2 military autonomy is considered to be 
threatened if the normal functioning of the military is affected by the Government. 
Thus a binding judicial review, which would in all likelihood come to the conclusion 
that the military does not have a role in politics, would have affected the military’s 
autonomy. This like several of the military interests before, was more speculative 
than immanent. First the Government needed the consent of the President to get a 
judicial review, which appeared unlikely because of the past actions of Iloilo which 
usually favoured the RFMF. Second, it was not completely certain that the courts 
would rule that the RFMF had no political role, as they had in the past expressed 
their disapproval of the Governments policies, particularly the ‘Unity’ Bill. Thus 
there were no strong military interests threatened, and rather than generating the 
motivation for intervention, these probably just helped keep the military focused on 
attempting to remove the Government legally through the ‘truth’ campaign.  
120 
 
The Causes of Fiji’s 5 December 2006 Coup  Brett Woods 
Part III: Triggering Causes 
Chapter Seven – 2006 Election 
 
 
 
 Government Failure 
The accumulation of failures which the military had been complaining about 
for the last three years, particularly the illegal early release of prisoners, and the 
increasingly racist policies, certainly would have motivated the military to carry out 
their ‘truth’ campaign. Furthermore the racial dialogue by Qarase and the SDL 
Party, particularly the statements that the country could not survive an Indian 
leader, would have inflamed the situation further. However, it is difficult to argue 
that this would have been sufficient enough to motivate the military to intervene. It 
appears that the failures of the Government were enough to motivate the military 
to speak out against them, and actively try to have them beaten in the election, but 
were not sufficient to motivate physical intervention.   
Opportunity 
 Legitimacy 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, while the definition of legitimacy used in 
this research, refers more to illegitimate acts, and not to the long term legitimacy of 
the government, the fact that there was an election would have still negated any 
possible legitimacy deflation. Also the reaction by many of the chiefs in not 
allowing the military to campaign on their territory shows that among much of the 
population, particularly the indigenous chiefly villages, the Government held a 
great deal of legitimacy. That said, the consent to govern, is often reflected in both 
the election result and the turnout, which at only 64 percent suggests some 
problems. However this more reflects the disassociation of the population with the 
type of Government rather than the specific people in power. Furthermore, this 
may only be a result of the logistical difficulties, than people not wanting to vote. As 
such not too much should be read into the low turnout.  
 Military Cohesion  
Military cohesion was relatively complex at this stage. While cohesion was 
probably strong after the removal of those involved in the attempted mutiny, the 
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continuing investigations would have complicated matters. Thus, while there was 
cohesion as a result of dismissing those disloyal to Bainimarama, the internal 
investigations would have weakened the organisational strength, and made 
intervention difficult. With both of these factors taken together it appears that there 
was not the sufficient opportunity for intervention.  
Discussion 
This was a tense time of civil-military relations in Fiji, with constant banter 
between the Government and the military. Upon closer examination though it 
appears that very few of the motivating factors were present, and that there was 
not the appropriate opportunity, so the chances of intervention were low. There 
were some military interests, but these had not yet matured into the full blown 
problems that would emerge later in the year. There were no great Government 
failures for the military to pick on, other than the accumulation of failures over the 
last few years, and Qarase stating that an Indian leader would cause instability. 
These were strong enough to motivate the military to carry out their ‘truth’ 
campaign, but they were not strong enough to garner any interventionist motives. 
The fact that it was an election strengthened the legitimacy of the regime in this 
period. Furthermore the internal difficulties that the military was still trying to solve 
would have made the job of intervening very difficult. Thus there was not the 
appropriate motivation or opportunity for intervention, yet this was an important 
dispute as it sets up much of the issues which would come back later on in the 
year and eventually lead to Fiji’s fourth coup.     
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C h a p t e r  E i g h t  
DECEMBER 2006 COUP 
 
On 5 December 2006 Fiji suffered its fourth coup, almost 20 years after the 
first. The crisis leading up to this coup began in the political realm with the dispute 
over the multi-party Cabinet, which put the Government in a position of instability. 
During this time, the military, after a sustained period of silence since the election, 
began to speak out against the Government. They issued a three-week ultimatum 
near the beginning of October, which demanded that the Government drop the 
Unity Bill, the Qoliqoli Bill and the Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill,16 or resign. Near 
the end of this ultimatum, the situation became tense as the Police would not 
release from Suva Warf ammunition intended for the military, which the military 
then took by force. At the same time the Government attempted to supplant 
Commodore Bainimarama; however, the attempt failed, which caused tensions to 
soar. At this stage the military did not have sufficient motivation to intervene, and 
so the situation did not eventuate in a conflict. However, a Police investigation into 
Bainimarama began to accelerate in early November, which finally gave the 
military adequate motivation to consider overthrowing the Government. In mid-
November they issued another ultimatum, this time with further demands. When 
the Government did not meet these in full, the military announced that they would 
take over; a few days later they carried out this threat.  
 
16 These three Bills will be referred to as simply ‘the three Bills’ or ‘the three contentious Bills’ 
throughout this chapter for the sake of brevity. 
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All the triggering causes were present. There were several threats to the 
military’s interests, most notably from the pending criminal charges against 
Bainimarama, but also from a scheduled Supreme Court Ruling into the role of the 
RFMF, and the increasing presence of the Police TRU, which began to closely 
resemble a palace guard. There were plenty of Government failures, particularly 
over the three contentious Bills, and the on-going corruption issue. However, the 
Government failures were no more severe than they had been in the other 
disputes; rather, it appears that it was the strength of the threats to the military’s 
interests that generated the motivation to overthrow the Government. The 
opportunity was also there as a result of a deflation in the legitimacy of the SDL 
Government due to its ‘ethnically biased’ policies and the difficulties in effectively 
governing during the multi-party Cabinet dispute. Military cohesion was also 
strong, having fully recovered from the attempted mutiny in January; Bainimarama 
had once again established enforced cohesion. It appears that each of these 
opportunity factors were necessary, as they combined to create the appropriate 
opportunity for the military intervention. As a consequence, the triggering causes 
came together, the underlying background tensions were enacted upon and the 
Government was overthrown.   
Description of Events 
The lead-up to the coup was a very complex time in Fiji, with many 
interconnected events occurring simultaneously. Of particular importance was the 
crisis in the multi-party Cabinet, which occurred alongside the increasing civil-
military tensions and is where this description shall start. After this, attention will be 
turned to the military’s actions, first, the end of the prolonged silence that was 
present from the election through to late September and the reasons behind the 
military’s renewed attacks. Second, an examination of the first and second 
ultimatums will take place; finally, attention will be turned to the coup itself.  
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Multi-party Cabinet 
After the election, somewhat surprisingly considering the problems in 2003 
and 2004, Qarase offered the FLP nine ministerial seats in an effort to set up Fiji’s 
first multi-party Cabinet. Chaudhry accepted this offer, saying that they would find 
the appropriate avenues for working out the inherent differences between the two 
parties (Fiji Live, 19/5/2006). However, immediately both leaders realised the 
potential for problems: Qarase admitted that he was surprised that Chaudhry 
accepted his offer, and that it would present some difficult situations, as the two 
parties had very different manifestoes (Radio New Zealand International, 
21/5/2006). At the same time Chaudhry questioned whether the offer to join the 
multi-party Cabinet was made in good faith, and foresaw that the Cabinet would 
hold some great surprises in the future (Fiji Times, 22/5/2006).  
The first problem that the cabinet faced was that Qarase did not accept the 
portfolios nominated by Chaudhry, instead giving the FLP Cabinet Ministers 
considerably less important positions. In response, the nine FLP ministers 
boycotted the swearing-in ceremony. The ceremony went ahead as planned, with 
Qarase stating that he would not let Chaudhry gain authority over him (Foster & 
Singh, 23/5/2006). This was quickly resolved; the FLP ministers accepted their 
positions, and the next day were sworn into Parliament (Fiji Live, 24/5/2006). 
Chaudhry was not one of the nine FLP Cabinet ministers, most likely because he 
wanted to take the position of Leader of the Opposition, which he was 
campaigning for. However, after some legal consultation, Iloilo instead appointed 
Mick Beddoes, the leader of the United People’s Party, to the post (Fiji Live, 
3/6/2006). In typically defiant fashion, Chaudhry did not give up the physical office 
for the Leader of the Opposition, and in the end Beddoes capitulated and let 
Chaudhry keep the office space (Radio New Zealand International, 8/6/2006). 
Then, on 6 July 2006 Iloilo opened the new Parliament, in which nine FLP 
members were ministers in the SDL Government. The Leader of the Opposition’s 
party held only two seats, and his office was being occupied by the leader of the 
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FLP, Chaudhry, who remained outside Cabinet. In retrospect, it is no great 
surprise that this situation led to a dangerously fragmented Government.   
It was not long until further difficulties emerged. On 13 June Lekh Ram 
Vayeshnoi, one of the FLP Cabinet ministers, told Parliament that the Government 
should withdraw its affirmative action programs, enforce a code of conduct, consult 
the FLP on all controversial Bills, and implement the goals and policies of both the 
SDL party and the FLP (Biumaiono, 15/6/2006). This obviously annoyed the rest of 
Government, and Qarase even spoke of dismissing or disciplining Vayeshnoi, as it 
amounted to a Cabinet minister speaking against Government policy, which runs 
contrary to the common Westminster principle of Cabinet speaking as one 
(Biumaiono, 15/6/2006). Vayeshnoi continued to speak out against the 
Government on these issues. However, it was soon revealed by Poseci Bune, the 
deputy leader of the FLP and Minister for the Environment, that Vayeshnoi was 
simply voicing the sentiments of Chaudhry (Radio New Zealand International, 
15/6/2006), which was the first sign that there was a split amongst the ranks over 
the proper way for the FLP Ministers to act. This was further fuelled when several 
FLP Cabinet ministers began to criticise Vayeshnoi for his comments against the 
Government (Radio New Zealand International, 16/6/2006). However, Chaudhry 
adamantly rejected any claims that there was a split within his party (Fiji Times, 
19/6/2006). Yet, noticeable differences began to emerge, particularly between 
Chaudhry and Poseci Bune. Chaudhry stated that he expected all FLP members 
to act along party lines; however, Bune argued that the FLP ministers should take 
a far more open approach, with the central goal of making the multi-party Cabinet 
work (Radio New Zealand International, 20/6/2006).   
These tensions reached breaking point in late June when a group of senior 
FLP members including the deputy leader Bune, the Vice Presidents Krishna Datt, 
Dr Atu Emberson-Bain and board member Felix Anthony, questioned Chaudhry’s 
list of names to be appointed to the Senate (Fiji Times, 28/6/2006). The group 
were worried about the omission of several notable names and the lack of 
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consultation with the management board over the formation of the list. Then when 
Chaudhry was out of the country Bune, as the acting Leader of the party, withdrew 
Chaudhry’s nominations and submitted a new list (Ali & Qalo, 29/6/2006). 
Chaudhry acted swiftly: he resubmitted his own list and said that those members 
who opposed him would face disciplinary measures (Fiji Live, 30/6/2006). The 
depths of the split in the FLP became evident a few days later when Bune received 
a petition against Chaudhry signed by 17 of the 31 Labour MPs (Fiji Live, 
3/7/2006).  In early July the President received both lists from the FLP, but in the 
end he accepted Chaudhry’s (Radio New Zealand International, 4/7/2006). The 
issue of discipline or dismissal for those who submitted the second Senate list 
hung in the air for some time, but at this time it never went any further than 
rhetoric. In mid July Qarase, Beddoes and Chaudhry met over the Cabinet 
problems and set a September deadline to reach a consensus over Cabinet 
conduct, an indicator that proceedings may have been becoming more civilised 
(Fiji Times, 13/7/2006). Soon after, four sub-committees were set up to try and 
resolve these differences (Radio New Zealand International, 19/7/2006).  
It appears that for a time these talks helped ensure that the multi-party 
Cabinet functioned properly. However, in early November the same problems 
reappeared, this time focused on the 2007 Budget. The FLP objected to the 
Budget primarily because it included a 2.5% increase to the Value Added Tax 
(VAT) to bring it up to 15%, which would most harshly affect the urban poor, the 
FLP’s key demographic. Thus, in a FLP Caucus meeting on 9 November it was 
unanimously decided to oppose the Budget and vote against it (Marau, 
10/11/2006). This meant that even those who were part of the Cabinet were 
compelled to vote against the Budget, even though such actions were strictly 
against the rules of Cabinet, which must vote as one unit. Qarase reminded the 
FLP ministers of this and warned that voting against the Budget would result in 
dismissal from Cabinet (Radio New Zealand International, 9/11/2006). The FLP 
ministers each reacted differently; some, most notably Krishna Datt, indicated 
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loyalty towards the Government over the FLP and openly stated that they would go 
against their party’s wishes and vote for the Budget (Fiji Times, 11/11/2006). In 
response Chaudhry said that Datt should resign from the FLP if he wants to 
support the Budget, as his constituency was against the increased VAT (Fiji Live, 
14/11/2006a). Conversely, others appeared to comply with Chaudhry’s wishes, 
such as Vayeshnoi, who openly stated that he would vote against the Budget; this 
again raised calls from Qarase to have him removed from Cabinet (Fiji Live, 
14/11/2006b). Thus, the rift that emerged in July was still present, and this resulted 
in a new round of intense infighting within the FLP. At about this time it was 
revealed that before the Budget was announced Qarase had offered Chaudhry the 
post of Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Finance. This was most likely an 
effort to settle the on-going multi-party Cabinet dispute, but it was also suspected 
to be a ruse to allow Qarase to slip the increased VAT through without protest (Fiji 
Times, 20/11/2006). Chaudhry rejected this offer in the end, stating that there 
would need to be substantial changes to both the Budget and the Government 
before he could enter into any such agreement (Radio New Zealand International, 
16/11/2006).  
On 22 November the vote for the Budget was held: five of the FLP Ministers 
were not in Cabinet, even after being explicitly asked to attend by Chaudhry, while 
the other four voted against it (Fiji Live, 22/11/2006a). This caused the underlying 
tensions to erupt. Shortly after the Budget was passed, Qarase stated at a press 
conference that he would advise the President to terminate the appointments of 
the four FLP Ministers if they did not resign immediately (Fiji Live, 22/11/2006b). 
Chaudhry advised the ministers not to resign, and furthermore indicated that those 
who were not present for the vote would be disciplined and potentially dismissed 
(Radio New Zealand International, 22/11/2006). Discussions were then held 
between Qarase and Chaudhry to sort out this situation, and it appeared that a 
compromise was forming, whereby Qarase would not remove the four FLP 
Ministers who voted against the Budget, and Chaudhry would not dismiss the five 
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FLP Ministers who were not present for the vote (Janine, 25/11/2006). However, it 
seems that these talks broke down as a few days later Chaudhry and the FLP 
expelled the five Ministers after a National Council Disciplinary hearing (Fiji Live, 
29/11/2006a). Only a matter of days later the military took control of the country. 
Thus, in the lead-up to the coup Fiji’s political scene was in chaos. Now attention 
will turn to the events that led up to the coup itself.  
The Military Breaks its Silence 
After the election, the military stayed silent for an extended time, the longest 
period of silence since the civil-military tensions emerged in mid 2003. At the time 
it appeared that the newly elected Government and the military had reached some 
sort of compromise, however in retrospect it would be more appropriately 
considered as the calm before the storm.  
Whatever the reason for their silence, there were three key events preceding 
the civil-military conflict that should be taken into consideration. First, in mid 
September Qarase and his Cabinet once again asked Iloilo to sign off the papers 
instigating a Supreme Court ruling into the Constitutional role of the RFMF (Fiji 
Live, 26/9/2006). Second, Bainimarama himself attributed his renewed attacks 
upon the Government to a speech given by US General John Brown at the Pacific 
Army Management Seminar, who said that decisive “issues should not be faced 
with politeness but with honesty” (Cited in Cabenatabua & Peters, 25/9/2006). The 
US Ambassador soon after pointed out that the Commander had misinterpreted 
the General’s comments, and that the military must be subordinate to civilian 
power (Rina, 26/9/2006). Thirdly, in early August the Government tabled the 
contentious Qoliqoli and Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bills which were to become 
the backbone of the military’s complaints against the Government (Radio New 
Zealand International, 6/6/2006).  
These Bills first emerged in late 2005; they received strong criticism, 
particularly from hotel and resort owners. The Qoliqoli Bill was to give ownership of 
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the foreshore, seabed and fishing areas (qoliqoli in Fijian) from the State to the 
traditional owners. While the principles behind the Bill may have been justified, 
there were several key issues. First, it would, only confer ownership to Indigenous 
Fijians, and not Indians. Such ethnic discrimination in land ownership is common 
in Fiji, but most of those arrangements were historical in nature; this Bill would 
continue an obsolete ethos that would frustrate the Indian community. Secondly, 
there is a distinct lack of clarity over who the traditional owners are. In some places 
it is clear, but much of the qoliqoli is contested between two or more villages or 
individuals. Resolving these disputes would be almost impossible, and would invite 
conflict between the disputing parties. Such conflict had already started: in July two 
men were hospitalised because of a fight over the ownership of fishing grounds 
(Fiji Times, 11/7/2006). It was the fear of many in Fiji that if the Government 
passed this Bill such conflicts would become commonplace. Thirdly, hotel and 
resort owners were worried: as many Fijians see hotels as destroying the natural 
habitat, thus if the land was given back to traditional owners then hotel leases may 
not be renewed which would inhibit further growth of the lucrative tourism industry. 
They also feared that the cost of the leases, which were currently paid to the 
Government, might substantially increase when the title was conferred to the 
traditional owners. Furthermore, they were worried that because of the lack of 
clarity over who the traditional owner is, they may face multiple rents, making the 
Fijian hotel business unprofitable.  
The Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill was based on New Zealand’s Waitangi 
Tribunal Bill and was to settle historical grievances for any land lost prior to the 
establishment of the Native Land Trust Act 1944. Grievances would be settled in a 
number of ways, from compensation to conference of the title for the land if it was 
still in the ownership of the state. This was criticised because it would give special 
rights to one ethnic group, whereas Fiji was a multi-ethnic society. Furthermore, it 
was suspected that there would be very few legitimate claims, and that those that 
were would be almost impossible to resolve because of the complexities of 
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subsequent land use and ownership. This, coupled together with the questionable 
composition of the Indigenous Claims Tribunal, which was to be a political panel, 
made the potential for corruption great. These Bills exacerbated the problems of 
the multi-party Cabinet that became deadlocked over the issue. Furthermore, 
many people in Fiji began to become disenfranchised with the Government, which 
they saw as taking the promotion of indigenous rights too far (Ramesh, 27/9/2006). 
It appears that the military also thought that these Bills were going too far, and 
were most likely a key source of motivation, especially in September and October.   
In late September Bainimarama broke his silence, strongly criticising the 
Qoliqoli and Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bills, warning that they would scare away 
investors, and “Fiji will be left with indigenous Fijians and their canoes and grass 
skirts” (cited in Fiji Live, 22/9/2006). A few days later Bainimarama was once again 
on the offensive, saying that the Ministry of Reconciliation was wasting public 
funds and calling for an inquiry by the Auditor-General into its spending (Fiji Times, 
24/9/2006). That same day Bainimarama made his focus clear, stating that he 
would “no longer keep quiet, and will not cave in to the Government’s attempts to 
shut him down” (cited in Raicola, 24/9/2006), obviously, referring to the Supreme 
Court ruling. It was then revealed that Baledrokadroka was short-listed for the job 
of Commissioner of Prisons. The military reacted angrily to this news, reminding 
the State that he was still to be investigated by a military Court Martial for his 
actions against the Commander earlier in the year (Fiji Live, 27/9/2006). Attorney-
General Qoriniasi Bale then told the military that it should not interfere in the 
appointment of the Commissioner of Prisons, however eventually Baledrokadroka 
was dropped from consideration for the post (Fiji Live, 27/10/2006b; Radio New 
Zealand International, 29/9/2006). Then in early October Bainimarama made what 
was to become a defining statement for the actions that were to come, saying that 
the military would now be the watchdog of all Government policies and would 
stand up against the Government and its corrupt policies (Fiji Live, 9/10/2006). 
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First Ultimatum 
In a bold move that took the Commander’s threats to another level, on 16 
October, speaking from the Middle East where he was on tour, Bainimarama 
issued a three-week ultimatum to the Government to get rid of the Unity Bill, the 
Qoliqoli Bill and the Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill or resign (Fiji Live, 
17/10/2006). The Government responded to this move by finally succeeding in 
convincing the President to endorse the request for a Supreme Court ruling, which 
was soon after set down for their next sitting in May (Ebourne, 20/10/2006). 
Surprisingly, the military responded to this relatively positively, stating that if the 
Supreme Court ruled against them, they would no longer oppose the Government 
(Fiji Live, 23/10/2006). Yet at the same time the military began another offensive, 
calling into question a possible election scam: accusing the SDL campaign director 
for the 2006 election, Jale Baba, of connections with known conman Peter Foster 
(Fiji Live, 26/10/2006). This was denied outright by Baba and did not amount to 
anything, but it served to keep tensions high between the military and Government 
(Fiji Live, 27/10/2006a). 
Once again, Vosanibola attempted to discipline Bainimarama. All of his earlier 
efforts had been failures, and so this time he employed a different tactic. Instead of 
appealing to the President, he went to the Police. He filed a complaint against 
Bainimarama because of the recent outbursts against the Government, which he 
believed would amount to sedition. Thus, there was a renewal of investigations 
into the actions of the Commander in light of his recent outbursts, however they 
also looked back to his previous dubious actions, including the treatment of the 
November 2000 mutineers (Fiji Live, 25/10/2006).  
Throughout this time Qarase had remained relatively quiet; on several 
occasions he had called for calm among the population, but it took him over a 
week to actually respond to Bainimarama’s demands, simply stating that his 
Government would not resign (Qalo, 27/10/2006). The military then began to 
consolidate its position. In response to what was rumoured to be dissent among 
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the ranks, Colonel Etueni Caucau was put on leave pending investigation, in yet 
another example of the consequences of disloyalty (Johns, 29/10/2006). Then 
3,000 territorial soldiers were called to report to camp by 2 November, raising the 
possibility for military action (Radio New Zealand International, 29/10/2006).  
At this stage, civil-military relations became very tense over two important 
issues. First, the Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes refused to release a seven 
tonne shipment of live ammunition intended for the military. Hughes said that he 
was concerned that the military may use the ammunition to remove the 
Government, and thus felt it necessary to hold the shipment until the civil-military 
tensions eased (Ebourne, 30/10/2006). This infuriated the military and it 
demanded that the ammunition be released immediately (Fiji Live, 31/10/2006b). 
The next day the RFMF ordered all 3,000 troops to report to camp by four o’clock 
that afternoon, which was claimed to be a normal exercise but the act also 
suggested that the military was strengthening its position for a potential move on 
the Government (Fiji Live, 31/10/2006a). Then on 1 November the military forcibly 
seized the ammunition. Hughes claimed that military soldiers came to Suva Wharf 
with an unrelated import licence, threatened the three Police officers on duty, and 
then unlawfully took the ammunition (Bola, 2/11/2006). The Police then opened an 
official investigation (Fiji Live, 2/11/2006d).  
At the same time as this dispute was brewing, the Government attempted to 
have Bainimarama removed. Reports suggest that Qarase asked the Vice 
President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi to replace Bainimarama with Colonel Meli 
Saubulinayau. Saubulinayau, however, in a demonstration of the strength of 
military cohesion, refused to take the position as he did not have the support of the 
military, and pledged his support for the Commander (Fiji Times, 31/10/2006; 
Radio New Zealand International, 31/10/2006). This inflamed the situation, and 
Bainimarama once again called on the Government to resign so as to avoid any 
violence (Fiji Sun, 1/11/2006). Qarase refused, and called on the Great Council of 
Chiefs (GCC) to intervene (Fiji Live, 1/11/2006). Bainimarama did not want the 
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GCC involved, and he stated that this would only encourage violence and 
bloodshed (Fiji Times, 2/11/2006). However, the GCC said that it would resolve 
the situation, just as it had done in 1987 and 200017 (Fiji Live, 2/11/2006c). At this 
stage the Police also stated that it was very likely that Bainimarama would be 
charged for his statements and actions over the last two months (Radio New 
Zealand International, 2/11/2006).  
These two events raised the possibility of intervention, but just as quickly as 
the tensions rose, they fell away. On 2 November Bainimarama said that there 
would be no coup, while at the same time requesting that Qarase step down (Fiji 
Live, 2/11/2006b). The next day the three-week ultimatum was up, but the military 
said that there was nothing to worry about, and that there would be no intervention 
(Fiji Live, 3/11/2006). Throughout this entire dispute, Bainimarama was outside of 
the country. He returned on 4 November, amidst rumours that the Police would 
arrest him; however this did not happen, and the situation appeared to settle down 
(Fiji Live, 4/11/2006b). The Budget was announced and while the military’s 
allocation was reduced, it said that they were happy with its funding (Fiji Live, 
4/11/2006a). Interestingly, the Budget did not allocate any funds for the 
implementation of the Unity, Qoliqoli or Indigenous Claims Bills, however the 
Government professed that this was not because they were dropping the Bills (Fiji 
Times, 4/11/2006). However, this did coincide with the announcement that the 
Government would completely drop the highly contentious amnesty provision from 
the Unity Bill (C. Peters, 5/11/2006). Many commentators around Fiji considered 
this as a victory for the RFMF, despite the Government refuting the claim that it 
was a result of pressure from the military (Fiji Sun, 5/11/2006).  
While the major tensions subsided, issues between the military and the 
Police, Australia and the GCC continued through the early part of November. The 
Police case against Bainimarama intensified, which, along with the conflict 
 
17 Their impact in helping resolve the crises in 1987 and 2000 is highly disputed.  
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surrounding the removal of the ammunition from Suva Warf and the attempted 
removal of Bainimarama, sparked a growing dispute between the military and the 
Police. On 4 November the military publically questioned the integrity of Police 
Commissioner Andrew Hughes, as he had gone to the media over the ammunition 
issue even after being asked by the military not to do so (Radio New Zealand 
International, 4/11/2006). Meanwhile, Hughes pushed forward with the 
investigations into Bainimarama, and asked for a one-on-one interview with him 
over his recent threats to oust the Government (Fiji Live, 6/11/2006a). Soon after, 
he commented that the police file on Bainimarama was almost complete, and that 
it would soon be forwarded to the Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP) (Fiji 
Times, 7/11/2006). At the same time the military, in a written request to Hughes, 
asked for him to step down as Police Commissioner during the ammunition case, 
as he could not be both complainant and investigator. Hughes refused to do this, 
and called the request ‘disrespectful’ (Fiji Live, 7/11/2006). Military comments 
through the media continued against Hughes: on 9 November he was accused of 
being under political pressure to convict Bainimarama (Fiji Live, 9/11/2006b). 
Then, the military demanded that Hughes resign, as they believed that he was 
involved in the attempt to have the Commander removed at the end of October 
(Fiji Live, 16/11/2006). These were the beginnings of a dispute between the 
military and the Police that would play a central role later in the month in the lead-
up to the coup. 
During this time Australia started to become a player in the dispute. On 2 
November they sent two naval ships to Fiji. The stated reason for this was to 
evacuate any nationals if the situation got any worse (Fiji Live, 2/11/2006a). 
However, it made the military nervous, particularly when several Australian 
nationals arrived in the country carrying 400kg of equipment in ‘silver boxes’. The 
RFMF then warned Australia to not even think about entering Fiji in a Solomon 
Islands style intervention (Fiji Times, 5/11/2006). The Police escorted the 
Australian personnel from the airport, and thus the military directed its concerns to 
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the Police demanding an explanation for the entry of the personnel and information 
on what was contained in the ‘silver boxes’ (Ragi, 6/11/2006). The military believed 
that the boxes contained arms and could be used against it to defend the 
Government. However, the Australian Defence Force professed that while the 
personnel were its men, the ‘silver boxes’ only contained communications 
equipment (Fiji Live, 6/11/2006b). Later, the head of the Australian Defence Force 
explained that soldiers were in Fiji, but only to assist the High Commission with 
administration and coordination, most likely concerning evacuation plans (Fiji 
Times, 9/11/2006a). The situation quietened down after this but it further damaged 
the relations between the Police and the military, and made the military suspicious 
of Australia.  
The GCC also started to become involved in the dispute. After a call from 
Qarase for the GCC to intervene they took up the challenge, and on 2 November 
declared to seek a resolution to the crisis (Fiji Live, 2/11/2006c). Then on 9 
November the GCC met for discussions on the conflict, however, neither 
Bainimarama, any representative from the RFMF, nor the President were present 
(Fiji Live, 9/11/2006a). However, the next day Bainimarama did meet with the 
GCC, where in a little over an hour he briefed them on his position. After this the 
Chiefs decided to set up a committee comprised of High Chiefs to mediate and 
resolve the crisis (Fiji Live, 10/11/2006). This was not taken well by the military 
which stated that the two-day meeting of the GCC was a waste of tax payer’s 
money and that it did not want the GCC to mediate (Fiji Live, 11/11/2006). 
Subsequently, the RFMF avoided the GCC, and failed to show up at several pre-
arranged meetings (Fiji Live, 20/11/2006). However, in general most of the early 
part of November was quiet and stable relative to the problems in late October, 
and the crisis in late November.    
Second Ultimatum 
After the first ultimatum passed with no consequences, Bainimarama kept up 
his presence in the media, calling for a change of direction of the Government but 
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at this stage he promised that there would be no coup (Fiji Times, 9/11/2006b). In 
an attempt to ameliorate the situation Qarase tried to set up a meeting with 
Bainimarama, but the Commander said that he would only attend if the 
Government met his earlier demands (Fiji Live, 15/11/2006). Then, Bainimarama 
started talking about a need to ‘clean up’ Government and soon after on 21 
November he issued a new ultimatum, now with nine demands to be met within 
two weeks, or for the Government to resign (Qalo & Kikau, 22/11/2006). Once 
again this ultimatum was set when the Commander was out of the country, this 
time he was in New Zealand where he was attending the christening of his 
granddaughter. The demands included the removal of the three pieces of 
legislation, as requested in the first ultimatum, but also included the sacking of any 
ministers convicted of involvement in the 2000 coup, dropping the investigations 
into Bainimarama and the RFMF, the removal of Andrew Hughes as Police 
Commissioner, and the disbandment of the Police Tactical Response Unit.18 This 
clearly showed the prominence of the dispute with the Police, but it also showed a 
return to the original requests concerning the removal of the ‘racist’ legislation, and 
the dismissal of ministers with connections to the 2000 coup. Thus, the dual 
motivations began to become clear.   
Soon after this, the GCC was able to secure a meeting with the RFMF, 
although without Bainimarama who was still in New Zealand. In this meeting the 
military reaffirmed their demands which they said must be met if the RFMF was to 
continue to be involved in any mediation talks (Kikau, 25/11/2006a). Meanwhile, 
the New Zealand Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters was attempting to set up 
a meeting between Bainimarama and Qarase on New Zealand soil, where he 
could act as a mediator to try and resolve the dispute. At this stage Bainimarama 
would not commit himself to such a meeting, but Qarase was willing to participate 
(Fiji Live, 23/11/2006a).  
 
18 For a full list of the demands by the military see appendix two 
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At the same time, the dispute with the Police continued to grow. On 23 
November the Police confirmed that they would interview Bainimarama when he 
returned from New Zealand (Fiji Live, 23/11/2006b). Bainimarama responded by 
asking the Police to write to him first to request an interview and in a clear sign of 
defiance he challenged the Police to try and arrest him (Fiji Times, 23/11/2006). 
Hughes then began talking of ‘shadowy figures’, who he believed were top Fijian 
politicians, civil servants and army officers, who were advising Bainimarama and 
manipulating his actions for their own goals (Fiji Live, 23/11/2006c). This served to 
belittle Bainimarama’s purported altruistic motivation of ‘cleaning up the 
Government’, and also made a connection to the 1987 coups, where it is 
commonly believed that Rabuka was used by more powerful forces within Fijian 
society. Hughes also responded to Bainimarama’s accusation that he was involved 
in the attempt to have him removed in late October, by saying that Bainimarama 
should step down, as it is common for civil-servants and armed forces personnel to 
step down from their positions when they are being investigated for serious 
misconduct (Fiji Live, 24/11/2006a). The Police also made it public that they had 
completed one of seven charges against Bainimarama, and expected the other 
charges to be completed soon (Fiji Live, 24/11/2006b).   
The already tense relations between the Police and the military were further 
inflamed when the RFMF accused the Police of raiding the President’s office on 23 
November (Kikau, 25/11/2006b). The Police said that they searched the 
President’s office, with a warrant, for transcripts from a recent meeting between 
Iloilo and Bainimarama to assist in their investigations into the Commander. The 
military did not find this to be a sufficient excuse, and Bainimarama called the 
search an insult to Fiji and its people, particularly as it was carried out by Hughes, 
an Australian. He called for the Commissioner to immediate leave Fiji voluntarily or 
to be forced to do so by the military (Fiji Live, 25/11/2006). Territorial soldiers were 
then called up by the military and asked to guard the President’s office to stop any 
more ‘raids’ (Raicola, Marau, & Nand, 26/11/2006). Then, to try and further enforce 
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his authority, Bainimarama stated in the media that the charges against him would 
not stick, as the RFMF would simply dismiss them (Fiji Live, 26/11/2006b). 
Vosanibola then publically stated that the Government would not accede to the 
demand that the investigations into the RFMF should stop (Fiji Live, 26/11/2006a). 
Then on 28 November the DPP, instead of filing sedition charges against 
Bainimarama, returned the files to the Police (Fiji Times, 28/11/2006). The reason 
for this was never revealed; it is likely that the Police simply had to make some 
amendments to the file, although there was also some speculation that it was 
ordered by the Government to stop a confrontation with the military (Fiji Live, 
28/11/2006). The continuing dispute between the military and the Police seems to 
have come to a head at this stage. Hughes claimed to have received life 
threatening threats from the military specific to him and his family, and as such he 
left Fiji and took leave in Australia (Fiji Times, 29/11/2006a). 
Meanwhile in New Zealand Winston Peters’ efforts to mediate the conflict 
began to bear fruit. On the weekend of 25 and 26 November it was reported that 
Bainimarama met with Peters, and together organised another meeting which 
would also involve Qarase in an effort to resolve the impending crisis (Fiji Live, 
27/11/2006). On the morning of 29 November Bainimarama and Qarase finally 
met in a two-hour meeting with Peters mediating, which was described by Qarase 
as “very meaningful” (Fiji Live, 29/11/2006b). In this meeting all of the demands by 
the military were addressed, many of which were fully agreed to by Qarase, 
including suspending the Unity Bill, putting the Qoliqoli and Indigenous Claims Bills 
up for review and a review of the role of the Police TRU. As for Hughes, Qarase 
said that he was nearing the end of his contract, and that he had been put on 
leave; this was essentially conceding that his contract would not be renewed and 
that he would probably not return to Fiji. It was also agreed that, if the Government 
was so advised from the appropriate authorities, they would drop the investigations 
into Bainimarama and the RFMF, suggesting that this was a likely outcome.19 The 
 
19 For a full brief of the outcomes of this meeting see appendix three 
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Government was as close as politically possible to complying with the military’s 
demands, and for a time there was a sense of relief in Fiji that the crisis had been 
adverted (Fiji Times, 29/11/2006b). However, these concessions were not 
sufficient for Bainimarama; he wanted all his demands met in full, and immediately. 
So on 30 November he reiterated his ultimatum, and this time he gave Qarase 
until noon the next day to meet the demands, or resign (Fiji Live, 30/11/2006). 
The Coup 
On Friday 1 December the entirety of Suva shut down at noon in anticipation 
of a coup; yet no direct action was taken against the Government (Fiji Times, 
2/12/2006b). Commodore Bainimarama announced that Qarase’s deadline to 
meet his demands was over, although at this stage he would not reveal his next 
course of action (Fiji Live, 1/12/2006b). Qarase and his cabinet then went into 
hiding “somewhere” in Fiji, but from this secret location Qarase made a statement 
in which he said that he would not resign, and that he and his cabinet were still in 
control of the country (Fiji Live, 1/12/2006a). Hughes, speaking from Australia, also 
refused to resign and said that he intended to charge Bainimarama based upon 
the evidence he already had (Ebourne, 1/12/2006). On 2 December several final 
attempts at mediation were made. The Vice-President Madraiwiwi met with 
Bainimarama and Qarase separately (Fiji Live, 2/12/2006b). The GCC committee 
also had further contact with both men and planned further dialogue in the near 
future to resolve the crisis (Fiji Times, 2/12/2006a). Qarase himself proposed an 
independent committee to look into the RFMF’s grievances (Fiji Live, 2/12/2006a). 
However, none of these had any effect and on 3 December Bainimarama ruled out 
any further talks with Qarase, saying that his time was up as of the previous Friday 
and demanded that he resign or he would be forcibly removed (Fiji Live, 
3/12/2006b, 3/12/2006c). At this stage Bainimarama said that he would no longer 
listen to anyone but the President (Fiji Live, 3/12/2006a).  
On 4 December the coup began to unfold; in the morning, fully armed soldiers 
entered the Police TRU headquarters, locking out the members on duty (Fiji 
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Times, 4/12/2006). The military then seized all the weaponry and took it back to 
their armoury in Nabua (Fiji Live, 4/12/2006c). They also set up a roadblock to 
intercept Qarase on his way to Naitasiri, however the Prime Minister took a 
helicopter to avoid being captured (Fiji Live, 4/12/2006b). The Police called these 
actions illegal and said that they would investigate all of those involved (Fiji Live, 
4/12/2006a). On 5 December 30 armed soldiers surrounded the Prime Minister’s 
house and confiscated his car, effectively putting him under house arrest (Fiji Live, 
5/12/2006f). Similar actions were then taken against several of the top Ministers in 
Qarase’s Government and checkpoints were erected around all Government 
buildings (Fiji Live, 5/12/2006b, 5/12/2006c). It was then reported that Iloilo gave 
permission to overthrow Government, however this was later denied (Fiji Live, 
5/12/2006d). Nonetheless, with the Prime Minister and his top Ministers detained, 
and a perception that the President was onside, Bainimarama announced that he 
had taken control of Government and would assume the role of the President 
under the Doctrine of Necessity (Fiji Live, 5/12/2006a). Then with his newly 
acquired powers as President, he appointed ex-military doctor Jona Baravilalala 
Senilagakali as the new Prime Minister of a caretaker Government, to assist in 
dissolving Parliament (Fiji Live, 5/12/2006e). The next day military soldiers entered 
Parliament, closed it down and took several senior state officials, including Police 
officers, state CEOs, and the Speaker of the House to the Queen Elizabeth 
Barracks in Nabua, where they were told to comply with the RFMF or resign (Fiji 
Times, 6/12/2006).  
At this stage the coup was not accepted by the Police and Hughes in 
particular was vocal in his criticism, saying that he would return to Fiji and arrest 
Bainimarama on charges of sedition (Fiji Live, 6/12/2006a). Then Bainimarama 
announced that Fiji was officially in a state of emergency, and would thus be run 
by a military council (Fiji Live, 6/12/2006b). On 7 December several 
‘troublemaking’ officials were dismissed by the military, including Hughes, Public 
Service Commission chairman Stuart Huggett, Public Service Commission CEO 
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Anare Jale, the CEO of the Prime Minister’s Office Jioji Kotobalavu, Solicitor-
General Nainendra Nand, acting Police Commissioner Moses Driver, and 
Assistant Commissioner of Police Kevueli Bulamaninaivalu (Fiji Live, 7/12/2006a). 
In a strange move, Bainimarama then announced that the ministerial positions in 
the military interim Government would be publically advertised (Fiji Live, 
7/12/2006b). In the end, the interim regime comprised of a diverse range of 
political figures, mostly indigenous Fijian but with almost no connections to the 
powerful nationalist forces. Bainimarama stepped down as President, and handed 
the title back to Iloilo, but was then named as the Prime Minister of the Interim 
regime (Radio New Zealand International, 5/1/2007). Other notable inclusions 
were Vayeshnoi, Bune, Nailatikau, Ganilau and Chaudhry (Radio New Zealand 
International, 9/1/2007). Many of these men had given support to Bainimarama in 
the past, or, as in the case of Vayeshnoi, were heavily involved in the political 
dispute.  
Since the coup the interim regime has been accused of several human rights 
abuses, culminating in the death of Nimilote Verebasaga aged 41 and Sakiusa 
Rabaka aged 19 in February 2007 (stuff.co.nz, 6/3/2007). These were the result of 
a sort of vigilante justice that the military was performing during the ‘state of 
emergency’ in an effort to assert their authority. This situation became even more 
confusing when the Fiji Human Rights Commission openly supported the coup and 
the military’s actions (Madraiwiwi, 2007).  However to the military’s credit it did lift 
the state of emergency on midnight 31 May (Fiji Times, 1/6/2007). Nonetheless, it 
has been a troubled time since the coup, and there has at the time of writing been 
very little evidence that the stated goal of ‘cleaning up the Government’ is being 
realised (see Lal, 2007b; Madraiwiwi, 2007).  
 
Discussion 
Fiji has undergone its fourth coup. Many commentators, this author included, 
did not believe that this would happen; rather, it was anticipated that the conflict 
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would simply fade away, as had happened in the other disputes since the 2000 
coup. Upon closer examination, though, it can be seen that all of the motivating 
and opportunity factors were present, allowing a coup to occur. The purported 
justification for the coup of the incompetent, corrupt, and racist policies of the 
Government were strong motivating factors. However, it is argued here that these 
only motivated the military to be a strong vocal actor in the national debate, just as 
it had been ever since mid-2003. In all the previous disputes, the military 
complained about similar failings of the Government but did not go as far as to 
intervene. Thus, these failings of the Government are not the reason that the 
RFMF shifted from being a vocal actor to coup instigator. The actual reason for 
this is that the military’s interests were profoundly threatened in the lead-up to this 
coup. Firstly, the Government finally set a date to go to the Supreme Court for a 
ruling on the role of the RFMF. Secondly, the police TRU began to resemble a 
palace guard, antagonising the military. Finally, and most importantly, the Police, 
led by Commissioner Andrew Hughes, were on the verge of charging 
Bainimarama for his actions in late 2006 and for historical matters dating back to 
the events following the 2000 coup. This strongly motivated the military to change 
from being merely a vocal actor as it was in the first ultimatum, to being the 
instigator of a coup, as it was by the end of the second ultimatum. While several of 
Bainimarama’s key demands were met by Qarase, by that stage it was too late. 
The decision to overthrow the Government had already been reached, and there 
was no going back.  
However, none of this would have been possible if there was not the proper 
opportunity. The actions of the Government, most notably their heavy bias towards 
Indigenous Fijian interests, had by this stage disassociated much of the population 
from those in power. Alongside this, the problems that the Government was having 
with the multi-party Cabinet raised questions about their ability to govern. 
Together, this resulted in a deflation in the Government’s legitimacy, not a loss of 
legitimacy, but enough of a drop so as that enough of the population was on the 
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military’s side to make a coup publically acceptable. The cohesion of the military 
was also relatively high. The problems faced earlier in the year with 
Baledrokadroka had by this stage mostly been eliminated, and again officers who 
were not loyal to Bainimarama were dismissed and replaced by those who would 
pledge an oath of loyalty.  
As such, the two necessary elements came together. There was a strong 
motivating force from the threats to the military’s interests, and there was sufficient 
opportunity, which together resulted in a coup. The difference between this and the 
other disputes was that this was the only time that there were strong threats to 
military interests, a deflation in legitimacy and strong military cohesion present at 
the same time. Thus, the failures of Government appear to have little importance 
in motivating the military and, as was theorised by Nordlinger, only have 
importance in lowering the public’s view of the legitimacy of the Government, and 
opening up the opportunity for military intervention.  
Motive 
As could be expected, in the lead up to the coup there were plenty of motives 
at play, with evidence of both strong threats to the military’s interests and large 
government failures. Military interests were threatened on several fronts. First, 
military autonomy was threatened through the impending Supreme Court ruling on 
the role of the RFMF. While the significance of this was later overshadowed, it was 
certainly a strong motivating factor early on, especially during the first ultimatum. 
While the military stated that they would adhere to the ruling of the Supreme Court, 
its actions suggested otherwise. It was one of the core beliefs of the RFMF during 
the period between the 2000 and 2006 coups that it was its central role to uphold 
the ‘wellbeing of Fiji and its peoples’, and thus there was the necessity of a political 
role. As such, it perceived the political role as one of its core functions, the removal 
of which would severely impinge on its autonomy. Such attacks on military 
autonomy in the inter-coup period always resulted in retaliation by the military, and 
there was nothing to suggest that this would not happen again. Yet, as the 
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Supreme Court was not to sit until May the next year this was not an immediate 
threat, and thus explains why it was not such a prominent factor.  
The military viewed the Police TRU as a functional rival in this dispute. The 
RFMF was threatened by this force particularly as it acquired the role of guarding 
the Prime Minister, effectively giving it the role of a place guard. While there were 
some previous low-level disputes with the TRU, in the lead-up to the coup its 
presence became one of the primary motivating factors. This is evidenced by the 
demand in Bainimarama’s second ultimatum that this division of the Police be 
disbanded, which, it is assumed, was because the military felt threatened by its 
presence: not because they felt that the RFMF was threatened to be replaced by 
the TRU, but because it antagonised the military by standing in in-between it and 
the Government. 
The personal interests of Bainimarama were also threatened as a result of the 
pending charges against him. The significance of this factor became obvious in 
Bainimarama’s second ultimatum where he demanded the charges against him be 
dropped, and for Hughes, the primary instigator and driving force behind the 
charges, to be removed. While the Government did show some signs of conceding 
on this demand in the meeting in Wellington, this suggestion was quickly 
dismissed by the Police, who said that they were adamant in prosecuting the 
Commander. In effect, the Police backed the Commander into a corner and it was 
his only option to come out fighting. Thus, it is the contention of this research that 
the pending charges upon Bainimarama were one of the primary reasons that the 
Commander took the final step and overthrew the Government, as he was fighting 
for his freedom.  
There were also several Government failures at play in the lead-up to the 
coup, which the military used as the justification for the intervention. This primarily 
focused upon the Unity Bill, the Qoliqoli Bill, and the Indigenous Claims Tribunal 
Bill. These three Bills were all biased towards indigenous Fijian interests. This bias 
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had been the norm for the Government since 2000, however many people in Fiji, 
the military included, believed that these Bills took this to an unacceptable level. 
The ethnic divisions in Fiji are very stark, and it is one of the greatest issues 
holding the development of the country back. In an interview with Asrali Lave, the 
Chief of Staff of the Fiji Times, this was made very clear. It was his opinion that the 
entire country was polarised along ethnic lines, beginning in the schooling process, 
running right up to the political level. Thus, the political party in power, be it Fijian 
or Indian, would largely pander to the interests of its constituency, and not look to 
the further development of the State. He argued that it was this growing trend that 
the RFMF was trying to stop, and that these Bills, while in themselves would 
probably not be devastating, represented a growth in this problem (Lave, 2006). In 
this respect, the military probably did have some altruistic motives for its opposition 
to the Government.  
The military also spoke of Government incompetence and corruption. While 
corruption was often included in their outbursts against the Government, there 
were very few specific allegations. Early on in the dispute, the RFMF spoke out 
against the short-listing of Baledrokadroka for the position of Commissioner of 
Prisons, suggesting some corruption in the selection process. Shortly after issuing 
the first ultimatum, it also accused the SDL Party’s Campaign Director Jale Baba 
of connections to Peter Forster, and possible corruption in the handling of the 
election. However, before the coup, these were the only instances of direct 
accusations of corruption. After the coup, the military made further allegations of 
corruption, initially concerning vote tampering in the General Election. It later 
added claims of endemic corruption in the Public Services Commission and the 
National Provident Fund, building to accusations of corruption in almost every 
public institution (Radio New Zealand International, 8/12/2006, 15/12/2006, 
31/1/2007). It is difficult to tell if this was a motivating factor before the coup that 
grew in importance after the takeover, or if it was simply a post-coup justification 
for why the military intervened. The intensity of corruption did not increase in the 
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months preceding the coup, such corrupt practices were endemic and had been 
that way for years, and it is thus difficult to reconcile the RFMF’s shift from a vocal 
opposition to the Government to coup instigator with this factor.   
Hence, there were both threats to the military’s interests, and significant 
Government failures. However, it appears that the threats to the military’s interests 
were far more influential in generating the motive for intervention than were the 
Government’s failures. Such Governmental failures were common in the period 
discussed between the 2000 and 2006 coups. Corruption was present in almost all 
of the other disputes, and significant failures of the Government were definitely 
present in the Unity Bill dispute. Furthermore, the dispute that ended with the coup 
shows that the conflict escalated only when the Government or the Police 
threatened the military’s interests. While the first ultimatum may have been made 
out of altruistic motives from opposition to the contentious Bills, the most 
combative situation was when the Police would not release the ammunition to the 
RFMF; soon after the Government unsuccessfully attempted to have Bainimarama 
removed. In the second ultimatum, the situation became especially heated when 
the Police revealed that they were nearing the end of the investigations into 
Bainimarama, its persistence with this eventually cornered the military and resulted 
in the takeover. This is why the coup seemed to be on an ad-hoc basis, as though 
there was not much planning put into it. This is shown by the RFMF advertising for 
positions in the interim regime: if this was a normal coup, planned months or even 
years in advance, such measures would not be necessary as there would already 
be a replacement government waiting in the wings. As such, it was not until the 
last week of the second ultimatum that the motive for intervention was finally met, 
and thus made the coup imminent. 
Opportunity 
In this dispute, the opportunity was present as a result of a deflation in the 
Government’s legitimacy and the strong cohesion of the military. By the time of the 
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coup the SDL Government was facing somewhat of a legitimacy crisis in the eyes 
of much of the population, as noted by the ex vice-President Mandraiwiwi: 
When the Commander finally mounted the coup, he had a ready constituency beyond the 
command structure of his officers and foot soldiers. This consisted of the Fiji Labour Party 
and a large majority of the Indo-Fijian community, scarred by the events of May 2000, and 
by sense of alienation from the SDL Government because of some of its policies. A 
majority of the minority communities also felt likewise i.e. marginalized and deprived of 
opportunities to benefit from Government assistance. It also included the Roman Catholic 
Church hierarchy, a significant section of civil society, elements in the judiciary and the 
professional classes as well as a portion of the private sector. (Madraiwiwi, 2007)  
Thus, a significant proportion of the population was dissatisfied with the 
Government, suggesting a deflation in legitimacy sufficient to allow for the coup. 
There were two key reasons for this. First, a significant proportion of the population 
viewed the ethnically biased policies as illegal behaviour. Because of these 
policies, many people believed the Government to be racist and running the 
country improperly. However, most telling of the sentiment that these policies were 
illegal was the claim by the Fiji Law Society that they were unconstitutional 
(Siddharta Sharma, 1/11/2006). Nordlinger theorised that one of the key indicators 
that a government is believed to have committed illegal acts is when key policies 
are said to be unconstitutional, which will severely damage their legitimacy 
(Nordlinger, 1977). This disassociated much of the population from the 
Government in Fiji, and in a research trip to Suva by the author it was noticed that 
much of the population was discussing the ‘racist’ and unrepresentative nature of 
the Government, thus, suggesting a significant drop in legitimacy. 
The other major delegitimizing factor was the political crisis as a result of the 
multi-party Cabinet dispute, which caused many people to question the ability of 
the Government to rule effectively. This weakness helped open up the possibility of 
intervention, as noted by Brij Lal:  
Had Chaudhry been less tepid about the multi-party Cabinet, and participated in it, 
Commodore Bainimarama might – just might – have considered the situation differently, 
deterred by a strong display of multi-ethnic unity on the political front between the 
leaders of the two main communities in Fiji. (Lal, 2007a)  
As shown above the multi-party Cabinet was torn between the responsibility to 
govern effectively and upholding party ideologies. This was particularly tough for 
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the FLP Cabinet Ministers, as their party leader who was outside of Cabinet was 
attempting to make them uphold party ideologies above all else, putting them in 
impossible positions. This resulted in deadlock over several important policies, and 
culminated in the disparity over the Budget, where the FLP dismissed five of its 
own ministers and the other four looked likely to have the same fate at the hands 
of Qarase. All of this occurred only days before the coup took place. This would 
have certainly lowered the population’s confidence in the Government to govern 
effectively, and thus made them more accepting of a military takeover, to get the 
country functioning again.  
The cohesion of the military was also very strong in this period. They had by 
this stage recovered from the difficulties felt earlier on in the year over 
Baledrokadroka’s attempted mutiny, and dismissed all those officers involved. In 
this process they were once again able to establish a climate of enforced 
obedience to the Commander, with the fear of losing their position if they did not 
do so. This was once again demonstrated in late October with the dismissal of 
Colonel Etueni Caucau for alleged disloyalty. This cohesion was evidenced when 
Meli Saubulinayau refused the Governments request to supplant Bainimarama as 
Commander of the RFMF. Furthermore, at the time of writing, there have not been 
any rumblings of dissent among the ranks over a year after the coup. If there were 
still some difficulties in cohesion then this would have most likely have become 
evident by now.  
Thus, it is the contention of this research that this deflation in legitimacy and 
strong military cohesion opened up an opportunity, explaining why the coup was 
able to happen. However, while the Government was certainly facing some 
legitimacy problems, it is difficult to argue that these were of the nature and 
intensity that Nordlinger and other theorists were imagining as necessary 
precursors to a coup. Normally it would be expected that a significant number of 
the population was more than simply dissatisfied with the Government, but actively 
rebelling against it. This was not the case in Fiji, and it was a long way from being 
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so. Furthermore, while there was a significant number of the population dissatisfied 
with the Government, there was also a large number who actively supported it: 
mainly Fijian nationalists and the traditional Chiefly structure. Yet, the coup did 
occur and as at the time of writing it has been a success. The reason for this lies in 
the heavy background causes present in Fiji, in particular the history of coups. This 
would have lowered the moral barrier for the military and lessened any public 
resistance to a coup, as coups have become ingrained as an acceptable part of 
the political process in Fiji. Thus, those who supported the Government would not 
have necessarily felt the upsurge of injustice, as coups have become socially 
acceptable. Even more crucially though, is the cohesion of the military. Normally a 
military will face internal fracturing if a coup is attempted against a legal 
government, but in the case of Fiji Commodore Bainimarama had managed to 
manufacture cohesion, through the dismissal of those disloyal to him and the 
promotion of those who would pledge an oath of loyalty. Therefore, there was little 
chance of internal dissent, increasing the opportunity for the coup. Thus, the 
relatively minor deflation in legitimacy was sufficient, which does not bode well for 
the future of Fiji, as the requirement for the opportunity for intervention has 
become very low.  
Conclusion 
The Government had put itself in a tenuous position since the election due to 
the multi-party Cabinet crisis, which helped open the opportunity for the military to 
intervene. However, it was not until late September that the civil-military dispute 
began, when the military broke its silence after three months with almost no 
comments in the media. After this, they issued an ultimatum to the Government, to 
drop the three contentious pieces of legislation or resign. In the end though, this 
ultimatum simply faded into obscurity, most likely because the military did not have 
enough motivation to intervene. These actions led to the Police becoming 
involved, who began investigating Bainimarama for his outbursts against the 
Government, and also historical crimes. This was the key that generated the 
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motive for intervention, and sparked the second ultimatum. This time the military 
had nine demands, to be met in two weeks, or for the Government to resign. 
Qarase did make some considerable concessions, however these were not 
sufficient for Bainimarama, and he then overthrew the Government.   
The key difference between this dispute and the others was that all of the 
triggering causes were met. For the motive, there were threats to the military’s 
interests, generated through the scheduled Supreme Court ruling on the role of the 
RFMF, the presence of the Police TRU and most importantly the pending charges 
upon Bainimarama. There were also Government failures, from the headstrong 
attitude towards pushing through the three contentious pieces of legislation, and 
the continuing issue of corruption. However, these issues were not unique to this 
dispute, and thus appear to have minimal significance in generating the motive for 
intervention. The opportunity was also present; there was a dip in legitimacy, as a 
result of the Government’s growing ethnic bias, and the difficulties in governing 
because of the multi-party cabinet dispute, alongside the unnaturally strong 
cohesion of the military generated by Bainimarama’s dismissals of any soldiers 
and officers who showed signs of disloyalty. Thus, both of the triggering causes 
came together, which, coupled with the background causes, explains why the 
Government was overthrown.  
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C h a p t e r  N i n e  
CONCLUSION 
 
Upon first assessment the causes of Fiji’s fourth coup are clouded and veiled 
behind the complex events and motives surrounding the crisis. This research has 
attempted to shine some light on the causes, looking beyond the obvious reasons 
stated by the military and those that have emerged in the early literature on the 
coup. From this it has been found that Fiji suffered from poor civilian control over 
the military ever since the 2000 coup. The country was on shaky grounds, and 
these underlying tensions fuelled tense civil-military relations lasting from mid-2003 
up to the coup in December 2006. However, this on-going disagreement seemed 
to have reached a balance, where the military would actively criticise the 
Government and often successfully moderate its ethnically biased policies, but not 
go as far as intervene. Many observers had come to a similar conclusion, which is 
why the coup took most by surprise. A central question is therefore: what was it 
that made the military make the shift from a vocal opponent to the Government to 
the instigator of a coup? This research has found that the reason for this was that 
the military’s interests were threatened, motivating them to intervene, which 
coincided with a dip in the Government’s legitimacy, and strong military cohesion, 
allowing for the military to act on its grievances.  
Background Causes 
From an examination of the background causes, it has been found that Fiji 
suffered from poor civilian control of the military in the period between the 2000 
coup and the 2006 coup, resulting in a high coup risk. Several factors contributed 
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to this. Historical legacies demonstrated that the military was used as an 
oppressor of the colonial rule, and from very early on had strong connections to 
the chiefly elite, thus predisposing them towards a political role. The coups in 1987 
further reinforced and solidified this political role. The 2000 coup also had an 
impact, and while it was not a military coup it did set up much of the poor relations 
between the SDL party and the RFMF under Bainimarama. The domestic political, 
economic, and social context illustrated the slight weakness of the political 
institutions in Fiji. There had also been the economic hardship since 2000 and 
there were impending crises in the garment and sugar industries. Furthermore, the 
social divisions rampant throughout Fijian society further increased the risk of a 
coup. The international context appeared to have a minimal impact upon this 
crisis. The institutional difficulties were of a central importance to the coup risk that 
Fiji faced, as there was a great deal of contention over the proper role of the 
RFMF, and a weak system of control. The culture and professionalism of the 
military revealed that the RFMF believed itself to have the role of protecting and 
upholding the security and wellbeing of Fiji and all its peoples, thus adhering its 
allegiance to the abstract concept of the continuing state, rather than the specific 
government in power. Moreover, the RFMF is an exceptionally powerful 
organisation in comparison to the Fijian Government, which meant that a coup was 
always achievable. From all these factors put together, it can be seen that Fiji had 
a high coup risk ever since the 2000 coup. However, simply identifying that there 
was a risk is only half of the issue when determining the causes, and thus it was 
necessary to turn to an analysis of the triggering causes that set the coup in 
motion and saw action being taken over these background tensions.  
Triggering Causes 
The triggering causes in this research were based upon Nordlinger’s (1977) 
theory on the causes of coups. This consisted of analysing the motive of the 
military to intervene, and the opportunity for them to do so. The factors comprising 
the motive were threats to the military’s interests and failures of government, and 
154 
 
The Causes of Fiji’s 5 December 2006 Coup  Brett Woods 
Part IV: Conclusion 
Chapter Nine - Conclusion 
 
 
the factors comprising the opportunity were a dip in the legitimacy of the 
Government, and military cohesion.  
Motive 
To garner the appropriate motive it is not theoretically necessary that there 
are both threats to the military’s interests and government failures, just that the 
military is motivated to intervene; this could come from either factor, or a 
combination of both. The dispute that resulted in the coup had both factors, which 
makes the identification of the military’s motive easy, but it hides the greater 
question of which of the two factors was more important, or if it was necessary for 
both factors to be fulfilled. To achieve this, this research compares all five 
instances of conflict and tension to find those with the strongest motivating force.  
The military had the appropriate motive for intervention during the dispute 
over the reappointment of Bainimarama in 2004. This was shown by the RFMF 
solidifying its position through dismissing disloyal officers; furthermore, several of 
those dismissed officers later accused Bainimarama of planning a coup if he was 
not reinstated. In this instance the only motivating factors were threats to the 
military’s interests, primarily from Bainimarama’s personal interests to retain his 
position, but there were no significant failures by the SDL/CAMV Government.  
During the Unity Bill dispute the military did not have the appropriate motive for 
intervention. There were only minor and speculative threats to the military’s 
interests from potential disciplinary measures against Bainimarama, the potential 
for the Reconciliation Commission to focus on Bainimarama’s actions during the 
2000 coup, and the potential for a functional rival from an offer by Viliame Raqio to 
protect the Government. However, none of these potential threats were carried 
out, and as such there were no substantial threats to the military’s interests. 
Conversely, there were significant government failures stemming from the 
Government impeding investigations into suspects of the 2000 coup and securing 
early releases for several who were convicted, as well as the actual Unity Bill itself 
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which would further this process. This resulted in plenty of vocal opposition to the 
Government, and an indirect threat to remove the Government if they passed the 
Bill, but this was only released as a leaked draft, and thus was not meant to be a 
direct threat. If at this stage there was the appropriate motive, then it is likely that 
there would have been a coup, as there was a similar level of opportunity as there 
was in late November and early December 2006.  
In the dispute surrounding the January 2006 coup threat, it was found that 
there was the appropriate motive for intervention, witnessed by the blatant coup 
threat, and further reinforced by Baledrokadroka’s allegation that Bainimarama 
was planning a coup. In this dispute there were very strong threats to the military’s 
interests from the surcharges put upon Bainimarama and the Government’s 
interference in the CRW court-martial; this was intensified by the Government’s 
confrontational stance towards the military. However, in this dispute there were 
insignificant government failures. While the military did mention the Government’s 
racist policies, this was far from its focus.  
In the dispute surrounding the election the military did not have the motive to 
intervene. There were virtually no threats to the military’s interests, but there were 
some government failures indicated by the military in its statements. These 
focused on the accumulation of failures that the Government had committed over 
the years, focusing on the early release of those convicted of involvement in the 
coup in 2000, and the Government’s ‘racist policies’. However, it never appeared 
that the military would actually intervene at this time, and was rather simply 
motivated to try and campaign against the Government to have them removed 
legally.   
Finally, in the lead up to the coup there was the appropriate motive. Military 
interests were threatened by the scheduled judicial review of the role of the RFMF, 
the strengthening of the Police TRU that represented a functional rival, and the 
impending criminal charges against Bainimarama. There were also significant 
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Government failures largely stemming from three controversial Bills: the Unity Bill, 
the Qoliqoli Bill, and the Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill. The military also spoke of 
Government corruption; however, they were never specific on this until after the 
coup took place, suggesting that this was simply a retrospective justification for the 
intervention. 
Thus, it can be seen that in those instances where there were only threats to 
the military’s interests and no government failures, there was the appropriate 
motive; an intervention was only halted by the lack of an opportunity. Conversely, 
instances where there were only government failures but no threats to the 
military’s interests did not create the appropriate motive; thus even when there 
was the appropriate opportunity no intervention occurred.  
Thus, this research has shown that the failures of the SDL Government had 
little impact upon the RFMF’s motivation to intervene. The often numerous failures 
did motivate the RFMF to vocally oppose the Government, but not to overthrow it. 
Governmental failures on their own were not a sufficient motivating factor. This 
confirms Nordlinger’s theory, but it contravenes the stated justification of the 
military. This is not to say that there was no goal to stop the Government’s 
performance failures, however if it were not for the threats to the military’s interests 
it would have pursued this goal in the same way that it had been doing for the last 
four years, by opposing the Government politically and through the media. The 
inclusion of threats to the military’s interests motivated them to go the extra step 
and remove the Government. Thus, the crucial factors in determining the 
motivation for intervention were the threats to the military’s interests. 
Opportunity 
For the opportunity, it appears that both a deflation in the Government’s 
legitimacy and cohesion of the military were necessary. This was shown in the first 
dispute over Bainimarama’s reappointment. In this dispute the Government 
suffered from a legitimacy deflation from the multi-party Cabinet dispute; however 
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the military lacked cohesion as shown by the dismissal of several officers, who 
later accused Bainimarama of planning a coup. Thus, the key impediment to 
intervention was the lack of cohesion in the RFMF.  
In the Unity Bill dispute, there was the appropriate opportunity. There was a 
legitimacy deflation from public perception that the early release of those convicted 
of coup-related crimes was an illegal act, along with the drafting and promotion of 
the ‘Unity Bill’ itself that many people saw as contravening the constitution. 
Furthermore, military cohesion appeared to be stable with no sign of internal 
dissent. Therefore, if the military attempted an intervention it is likely that it would 
have been a success. 
In the ‘January 2006 coup threat’ dispute there was no legitimacy deflation 
because of a lack of overt illegal acts by the Government, and the impending 
elections that provided confirmation of the Government’s legitimacy and 
demonstrated its willingness to follow due process. Neither was there cohesion in 
the military as evidenced through Baledrokadroka’s attempted mutiny. Thus, while 
there was the appropriate motive, a coup did not occur. Similarly, in the dispute 
surrounding the 2006 election, there was neither a legitimacy deflation because of 
the current election, nor cohesion in the military, still suffering from the effects of 
the attempted mutiny.  
Conversely, in the dispute that ended in the 2006 coup there was both a 
deflation in legitimacy and strong military cohesion. Government legitimacy was 
low as a result of the political crisis surrounding the multi-party Cabinet, and the 
ethnically biased policies of the Government, both of which began to alienate 
significant sections of the population. Additionally, after another round of 
dismissals of disloyal officers early on in the dispute, military cohesion became 
very stable. Together these two factors opened the necessary window of 
opportunity and a coup became possible.     
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Thus, Nordlinger’s assessment that the only necessary opportunity is a 
deflation in legitimacy did not hold true for Fiji, as there was also a requirement for 
cohesion in the military. The reason for this was that the legitimacy deflations of 
the Government were never as severe as would be expected. Thus, it was 
necessary to have a highly cohesive military force, so there were no internal 
dissenters who were against overthrowing a largely legitimate Government. 
Theoretically, it is possible that if the Government did suffer a very severe loss of 
legitimacy then it would be not be necessary to have a particularly cohesive 
military, as it would be easy to convince all of the officers to go along with a coup. 
However, such a loss of legitimacy never occurred, and thus it was necessary for 
there to be both a legitimacy deflation and a cohesive military force.  
The key difference between the 2006 coup and the other four disputes is that 
there were threats to the military’s interests constituting the motivation, and there 
was both a deflation in the Government’s legitimacy and strong military cohesion, 
providing the necessary opportunity. In the previous disputes there was often the 
motive but not the opportunity, or the opportunity but not the motive, and in some 
instances neither were present. It took both of these forces to come together at the 
same time to instigate a coup.   
Implications 
This research has shown that the stated justification for the coup to ‘clean up 
the Government’ was merely a façade, covering the more important motivation of 
protecting military interests. Furthermore, this research has also shown that the 
requirement for the opportunity for a military intervention in Fiji has become very 
low. The implications for this are very important for Fiji and for the international 
community in their relationship with post-coup Fiji. For Fiji, Bainimarama’s goals of 
‘cleaning up the Government’ must be questioned, as it has been shown here that 
this was not the reason that he overthrew the Government. Even so, these goals 
are central to the ongoing legitimacy of his regime and are thus likely to be at the 
forefront of his aspirations. However, these goals were not part of a rational 
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decision when overthrowing the Government. Thus, it is unlikely that Bainimarama 
and the RFMF considered the difficulty of these goals, the likelihood of being able 
to achieve them, or had planned how to do so before instigating the coup. As such, 
the ability of the RFMF to make the massive reforms that they have proposed to 
the electoral system and in abolishing corruption has to be questionable. 
Furthermore, the low requirements for the opportunity for intervention in Fiji is 
concerning. There is no easy or quick solution to this problem, but if measures are 
not put in place to raise the moral barrier then Fiji will most likely follow the same 
path of recurrent coups.  
While it has been argued in this research that the surrounding conflicts in the 
Pacific had little influence on Fiji, it has been shown in previous instances of 
political instability in Fiji, particularly during the 1987 and 2000 coups, that conflict 
in Fiji affects the rest of the pacific. Fiji holds an essential role in the Pacific, as the 
centre of much of the economic activity, and Pacific wide organisations and often 
the first point of call for international aid to the Pacific. As such this coup will have 
wide reaching implications for the whole of the Pacific region particularly if it falls 
into conflict. So ensuring the stability of Fiji in this time of crisis is important for the 
prosperity of the whole region.  
The international community should also be weary of Bainimarama. As has 
been shown through this coup, threats to his personal interests result in military 
action. This assumption has been reinforced after the coup as well, as evidenced 
by the removal of the New Zealand High Commissioner Michael Green for what 
was reported as ‘interference in domestic affairs’ (Fiji Times, 15/6/2007). As such, 
antagonising the Commander is not the best course of action; rather, working with 
him to achieve his ambitious goals as quickly as possible and then bringing about 
new democratic elections would be a wiser course of action.  
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Suggestions for Further Research 
As this study was conducted not long after coup there is a need for further 
research. Growing discussions and debates over the causes of the coup are 
required; what is presented here is one perspective, which is likely to be 
challenged by others as more information comes to light. Through these debates 
any details which may have been missed in this study will be revealed, and thus a 
much greater picture of the causes will be determined. Additionally, further 
research should be conducted into the events following the coup, as these may 
prove to be of great importance in determining the impact of this coup on Fiji.  
This research also showed that Nordlinger’s theory on the causes of coups is 
still relevant in the modern context in helping to understanding why coups occur. 
The general proposition that the primary driver of a coup is to protect the military’s 
interests held true in this context and is a lesson that should be remembered when 
studying all coups. All too often this is forgotten in the mass of theories on coups 
that are common today, particularly when studying recent coups. This research 
has shown that such an approach is still important and is therefore worthy of 
greater attention.    
 
Final Comments 
This research set out to try to establish the causes behind Fiji’s 2006 coup, by 
taking a political science perspective in an effort to establish the more pertinent 
reasons for the overthrow. To do this, two theories were used. The first theory, 
developed by Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002) looked at the civilian control of 
the military in Fiji, from which it was determined that in the period between the 
2000 and 2006 coups Fiji had poor civilian control over the military, resulting in a 
high risk of a coup. The second theory was an adaptation of Nordlinger’s (1977) 
classic study on the causes of coups in developing states, which looked at the 
triggering causes focusing on the motive and opportunity for intervention. The 
motive examined both threats to the military’s interests and Government failures; 
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however, it was found that only military interests had an impact on the motive for 
the military to intervene. While the military often spoke out against Government 
failures, these only motivated them to be a vocal actor in the political scene, but 
did not motivate them towards a coup. The opportunity looked for a deflation in 
Government legitimacy, as well as military cohesion. It was found that both of 
these factors were necessary to open the window of opportunity. While there were 
several disputes between the Government and the military in Fiji before the coup, 
the coup was the only time that there were threats to the military’s interests, 
coupled with the opportunity from a legitimacy deflation and strong military 
cohesion, which together, along with the strong background influences, were the 
causes behind Fiji’s fourth coup.  
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A p p e n d i x  O n e  
LIST OF IMPORTANT PEOPLE 
 
Baba, Jale  - Campaign Director for SDL in 2006 
Election 
Baba, Tupeni  - Founding member of FLP. MP in 1987 
deposed in 1987 Coup. 1999 Foreign 
Minister, and one of two deputy Prime 
Ministers, deposed in 2000 coup.  
Bainimarama, Vorque  - Commander of RFMF 1999 – 2006. Leader 
of2006 coup, Prime Minister of post 2006 coup interim regime
Baledrokadroka, Jone  - Land Force Commander of RFMF 11 
January – 13 January.  
Bale, Qoriniasi  - Attorney General 2001 – 2006.  
Bavadra, Timoci  - Formed FLP and Leader of FLP 1985 – 
1989, Prime Minister April 1987 – May 
1987. Died 1989 
Bune, Poseci  - Member of the FLP. Served as Deputy 
leader of the FLP from June to December 
2006. He was one of nine FLP members in 
the multi-party Cabinet in 2006 as Minister 
for the Environment, and was at the centre 
of a rift in the FLP against the Leader 
Chaudhry.  
Chaudhry, Mahendra  - Helped form FLP in 1985. Minister of 
Finance and National Planning April 1987 
– May 1987. Leader of FLP 1991 – 
present. Prime Minister 1999 – 2000. 
Minister of Finance, Sugar Reform, Public 
Enterprise and National Planning in post 
2006 coup interim regime.  
Cokanasiga, Joketani  - Minister of Home Affairs 2001 – December 
2004. 
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Ganilau, Penaia   - 3rd Governor General 1983 – 1987, 1st 
President 1987– 1993.  
Datt, Krishna  - Member of the FLP, and party Vice 
President. He was one of nine FLP 
members in the multi-party Cabinet as 
Minister for Labour and Employment 
Opportunities, and was part of the 
breakaway group in the party, which 
caused a political conflict in the lead up to 
the coup 
Ganilau, Epeli   -Son of Penaia. RFMF Commander 1991 – 
1999. Elected as a member of GCC in 
1999, chairman of GCC 2001 – 2004.   
Founded the National Alliance Party in 
2005, and has been their leader since.  
Hughes, Andrew - An Australian who held the office of Fiji’s 
Police Commissioner from 2003 till 2006 
coup. 
Korovavala, Lesi  - CEO of the Ministry of Home Affairs 2001-
2006 
Kotobalavu, Joji  - CEO of the Prime Minister’s Office, 
deposed in 2006 coup. 
Lalabalavu, Naiqama  - Minister for Lands and Minister for Mineral 
Resources 2001 – April 2005. Minister for 
Transport and Civil Aviation September 
2005 – May 2006. Minister of Fijian Affairs 
and Minister for Lands and Provincial 
Development May 2006 – December 2006. 
High Chief Tui Cakau 1999 – present. 
Lewneni, Neumi  - RFMF Spokesperson 
Ligairi, Ilisoni  - Leader of the CRW upon Formation 
Lyon, David  - US Ambassador to Fiji January 2003 – July 
2005. 
Madraiwiwi, Joni  - Vice President 2004 – 2006  
Mara, Kamisese  - First Prime Minister of Fiji 1970 – 1987 
coup, and then again from 1987 – 1992. 
Vice President 1992 – 1993, President 
1993 – 2000. Died 2004. 
Nailatikau, Epeli  - RFMF Commander 1982 – 1987 coup. 
Deputy Prime Minister in the interim regime 
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after the 2000 coup. Speaker of the House 
2001-2006. Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
External Trade in the interim regime after 
2006 coup. 
Qarase, Laisenia   - Prime Minister of Fiji 2001 – 2006 under 
SDL Party.  
Rabuka, Sitivini  - Leader of Fiji’s first and second coups in 
1987. Prime Minister under the SVT party 
from 1992 – 1999. Chairman of the GCC 
1999 – 2001. 
Seniloli, Jope  - Vice- President 2000 – 2004, supporter of 
Speight 
Speight, George  - Leader of the 2000 coup 
Taoka, Aisea  - Commissioner of Prisons 1996-present, 
responsible for the early release of many of 
the high profile coup convicts.  
Tarakinikini, Filipo  - Military Spokesperson during 2000 Coup, 
subsequently began working for the UN in 
the Department of Peace Keeping 
Operations 2001 – present. 
Tora, Apisai  - Member of Alliance party 1970 – 1987. 
Leader of Taukei Movement 1987. Member 
of interim regime post 1987 coups – 1991. 
1992 Formed the ANC party. 1998 formed 
PANU party, left party in 2000. After 2001 
election was appointed to the Senate.   
Uluivuda, Josefa Iloilovatu  - President 2000 – December 2006 and 
January (Iloilo)   2007 – present 
Vayeshnoi, Lekh Ram  - FLP member first elected into parliament in 
1992. He was one of the nine FLP 
members brought into the SDL multi-party 
Cabinet in 2006 as Minister for Energy and 
Mineral Resources, and was often 
outspoken against Qarase.  
Vosanibola, Josefa  - Minister of Home Affairs December 2004 – 
December 2006. 
Waqanisau, Jeremaia  - Appointed as CEO of Ministry of Home 
Affairs in January 2004, but was removed 
in April 2004, as a result of the dispute over 
Bainimarama’s reappointment, to serve as 
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Fiji’s ambassador to China, where he 
currently continues to serve.  
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A p p e n d i x  T w o  
RFMF SECOND ULTIMATUM DEMANDS 21/11/2006 
 
• A public declaration by the Government that the event of 2000 were illegal; 
and that the Ministry of Reconciliation educate the society that the events of 
2000 were illegal. Those implicated in the coup should be removed from 
their positions in the government. 
 
• Withdrawal of the three contentious Bills: Promotion of Reconciliation 
Tolerance and Unity Bill, Qoliqoli Bill and the Land Tribunal Bill 
 
• Investigations against Commodore Bainimarama and the RFMF should be 
dropped 
 
• The Police Tactical Response Division formed recently should be 
disbanded 
 
• Terminate the contract of the Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes. 
 
• No foreign Police or military intervention should be entertained 
• Removal of the commercial arm of the Native Land Trust Board and focus 
on the core function of taking care of the land lease. 
• The Ministry of Home Affairs must respond to RFMF concerns about force 
structure, allowances and promotions 
 
• Government must address good governance 
 
Note: the specific wording of these demands may have differed from that used by 
the RFMF, as a result of the patchy and often inconclusive reports on these 
demands. 
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A p p e n d i x  T h r e e  
WELLINGTON MEETING OUTCOMES 
 
Meeting between Prime Minister Qarase and Commodore Bainimarama 
Government House: Wellington 
29 November 2006 
Points of agreement and next steps 
Overview: 
The meeting between Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase and Commodore 
Frank Bainimarama at Government House in Wellington has seen lengthy, 
serious and meaningful discussions on the issues raised by the Royal Fiji Military 
Force. Substantial progress was made in resolving areas of difference. 
The areas discussed, and the outcomes reached were: 
Issue: Public declaration by the Government that the event of 2000 
were illegal; and all those associated with them must be removed from 
office.  
Outcome:  
The Fiji Government reaffirms that the events of 2000 were illegal. 
The Government has undertaken to develop, without delay, a renewed and 
fully-resourced public education program to take to the public and villages of Fiji 
an information program aimed at ensuring wide public awareness and 
understanding that the events of 2000 were illegal.  
The Government is prepared to proceed, consistent with Fiji constitutional 
and legal process, to continue to bring to account those people found by due 
process to be illegally associated with the events of 2000.  
The RFMF has been invited to provide to the Government the names of 
people whom it believes should face legal process. 
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Note: the Government of New Zealand has indicated its willingness to assist 
in providing resources of the public education program. 
Issue: Withdrawal of the three contentious Bills: Promotion of 
Reconciliation Tolerance and Unity Bill, Qoliqoli Bill and the Land Tribunal 
Bill 
Outcome:  
Action on the Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill has been 
suspended. The Government and RFMF agreed that an independent review of 
the constitutionality and legality of the Qoliqoli Bill and Land Tribunal Bill should, 
with resource-assistance from New Zealand, be accelerated and brought to a 
rapid conclusion.  
New Zealand has undertaken to provide proposals to the Government of Fiji 
by December 1 on how the review process is to be accelerated through attaching 
additional legal and analytical resources to the review. The meeting agreed that 
the review of the Bills will be completed by January 1 with a progress report to be 
provided by mid-December. 
If the review finds that the Bills are legally or constitutionally unsound then 
action on them will be automatically suspended.  
If the review finds otherwise, then the Government will enter into renewed 
consultations with the RFMF and other interested parties on the areas 
concerned. 
The meeting noted international precedents around issues such as 
indigenous land ownership and reform typically require lengthy processes of 
consultation and inclusive processes in order to ensure broad-based consensus 
and participation. Such an approach would be equally appropriate for Fiji. 
Issue: Investigations against Commodore Bainimarama and the RFMF 
Outcome:  
The Government of Fiji, should it receive advice from the appropriate Fiji 
Government authorities the Solicitor-General, the Director of Public Prosecutions 
and Police Commissioner that the investigations in dispute should be suspended, 
would be prepared to follow that advice and to confirm publicly that it has done 
so. 
Issue: Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes' contract to be 
terminated. 
Outcome:  
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The situation is that Mr Hughes is nearing the end of his term and has been 
granted leave. 
Issue: No foreign military/police intervention 
Outcome:  
The Government of Fiji and the RFMF agree that there should be no foreign 
military or police intervention in the domestic affairs of Fiji. 
Issue: Review of the role of the Police Tactical Response Division. 
Outcome:  
The Government of Fiji and RFMF agree on the need for a capable and 
professional police force that retains public confidence.  
In that context, the Government agrees to undertake a review of the role of 
the PTRD. 
Issue: Review the commercial arm and role of the Native Land Trust 
Board. 
Outcome:  
It was acknowledged the NL TB is a statutory organisation and the 
Government of Fiji cannot interfere in its operations. However, it was agreed that 
the NTLB would be asked to review its commercial arm and, in this context, New 
Zealand offered to provide resources and/or international expertise to assist such 
a review. 
Issue: Ministry of Home Affairs must respond to RFMF concerns about 
force structure, allowances and promotions 
Outcome:  
The Government of Fiji agrees to renewed engagement with the RFMF to 
address its concerns. 
Issue: Government must address good governance. 
Outcome:  
The Government of Fiji agrees to work with the RFMF, and other Fiji groups, 
to develop higher standards of governance within Fiji. 
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